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Abstract
Used by states to investigate patterns of past human rights abuses, truth commissions have
garnered considerable consensus for their value in addressing past harms and repression. Many
still tout the South African model as a success story of truth commissions. This dissertation
provides answers to two questions. First, what role, if any, did earlier investigative institutions
play in shaping South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)? The dissertation
argues that the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation,
also known as the Goldstone Commission, played a central role in transforming informationgathering measures in South Africa. Second, what were the contributing institutional
developments of the Goldstone Commission, and how do we characterize these contributions?
The dissertation argues that the Goldstone Commission’s founding conditions, its institutional
design, and its impartial investigations, created the conditions for the process of gradual
institutional change in the Goldstone Commission as a commission of inquiry. The
Commission’s credibility helped to strengthen information gathering during the negotiating
period in South Africa and facilitated further change in information-gathering capacities,
including the incorporation of witness protection. The dissertation also traces gradual
institutional change in the use of amnesty to situate its eventual implementation as an
information-gathering mechanism by the TRC. The South African TRC benefited from the
operation of the Goldstone Commission in terms of investigative credibility and institutional
experience. This dissertation makes the case that to better understand truth commission design
and operation it is necessary to take institutional histories into account.

Keywords
Commissions of inquiry, Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation, Goldstone Commission, gradual institutional change, South Africa, transitional
justice, truth commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
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Summary for a Lay Audience
This dissertation offers an answer to the question: What role, if any, did earlier investigative
institutions play in shaping South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)? I
argue that the South African TRC was shaped, in part, by an investigative institution, the
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (also known
as the Goldstone Commission), that preceded it. I demonstrate the impact of the Goldstone
Commission, examining its contributing institutional developments, and how we characterize
these contributions.
Three components of information gathering are studied in detail to explore how the
Goldstone Commission helped to undo legacies of repression and, through its operation, laid
a strong foundation for the operation of the TRC. These three institutions are the commission
of inquiry, witness protection, and amnesty. Each of these institutions had a history of unjust
use under the Apartheid regime.
The dissertation argues that the Goldstone Commission’s founding conditions, its
institutional design, and its impartial investigations, created the conditions for the process of
gradual institutional change, in the Goldstone Commission as a commission of inquiry. The
Commission’s credibility helped to strengthen information gathering during the negotiating
period in South Africa and facilitated further change in information-gathering capacities,
including the incorporation of witness protection. The dissertation also traces gradual
institutional change in the use of amnesty to situate its eventual implementation as an
information-gathering mechanism by the TRC.
This dissertation makes the case that to understand truth commission design and operation, it
is necessary to take institutional histories into account. Although truth commissions are
established to address past harms and injustice, they may rely on institutions that were
implicated in past abuse. Using the case of South Africa, this project offers insight into how
existing institutions can be adjusted or re-tooled in order to serve ends of truth-seeking. This
is significant not only for countries establishing truth commissions after periods of conflict
and authoritarian repression but also for countries engaging with questions of justice and
redress in established democracies.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

This project explores how truth-seeking is institutionalized in the aftermath of repression,
conflict, and abuse. The institutionalization of truth-seeking is particularly relevant in
circumstances in which governments purposefully keep information hidden from the public
or fail to acknowledge injustice by keeping information in the shadows. Offering an
engagement with, and contribution to, the discussion on information gathering during
transitions, this dissertation interrogates the effects of state-led commissions of inquiry on
later truth-seeking processes in South Africa.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in
1995. Implemented after the country’s first democratic election in 1994, the TRC was
devised as the vehicle through which South Africa and South Africans would address and
redress the country’s violent past. Violence and repression were pervasive in Apartheid
South Africa. In response to the regime’s oppression, institutionalized racism, and
restrictive discriminatory policies, opposition groups engaged in resistance against the
regime. Throughout the 1980s, the Apartheid regime conducted counter-revolutionary
warfare against the African National Congress (ANC) and other groups acting in
opposition to Apartheid. But by the 1990s the country was in a “stalemate” with the ANC
recognizing it was unable to win its struggle against the state and the regime conceding it
1

too costly to continue using force.

1

On the situation as a stalemate see Timothy D. Sisk, "The Violence-Negotiation Nexus: South Africa in
Transition and the Politics of Uncertainty," Negotiation Journal 9, no. 1 (1993): 78-79. See also, Steven
Friedman, ed., The Long Journey: South Africa’s Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Raven
Press, 1993), 10-13.

2

In February 1990, President F.W. de Klerk initiated a number of reforms in a
landmark speech. This address formally laid the foundation for negotiations towards an
2

inclusive democracy. Reforms outlined in this speech included provisions to release
Nelson Mandela from prison, unbanning opposition groups including the ANC, and a
3

promise to repeal Apartheid legislation. Constitutional negotiations would not begin for
almost two years, when in December 1991, the Government and the ANC, among others,
agreed to a negotiating process, known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa
4

(CODESA). This was just the beginning of a long process of negotiation, which
culminated with the 1993 Multi-Party Negotiation Process. Through this process, the
parties established an agreement to transitional administration and an Interim Constitution
5

in 1993. The intervening years saw substantial numbers of fatalities from political
violence. Between February 1990 and April 1994, approximately 15,000 people died as a
result of political violence.6
In late 1991, the negotiating parties in South Africa agreed to the establishment of
a commission of inquiry to investigate ongoing violence as a component of the National

2

Some negotiations had begun to some degree before the 1990 speech. For an overview on this history see
Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country (Sandton: Struik Book Distributors, 1994).
3

"F.W. de Klerk’s Speech at the Opening of Parliament 2 February 1990," O’Malley Archives: The Heart
of Hope, accessed April 13, 2020,
https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02104/06lv02105.h
tm.
4

Friedman, The Long Journey, 14-15.

5

John Hatchard and Peter Slinn, "The Path Towards a New Order in South Africa," International Relations
12, no. 4 (1995): 8-9.
6

Adrian Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa’s Transition," Politikon 27, no.
2 (2000): 241.
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Peace Accord. For three years, until the democratic election in 1994, the Commission of
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation conducted over forty
investigations into ongoing violence and made recommendations on measures to avert
8

future violence. This Commission, also known as the Goldstone Commission, played an
9

important role in the transition. It uncovered information about the causes of violence and
made recommendations to prevent ongoing violence.
In 1995, in the year after the first democratic election, the Government of national
unity in South Africa passed legislation for the now famous TRC.

10

The South African

TRC, established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, was
11

mandated to investigation gross violations of human rights between 1960 and 1994.

It

was a comprehensive exercise in truth-seeking in order to establish a record about past
violations, “conceived as part of the bridge-building process designed to help lead the
nation away from a deeply divided past to a future founded on the recognition of human
12

rights and democracy.”

The South African TRC’s innovations in public hearings for

7

"South Africa, National Peace Accord, 1991," here after National Peace Accord, 1991. A copy of the
accord can be accessed at United Nations Peace Maker, last accessed February 3, 2020,
https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-national-peace-accord91. See also, Timothy D. Sisk, "South Africa’s
National Peace Accord," Peace & Change 19, no. 1 (January 1994): 50-70.
8

Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 2000), 25-58. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume
One, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (29 October 1998), Chapter 13, 508.
9

The names of the Commission, “Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation” and “Goldstone Commission” are used interchangeably in this analysis so that the
significance of its establishment as a commission of inquiry and the role of the Commission’s leadership
remain equally present for the reader.
10

Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Act 9534 (1995).
11

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 2, 25, 29.

12

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 4, 48.
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testimony and its unique amnesty process captured attention at home and abroad. It helped
bring to light information about the past regime’s deeds and formally acknowledged
information that was already known. This dissertation interrogates the relationship between
the Goldstone Commission and the TRC.

1.1

Research Questions and Argument Overview

This dissertation answers two questions. First, what role, if any, did earlier investigative
institutions play in shaping South Africa’s TRC? The dissertation argues that the
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation played a
central role in transforming truth-seeking measures in South Africa, particularly in relation
to the investigative institutions that preceded it. The Goldstone Commission’s design and
investigation credibility facilitated information gathering that distinguished it from earlier
commissions of inquiry. In addition, this dissertation demonstrates that institutional
elements that supported the Goldstone Commission’s information-gathering capabilities
were later taken up by the TRC.
The second question asks: what were the Goldstone Commission’s contributing
institutional developments, and how do we characterize these contributions? I argue that
the Goldstone Commission contributed to the institutionalization of truth-seeking by
undertaking gradual institutional change, and in so doing, it laid a positive foundation for
the TRC. Characterized as a site for the processes of institutional conversion, as outlined
by Mahoney and Thelen, the institutional developments of the Goldstone Commission
provide an example in which institutions that have been entrenched by a repressive regime

5
13

were adjusted to serve different aims, in this case truth-seeking. These specific modalities
were chosen because they are directly related to the project of information gathering. They
facilitate the uncovering of information through testimony and investigation.
First, the Goldstone Commission addressed a credibility crisis within the institution
of the commission of inquiry. As a product of the transition, the Goldstone Commission
was more effectively designed than its predecessors, and both the Government and the
leadership of the Commission capitalized on the potential to make changes to the
commission’s process. The opening of the political transition saw the establishment of new
rules by the regime soft-liners. The Goldstone Commission is an example of institutional
redeployment under these conditions. Instilled in the language guiding the Commission
was an element of consensus and a separate legitimation given its establishment as part of
the 1991 National Peace Accord. Its implementation as part of the peace agreement and the
political environment shaped the Commission’s potential to alter the status-quo. The
Government granted many of the requests made by the Goldstone Commission with
regards to adjustments in the structure of investigations, increased resources to conduct
14

investigations, protection for witnesses, and the publication of the reports.

Second, the Goldstone Commission responded to institutional limitations and
identified institutional measures that were valuable for information gathering and which
were eventually used by the TRC. The Goldstone Commission developed witness

13

James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-37.
14

For example, on the immediate publication of reports see, Richard J. Goldstone, "Quality Control in
International Fact-Finding Outside Criminal Justice for Core International Crimes," in Quality Control in
Fact-Finding, ed. Morten Bergsmo (Florence: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2013), 42-43. See also,
Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor, 28-30.

6

protection measures during its operation, recognizing the limitations in relying on the
inadequate existing state witness protection measures. As is demonstrated in Chapters 7
and 8, these changes were possible because of the design of the Commission itself. A
process of conversion is evident in the commission of inquiry and its adaptation of witness
protection. After it was deployed within the Goldstone Commission and its value
demonstrated, the use of witness protection continued within the TRC. Although South
Africa’s was the first truth commission to include witness protection measures, taking its
antecedents into account contextualizes this development in South Africa’s institutional
history.
Third, the final component, the truth commission’s ability to grant amnesty, is
widely cited as a successful innovation of the South African TRC, and has garnered
significant attention. However, assessing the amnesty process in light of previous
indemnity processes and through the negotiating period demonstrates the manner in which
amnesty was differently justified and deployed during Apartheid, in the transitional period,
and in efforts at redress. The Goldstone Commission’s consideration of amnesty-inexchange-for-information helped to illustrate the potential value in changing the
justification of amnesty. The experience of the institution of amnesty during the tenure of
the Goldstone Commission highlights the significance of the environment for changing
institutional deployment. Critically, the deliberations about amnesty by the Goldstone
Commission also suggested the necessity of further truth-seeking.
Tracing earlier investigations in addition to the TRC facilitates an in-depth
investigation into information-gathering practices. Information gathering and/or factfinding are considered key justifications for the implementation of a truth commission. It

7

is therefore important to clarify how the truth-seeking practices were institutionalized and
adjusted over time. The dissertation is making the case that institutional histories may offer
important insights into information-gathering processes in transition. The Goldstone
Commission played an important role in the transitional period and taking into account this
influence deepens an understanding about the development of truth-seeking and
information-gathering practices in South Africa.
Like Sitze, who argues that the TRC can only be understood by taking into account
colonial applications of indemnity and the colonial use of the commission of inquiry,15 this
dissertation takes as a starting point that the truth commission in South Africa ought to be
examined in relation to institutional elements and frameworks that came before. Sitze
16

positions these elements genealogically to reframe the TRC not as “novel”,

but as

“reiterating the forms of colonial sovereignty and governmentality whose excesses the
17

TRC also exposed and criticized.” He persuasively unpacks the inherent tensions in using
an apparatus that entrenched or maintained colonial powers through indemnity practices
and commissions of inquiry.18 This is a valuable interpretation of the structure of the TRC.
Sitze’s skepticism of the transitional justice project provokes questions about the
underlying assumptions associated with truth commission processes as a potentially
unquestioned postcolonial endeavour.19

15

Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 3-11. I owe a great deal of gratitude to
the person who recommended Sitze’s work upon hearing about my research.
16

Ibid., 3.

17

Ibid., 251.

18

Ibid., 83, 84, 98-127, 188-214.

19

Ibid., 255.

8

Whereas Sitze’s focus is on interrogating and then repudiating the perceived
innovation of the TRC itself, this project shifts the focus to explaining potential change
within the institutions, building on the recognition of the institutional continuity. Sitze’s
observations about the truth commissions genealogy can be used to approach the analysis
of the institutionalization of truth-seeking, stretching back beyond the “transition”
demarcated by the 1994 election. Here, though the line of argumentation breaks with the
critical genealogy thrust of Sitze’s work, it keeps in mind the historical linkages and
similarities in the process. Rather, it takes as foundational that truth-seeking relies on some
facilitating institutional framework, like an investigatory commission. Further, the
mechanisms that are developed in this regard may be shaped, in terms of transitional forces
and institutional characteristics, by their predecessors. Yet Sitze’s work pays little attention
to the role of the Goldstone Commission. The dissertation assesses how the Commission
of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation countered the trends of
state-mandated investigations prior to the democratic election in South Africa. It frames
this difference as a process of gradual institutional change.
It is helpful to look outside of the boundaries of the transitional justice field to delve
into the questions under consideration here. While repressive policies and institutions
posed a problem for the investigation of violence in South Africa’s transitional period, the
eventual implementation of the TRC, and its institutional innovations, can be better
understood by taking into account institutional changes during the transitional period. This
recognition is not intended to suggest that the repressive policies of Apartheid were reapplied in the transition. Nor does it intend to prove the contrary. Rather, incremental
adjustments to the familiar institutional frameworks during the negotiating period, suggests

9

that the truth-seeking measures that were eventually applied in democratic South Africa
are rooted in the somewhat unexpected transformation of a familiar institution.

1.2

Theoretical Framework

This project uses an institutional approach to investigate how truth-seeking was
institutionalized in South Africa. The theoretical framework used for this project is
historical institutionalism, and particularly, theories of institutional continuity and change.
Path dependence is a valuable explanatory concept in this investigation because of the
emphasis on the importance of history and sequence in later institutional development.

20

Exploring the strength of the TRC as a result of institutional precursors requires observers
to lengthen the time frame of analysis. In addition, path dependence helps make sense of
the government’s use of commissions of inquiry. This type of investigatory practice was
well-institutionalized under the Apartheid regime. However, the institutional persistence
associated with path dependence does not explain why the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was implemented in a manner so markedly
different from its predecessors.
Where earlier investigations into violence did little to rectify injustice, and in some
ways perpetuated it, the Goldstone Commission remediated issues related to investigation
credibility. This had positive longer-term impacts on the TRC. The Goldstone
Commission’s ability to facilitate these effects resulted from the circumstances of its
implementation and operation, in particular the negotiating period that guided the country

20

Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political
Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 251-267; Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social
Analysis (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

10

to democracy. Both the context of its emergence, and its incorporation into a negotiated
peace agreement lent the Goldstone Commission different credibility to other
investigations into violence that preceded it.
This dissertation uses Thelen, and Mahoney and Thelen’s theories of gradual
institutional change to unpack the process over time. The Commission’s establishment, and
the implementation of new institutional modalities, can be explained as processes of
conversion, which is understood as the deployment of the same institutional structures
21

towards different ends or goals. In this case, institutions used for maintaining a repressive
regime were redeployed as information-gathering institutions.
The theories of gradual institutional change and path dependence also shed light on
the return to the inquiry method with the establishment of the South African TRC. Not only
did the TRC share certain institutional similarities with the Goldstone Commission, but the
Goldstone Commission in some ways helped prepared the groundwork for its
establishment. Thus, the persistence of this largely familiar institution was aided by the
operations and gradual adjustments made by the Goldstone Commission operating
beforehand. This dissertation argues that knowledge about the TRC can be better
understood when articulated as a process of institutional continuity and change based on
the operating experience of the Goldstone Commission, even though the Commission of
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was not established as
purposeful precursor to the TRC.
21

Kathleen Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve: Insights From Comparative Historical Analysis," ed. James
Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208-240; James
Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining Institutional
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 1-37; Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills
in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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1.3

Concepts

This project uses Mahoney and Thelen’s conceptualization of institutions as “relatively
enduring features of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures) that structure
behavior and that cannot be changed easily or instantaneously.”

22

Institutions decrease

uncertainties by creating and structuring expectations about process and behaviour.

23

The

information-gathering and truth-seeking institutions under consideration in this project are
the commission of inquiry, witness protection, amnesty, and truth commission. As
institutions, commissions of inquiry, witness protection, and truth commissions structure
procedures for investigation and processes of information gathering. Each also has
associated rules for participation. The institution of amnesty specifies how amnesty can be
applied, who decides on its application, and the eligibility criteria for amnesty. The focus
of this project is how these institutions, and their comprising rules and process, endured
and changed during the time-period under consideration.
For the purposes of this project, it is important to draw a distinction between truthtelling and truth-seeking measures. Although the terms are sometimes used
interchangeably, truth-telling places the emphasis more specifically on victims’
testimony.

24

While such measures are an integral part of many truth-seeking endeavours,

the term directs attention away from the other investigative capacities of these tools. In this
dissertation, truth-seeking refers to the often symbolic formal polices and processes

22

Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 4, emphasis in original.

23

Robert E. Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert E.
Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22.
24

See, for example, Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, "Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice
from the Bottom Up," Journal of Law and Society 35, no. 2 (2008): 271.

12

through which states pursue and make available information about human rights violations
and repression. Information gathering refers to formal institutions and processes through
which states pursue and make available information about violence and human rights
violations. Both truth-seeking and information gathering efforts commonly take the form
of commissions of inquiry, special investigations, and truth commissions. This project uses
Freeman’s definition of a truth commission, defining a truth commission as:
an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of inquiry set up in and
authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on
the principal causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of
severe violence or repression that occurred in the state during determinate periods
of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress and
25
future prevention.
The distinction between these institutional mechanisms is taken up further in Chapter 3.
The project focuses on domestic, state-mandated truth-seeking processes:
commissions of inquiry and truth commissions. These are distinct from what Bickford
identifies as “unofficial truth projects”, which are carried out by non-state actors.

26

Bickford argues that these projects may be in lieu of, in preparation for, or in addition to
27

“official” truth seeking-investigations.

Their value can be linked to the type of process

that emerges. When these projects operate instead of truth commissions, they may be the
only source of information gathering under repressive governing structures or the chaos of
civil war. Acting as a preparatory tool for a truth commission, they can retain and maintain
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Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 18.
26

Louis Bickford, “Unofficial Truth Projects,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 994-1035. See
also: Padraig McAuliffe, "Surrogacy and Resistance: Evolving Patterns in Unofficial Truth Commissions
and Truth Projects," in The Global Impact and Legacy of Truth Commissions, ed. Jeremy Sarkin
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 269-292.
27

Louis Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 1004-1005.
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evidence and records in line with a vision toward a future truth commission. A key feature
in all of these ‘unofficial truth projects’ is that they do not rely on the support of the state.
In fact, the behaviour of the state might compel non-governmental organizations to initiate
and undertake these processes.

28

Commissions of inquiry and other domestic investigations are also different from
investigations convened or carried out by international actors that precede truth
commissions, generally the United Nations.

29

The United Nations-sponsored

investigations, “international commissions of inquiry” or “international fact-finding
missions,” are defined as:
Temporary bodies of a non-judicial nature, established either by an
intergovernmental body or by the Secretary-General or the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, and tasked with investigating allegations of violations of international
human rights, international humanitarian law or international criminal law and
making recommendations for corrective action based on their factual and legal
30
findings.
International commissions of inquiry share a name with domestic investigations but require
little, if any, institutional support from the government of the state being investigated. A
lack of support from governments does not preclude investigations from continuing but
31

does raise challenges of access.

Since these investigations do not use institutions of the
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Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 1004-1005; McAuliffe, "Surrogacy and Resistance: Evolving
Patterns in Unofficial Truth Commissions and Truth Projects," 282-286.
29

Eric G. Berman, "The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda): Lessons and Observations From
the Field," American Behavioural Scientist 45, no. 4 (2001): 623; Rob Grace, "From Design to
Implementation: The Interpretation of Fact-finding Mandates," Journal of Conflict & Security Law 20, no.
1 (2014): 27-60.
30

Office of the High Commissioner United Nations Human Rights, Commissions of Inquiry and FactFinding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice, United
Nations (New York and Geneva, 2015), 7,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf.
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state, the locus of path dependence and gradual institutional change are differently
embodied, putting them beyond the scope of this project.

1.4

Chapter Outline

Chapter two outlines the methodology for this project. It explores the value of the case
study and identifies the utility of process-tracing to explore the comparison of institutional
modalities explored in the dissertation. The third chapter provides an overview of the
literature on transitional justice and truth commissions. This chapter defines a truth
commission, situating its use in the field of transitional justice. The literature review also
uses scholarship on commissions of inquiry to draw a distinction between truth
commissions and commissions of inquiry. The literature illustrates a conceptualization
challenge with these investigative processes in their institutional similarities. The project
uses this tension as a starting point to consider the significance of this institutional
continuity.
The fourth chapter offers an analytical framework to articulate the relationship
between earlier institutional investigations and later truth commission processes. The focus
is on the potential explanations offered from a framework rooted in historical
institutionalism’s path dependence in the context of transitional justice and the process of
institutional change. Chapter 4 chapter situates a main contribution and argument of the
dissertation. It argues that the operation of earlier commissions, under certain conditions,
can engender change in what are considered usually well-entrenched institutions.
Contextualizing truth-seeking in this light enables an account of the development of truthseeking in South Africa that offers additional insight into the design and operation of the
South African TRC.
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The fifth chapter provides an overview of the case of South Africa. This chapter
offers background on the Apartheid system, violence, and the transitional negotiating
period. The dissertation focuses on violence investigation and, as such, the framing for the
case description focuses on violence under Apartheid and efforts to manage violence,
including the National Peace Accord and the subsequent constitutional negotiations. In this
chapter, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation
is introduced along with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. The
parameters for articulating the strength of South Africa’s TRC are presented in terms of
institutional design and efficacy.
In the sixth and seventh chapters, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of
Public Violence and Intimidation is analyzed in depth to identify innovations in the
application and deployment of this particular commission of inquiry. The chapter argues
that the ability of the commission to facilitate incremental change in the legacies of
commissions of inquiry in South Africa stemmed from the innovations in the founding Act,
and the consensus built into the commission based on its inclusion in the National Peace
Accord. In addition, the Goldstone Commission’s cultivation of internal credibility
demonstrated value in the inquiry. This chapter then articulates the significance of this
earlier institution for the later operation of the TRC in terms of credibility and the
recognition that further investigation was warranted.
The eighth and ninth chapters use two institutional modalities that are associated with
information gathering to explore the impacts of the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation on gradual institutional change and thereby
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. These two chapters explore
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witness protection within the Goldstone Commission and amnesty. The purpose of these
chapters is not to assess the operation of the individual institutional modalities. Rather, the
purpose is to trace institutional continuity and change in the path dependent components
of truth-seeking in the South African case.
The eighth chapter demonstrates, with regards to witness protection, that the
operation of the Goldstone Commission illuminated a challenge presented by the
expectation that people could and would participate in these investigative processes. Over
the period of its operation, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence
and Intimidation built up the structures needed so that the powers granted to it could be
used to serve the purposes of uncovering information. The design of the truth commission
reflects some of the gradual adjustments that resulted from familiarity and experience with
earlier information-gathering processes.
The ninth chapter tackles the complex issue of amnesty. This chapter argues that
indemnity/amnesty underwent a process of conversion from its initial purpose at the outset
of negotiations and eventually for information-gathering purposes at the TRC. Although
the processes around indemnity and amnesty preceded and succeeded the Commission of
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, the potential value of
information-in-exchange-for-amnesty was articulated by the Goldstone Commission.
These changes had significant implications for gathering information; restricting access to
information at the beginning and then facilitating access to information at the TRC. This
chapter identifies a deep-seated tension in the earlier investigations and TRC with regards
to the eventual justifications for information gathering and the available means to do so.
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The final chapter presents a concluding analysis of the implications of this research.
This chapter identifies the main contribution of this project: articulating an institutional
approach to truth-seeking, and identifying how earlier institutions transformed restrictive
legacies through processes of gradual institutional change. This approach helps to
illuminate the roots of unique institutional elements in the design of the TRC. Furthermore,
considering the TRC and associated truth-seeking not only as a mechanism of transitional
justice that emerged after the transition but as a project rooted in institutional histories, one
can trace the adjustment within earlier truth-seeking efforts and between the Goldstone
Commission and the TRC. Exploring transitional justice in light of a process of gradual
institutional change is an innovative way to explain the implementation and operational
design of truth commissions. The chapter then positions the findings more broadly in the
transitional justice literature and identifies potential future avenues for research.
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Chapter 2

2

Methodology

This project is a case study, exploring an instance of truth-seeking institutionalization in a
political transition. The case under investigation is South Africa between 1990 and 1995.
George and Bennett define a case as “an instance of a class of events,” and a case study as
“a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis,
rather than the event itself.”1
The value of a single case study is its ability to interrogate, in detail, an instance of
2

interest. The nature of the outcome of interest in this project warrants an immersive study
to understand, in a comprehensive manner, the processes, and institutional development
that shaped the conditions and operation of the truth commission in South Africa. In some
ways, this fits within Gerring’s definition of a “single-outcome study,” which he defines
as “studies that investigate a bounded unit in an attempt to elucidate a single outcome
occurring within that unit.”3 This distinction separates case studies, which try to identify
patterns in other cases, from a focus on a single-case itself.4 However, Gerring’s analysis
5

focuses on determining causal explanations in a single-outcome. This dissertation project
does not intend to make a specific causal claim about why the relationship exists, but rather
1

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005), 17-18.
2

John Gerring, "What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?," The American Political Science Review
98, no. 2 (2004): 345.
3

John Gerring, "Single-Outcome Studies: A Methodological Primer," International Sociology 21, no. 5
(2006): 708.
4

Ibid., 707.

5

Ibid., 710.
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advances a analytic, probabilistic account of the case under investigation. The case under
consideration here can be categorized as a “heuristic” case study as per George and
7

Bennett’s classification.

There are, of course, limitations to the case study approach. Perhaps the most
8

significant of these is an inability to generalize to a broader population. In addition, small9

n research and case studies run the risk of selection bias. The elements under consideration
in this project are specific to the South African case. This is not to suggest that the
relationship could not be similarly analyzed in other cases, but that the study presented here
is a valuable starting point to prod how the process unfolded in this case. In future research,
engaging in a cross-case comparison of the influence of earlier investigations will help to
identify conducive or constraining conditions across cases. An understanding of the
processes and institutions under investigation in this prominent case is a valuable exercise
to identify under-considered components of truth-seeking because the focus is often on
truth commissions themselves, rather than the influence of earlier truth-seeking policies.
The decision to focus on the South African case for this study is warranted because
of its centrality in the field of transitional justice. The South African case has been selected
because it holds a position of notoriety in the transitional justice literature. It has been wellstudied, on multiple dimensions, given the popular attention it has received. In the field of
6

Gerring distinguishes between descriptive and causal inference, see Gerring, "What is a Case Study and
What is it Good For?," 347.
7

See George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 75. According to
George and Bennett, “Heuristic case studies inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal
mechanisms, and causal paths.”
8
9

George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 22.

Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases you Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in
Comparative Politics," Political Analysis 2 (1990).
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transitional justice, much of the research conducted on truth commissions uses the South
African model as an example or reference point. Similarly, in practice, the influence of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has been widely noted.

10

It

stands out given its impact on the field and, in many ways, is considered a “model” in the
universe of truth commissions.11 However, much of the theorizing of the South African
case has been directed at the operation of the commission, the purpose of the commission,
12

and an assessment of its influence on reconciliation.

Less attention has been paid to the

connection of the truth commission to past institutional developments in South Africa, and
to their potential significance. An investigation into the roots of these elements will deepen
the field’s understanding of this well-studied case.
An exploration of the pre-transitional roots of transitional justice features offers
further insight into the structure of the South African TRC. It enables an investigation into
the component pieces of the truth commission project in South Africa, rather than taking
for granted the ‘whole’ of the institution of the TRC. Given the propensity to model truth
commissions after successful efforts, the past institutional influence matters for
understanding the TRC’s operation.
South Africa is also an interesting case for this investigation because an important
component of information gathering emerged prior to the actual creation and

10

For example, on Liberia see Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility
for Justice, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and The International Centre for Transitional Justice
(2009), 17-18. On the Kenyan case, see Ronald C. Slye, The Kenyan TJRC: An Outsider’s View from the
Inside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 50-51, 64-67.
11

Robert I. Rotberg, "Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation," in Truth
V. Justice, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 6.
12

James L. Gibson, "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no.
3 (2006): 409-432; Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 2.
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implementation of the truth commission. The de Klerk government envisaged and
appointed an investigative institution with the capacity to carry out truth-seeking
endeavours. This leads to a query about the process of institutionalizing truth-seeking prior
to the transition and about how this process continued throughout and after the transition
itself. An assessment of the information-gathering institutions during the transition can
help to trace the lineage of truth-seeking institutionalization in this context.

2.1

Methodological Approach

The within-case analysis is conducted using process tracing. Process tracing enables both
confirmatory analysis on necessary and sufficient conditions, and can advance causal
explanations.13 However, the purpose of employing this tool in this project is a third option
identified by Beach and Pedersen—outcome explanation.14 The purpose in this variant of
process-tracing is, “not the theory-centric one of building or testing a generalizable
theorized mechanism; instead the aim is to craft a sufficient explanation of the outcome.”15
The purpose of this analysis is to identify under-considered influencing factors in the
design of the TRC, and explain how the Goldstone Commission contributed to the
institutionalization of truth seeking.
With this approach, and with the parameters of the transitional justice universe of

13

Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Process Tracing: from philosophical roots to best practice," in
Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4. See also: James Mahoney, "The Logic of Process
Tracing Tests in the Social Science," Sociological Methods & Research 41, no. 4 (2012): 57.
14

Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 11-12, 18.
15

Ibid., 11.
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cases, generalizability is not the most valuable way to engage with the case. Comparisons
with other cases can be offered, as they are in this study, where valuable linkages can be
drawn. However, countries do not follow the same paths in transitions to democracy, from
conflict, or in addressing other institutional injustice. They also do not face the same
political conditions and constraints. There are sufficient similarities over time in
transitions, that middle-range theory is a more fruitful intention in such analysis,
recognizing, of course, the limitations in generalization and comprehensiveness therein.16
This study contributes to a foundation for further study of these phenomena across cases
by scholars of transitional justice.
I used primary and secondary documentary evidence to trace the institutional
developments. I relied heavily on primary sources collected from multiple archival sites
during field work undertaken in South Africa over five months in 2016 and 2017. I
analyzed approximately 2,000 pages of archival material from collections housed at Wits
Historical Papers, the South African History Archive, the National Archives of South
17

Africa, the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory,

Special Collections at the University of

Cape Town Libraries, and the Parliamentary Library for the Government of South Africa.
I began the archival process at Historical Papers at the Willian Cullen Library at
Wits University looking for information to contextualize violence and the Goldstone
Commission in South Africa. I started with collections like the Independent Board of

16

Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Mechanisms, process, and international institutions," in Process Tracing: From
Metaphor to Analytic Tool, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2015), 91-93; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 8.
17

“I acknowledge that the research assistance provided by the staff of the Nelson Mandela Centre of
Memory does not constitute an endorsement of my work, or any views contained therein, and should not be
construed as such. Any conclusions I have reached are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions
or viewpoints of the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory.”
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Inquiry, press clippings from the South African Institute of Race Relations Collections,
and the legislation in South African Government records. From here, I expanded the
parameters to better understand the patterns in the Goldstone Commission’s operations and
the TRC. I consulted a wide range of collections that contained information relating to, but
not limited to: the peace process, the Multi-Party Negotiation Process, commissions of
inquiry, the Goldstone Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and
parliamentary records related to the Goldstone Commission. Personal collections of people
engaged in these processes, such as those of Alex Boraine at the University of Cape Town’s
Special Collections, also contained important material about the period under investigation.
The collections of non-governmental organizations and local organizing committees
contained information that provided chronological accounts of the negotiations and
transitions

through

publications,

news

clippings,

and

internal

organizational

documentation. I also consulted official reports from the Commission of Inquiry regarding
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, other commission reports, and the
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.
There are important considerations when using archival material as evidence. It is
important to recognize that archives are created and managed by different members of
society. As Verne Harris argues, “in any circumstances, in any country, the documentary
record provides just a sliver of a window into the event.”18 Power and influence play an
important role in the capacity to archive material and the perceived importance of
information that ‘belongs’ in the archives and how archives are used. Returning to Harris

18

Verne Harris, "The Archival Sliver: Power, Memory, and Archives in South Africa," Archival Science
no. 2 (2002): 64.

24

again,
if archival records reflect reality, they do so complicitly, and in a deeply fractured
and shifting way. They do not act by themselves. They act through many conduits
– the people who created them, the functionaries who managed them, the archivists
who selected them for preservation and make them available for use, and the
researchers who them in constructing accounts of the past. Far from enjoying an
exteriority in relation to the record, all these conduits participate in the complex
processes through the record feeds into social memory.19
In South Africa, powerful forces have influenced the state material that has been available
to be archived.20 While the TRC report has been publicized as historical record, other
information and its access is managed tightly.21 Thus, the availability of information
pertaining to government decisions, actions, and processes with regards to the Apartheid
state and transition is still sometimes limited. Contemporary discussions continue to debate
the necessity of “opening” the Apartheid archives and struggles of individuals and
organizations to gain access to information.22 Acknowledging these constraints
necessitates recognizing the silent voices, of both perpetrators and victims, that inform and
comprise the information available in the archives.
As Harris points out above, the researcher also plays a role in how documents are
used. I tried to look widely in the archival collections and to consult a cross-range of
collections. Attempts have been made to acknowledge these absences by consulting a range
of collections at different archival centres. I made every effort to note the order of

19

Ibid., 65.

20

On the destruction of records, see: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume
One, 201-236. Verne Harris, "“They should have destroyed more”: The Destruction of Public Records by
the South African State in the Final Years of Apartheid, 1990-1994," in Archives and Justice: A South
African Perspective (Chicago: The Society of American Archivists, 2007).
21

See discussions on the South African History Archive website: "The South African History Archive,"
accessed February 3, 2020, http://www.saha.org.za/index.htm.
22

Author observation of conference proceedings, “Archives and Democracy: A colloquium of civil
society,” The University of Witwatersrand, 24 August 2017.
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documents in files and collections and to connect chronological points from materials
across collections. Practical constraints prevented access to all archives across the country,
and the ability to comb through all available collections. I recognize these limitations and
attempted to supplement available documentary material with secondary sources and
interview material.
I conducted interviews in 2016 and 2017 as the project was taking shape. However,
the project developed theoretically in a different direction, in part because of challenges to
access information about the initial question under investigation. As such, given the
changed focus of the project and the evolution in research design, I did not use the interview
data to draw conclusions. While the interviews provided valuable background and
contextual information there was not a sufficient number or breadth to empirically assess.
Not all participants contacted to conduct an interview were willing to participate. The thencurrent political environment in South Africa and the natural progression of life also
impacted the availability of representative participants. I have relied most heavily on
archival sources of information and public documents to draw conclusions such that other
researchers can assess and review. However, two of the interviews conducted with the
Chairperson of the Goldstone Commission inform some illustrations in Chapter 7.
I conducted nine interviews with actors involved in, or with knowledge of, the
negotiations, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I identified interviewees
based on their expertise on the South African transition and the specific elements under
consideration. I conducted interviews in person in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and
Ottawa. Each interview lasted between one and two hours. Participants were asked
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questions from a framework designed beforehand. Given that the questions were openended, follow up questions based on information presented in the interview were often
based on the participant’s role and area of expertise. In order to conduct interviews, The
University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board provided approval for
this project.

23

The terms of the ethics approval were, in some ways, restrictive. For

example, I was not permitted to use snowball sampling nor was I allowed to ask questions
by email. This is understandable as it pertains to protecting participants. However, it did
limit the recruitment of potential interviewees. Despite the challenges, the interviews
provided context for the information under exploration here. I am grateful for the time
people gave to speak with me. These conversations were a privilege.
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The University of Western Ontario, Non-Medical Research Ethics Board, Ethics file number #108564.
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Chapter 3

3

Literature Review

This dissertation project focuses on one type of mechanism of transitional justice, the truth
commission, to explore institutional continuity and change in transitional settings. This
chapter uses literatures of transitional justice and comparative politics as the foundation for
the discussion of institutional continuity and change in truth commissions. The next chapter
incorporates the literature on institutionalism to position the project’s contribution to the
literature. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the field of transitional justice
before defining and assessing the truth commission specifically. It outlines a number of
justifications for truth commissions and identifies, in the literature, several factors that
influence the design of truth commission processes. Then, the next section explores the
relationship between truth commissions and commissions of inquiry. It sets up the
argument that truth commissions are a variant of a type of commission of inquiry, outlining
the importance of the institutional lineage. The final section situates specifically the
literature on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Given its notoriety,
it has had an important impact on the study of truth commissions themselves.

3.1

Transitional Justice

Transitional justice can be understood as “a set of moral, legal, and political dilemmas
involving how best to respond to mass atrocities and other profound injustice in the wake
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1

of periods of conflict and repression.” For many, the field is conceptualized based on the
2

tools or mechanisms that have come to be associated with their use. These tools include:
Trials, truth commissions, and lustration policies; victim-oriented restorative
justice mechanisms, including reparations construction of monuments, and public
memory projects; and mechanisms of security and peace, including amnesties and
pardons, constitutional amendments, and institutional reform.3
The field has evolved from a largely legalistic approach to justice during or after transitions
to democracy to addressing broader components of justice for societies emerging from
4

conflict and abuse. The field of transitional justice has developed around a shared belief
that formally addressing past abuse creates a stronger foundation to rebuild societies and
systems.5
As theorized initially, transitional justice offered the potential for countries to
attempt “extraordinary” measures of justice; Teitel posited that justice mechanisms could
6

be established that might otherwise not be possible during more stable periods. So the

1

Dustin N. Sharp, Rethinking Transitional Justice for the Twenty-First Century: Beyond the End of History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1.
2

M. Brinton Lykes and Hugo van der Merwe, "Exploring/Expanding the Reach of Transitional Justice,"
International Journal of Transitional Justice 11 (2017): 372. Sharp, Rethinking Transitional Justice for the
Twenty-First Century: Beyond the End of History. See also: Secretary General United Nations, The Rule of
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (2004), S/2004/616, (2004), 4.
3

Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing
Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 1.
4

Paige Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional
Justice," Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 359; Zinaida Miller, "Effects of Invisibility: In Search
of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008); Ruti
G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
5

Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice," 321367; Louis Bickford, “Unofficial Truth Projects,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 936; Pablo De
Greiff, "Theorizing Transitional Justice," Nomos 51 (2012): 31-77; Colleen Murphy, The Conceptual
Foundations of Transitional Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Diane F. Orentlicher,
"‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency," The International Journal
of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 10-22; Teitel, Transitional Justice.
6

Teitel, Transitional Justice, 11-26.
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“transitional” moment, or the “transitional” period, could facilitate a reconstruction of
sorts. Countries in transition could demonstrate a commitment to human rights, and
through transitional justice practices they could address and acknowledge the injustices of
the previous regime.

7

Once cemented, the focus of the field of transitional justice has been on what types
of justice should be pursued in different transitional situations, and the focus has turned to
assessing, and/or advocating for, the range of the application of transitional justice. Early
debates framed questions of applicability in terms of what was possible, set alongside was
8

determined to be morally correct. As the field has become more entrenched, articulations
of the early framings have been questioned. The focus on retribution has been critiqued,
and the field has, in many ways responded with a broader spectrum of default options.

9

Critics have voiced and attempted to rectify a ‘top-down’ approach of transitional justice,
arguing for more focus on the victims and, perhaps more specifically, the local context of

7

Jose Zalaquett, "Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations," Hastings Law Journal 43 (1992): 1425-1438.
8
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Make in Dealing with the Past," Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1995): 51-78; Martha Minow, Between
Vengeance and Forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence (Boston: Beacon Press,
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World Quarterly 20, no. 6 (1999): 1109-1128; Paul van Zyl, "Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case
of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission," Journal of International Affairs 52, no. 2 (1999):
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International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet," 49, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 205-222. A
comprehensive overview is provided in Kritz’s three volumes: Neil J. Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1995).
9

Kieran McEvoy, "Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice," Journal
of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 411-440; Jennifer J. Llewellyn and Robert Howse, "Institutions for
Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission," The University of Toronto
Law Journal 49, no. 3 (1999): 355-388.
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transitional justice processes.

Transitional justice mechanisms are frequently, almost

automatically, assumed to be appropriate across situations of human rights violations.
Despite the entrenchment of the idea of transitional justice internationally, the field is still
divided on the effectiveness of transitional processes.

11

Evaluations of transitional justice processes often take the form of case studies or
small-n comparative analysis in order to account for the specific forces at play in particular
settings. Many studies have focused on the operation of particular mechanisms through the
12

study of single cases and comparative studies. Others explore whether the theorized goals
of transitional justice, like reconciliation and recognition, are achieved through certain
transitional justice processes.

13

Large-n research exploring the utility or effectiveness of
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Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, "Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom
Up," Journal of Law and Society 35, no. 2 (2008): 265-292.
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transitional justice mechanisms has focused most frequently on outputs or goals of
transitional justice: measures of democracy and human rights,

14

or deterrence.

15

The traction that the idea of transitional justice has gained has seen transitional
justice mechanisms implemented across a variety of cases and under different operating
conditions. State-led transitional justice processes implemented within a country rely on
the institutions in place to carry out their work. Even if new institutions are established,
like truth commissions, their operation depends on other facets of governance. The extent
of this reliance is informed by their mandate. For instance, if a truth commission is
established with subpoena powers, other judicial institutions may be necessary to enforce
those powers.

16

Sharp points out that the historical roots of the field of transitional justice,

heavily influenced by legal practitioners, have resulted in:
an emphasis on a constrained yet institutionally and professionally demanding
understanding of justice that some have argued is not consistent with the quality
and capacity of state institutions in many postconflict countries, to say nothing of
17
cultural congruence.
Sharp’s recognition of the institutional weight required to facilitate transitional justice
raises important questions about the institutions themselves. Often, the institutional and
governance characteristics for legitimate transitional justice institutions to operate are not
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found in the places where transitional justice is most heavily advocated.

18

For example,

institutions, like the rule of law, are necessary to implement prosecutorial transitional
justice processes, but are also expected or anticipated ‘ends’ of transitional justice.

19

Continuing in this vein, legitimate prosecutions for human rights violations depend on the
capacity of a judicial system to do so. This illustrates somewhat of a disconnect in the
transitional justice mechanisms advocated by the international community and that have
been the focus of the field of transitional justice.
One debate about how to respond to human rights violations is referred to as the
truth versus justice debate that characterized the field of transitional justice in 1990s and
2000s.

20

The crux of the debate pertained to the type of justice to be prioritized: that

achieved through prosecution or that achieved through investigation and truth. The field’s
resolution of the truth versus justice debate gelled around the idea that truth commissions
could serve as a middle ground, offering a different, but equally valuable, or
complementary type of justice.

21

Sometimes truth commissions are advocated when trials

are not possible, and increasingly they are valued for their own contribution to justice.
Rather than engaging in the debate about the trade-offs or complementarity in types of

18

The institutional characteristics will be addressed further below. See Angela D. Nichols, Impact,
Legitimacy, and Limitations of Truth Commissions (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Jeremy Sarkin,
"Redesigning the Definition a Truth Commission, but Also Designing a Forward-Looking Non-Prescriptive
Definition to Make Them Potentially More Successful," Human Rights Review (2018): 349-368.
19

For example De Greiff, "Theorizing Transitional Justice," 47.

20

See for example, Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, eds., Truth V. Justice (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
21

See for example, Alex Boraine, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way," in Truth V.
Justice, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 143;
Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 57-61; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "The New Landscape of
Transitional Justice," in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice, ed.
Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 9.

33

justice, it is important to underscore that insufficient attention has been to paid to the fact
that a truth commission is a mechanism that requires a similarly demanding institutional
framework to prosecutorial legal responses. While truth commissions may be politically
possible when prosecutions are not possible, the institutional demands of truth
commissions are still extensive.

3.2

Defining a Truth Commission

Definitions of truth commissions do two things. First, definitions delineate truth
commissions from other types of investigatory bodies, whether that is commissions of
inquiry, “unofficial truth projects”, or international investigations.

22

Second, definitions

specify the features of truth commissions that refine the universe of cases. This includes,
23

for example, elements such as independence, duration, location, and focus.

The

importance of agreement on the definition is recognized, particularly as the number of truth
24

commissions increases alongside assessments of their effectiveness.

Hayner’s definition of a truth commission has anchored the debate on the definition
in the field of transitional justice. Hayner offers the following definition:
A truth commission (1) is focused on past, rather than ongoing, events; (2)
investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their

22
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experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final report;
25
and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review.
Criticisms of this definition highlight the conflation of procedural characteristics and the
outcomes of truth commission process. For example, Hayner’s definition is critiqued
26

because it does not specify independence.
report.

Others criticize the necessity of completing a

27

In other definitions, Wiebelhaus-Brahm argues that there is an over-prescription of
certain goals, like democratic consolidation, and certain features, like public hearings
28

which are not necessarily constitutive elements of truth commissions.

A narrower

definition is offered by Freeman:
A truth commission is an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of
inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1)
investigating and reporting on the principal causes and consequences of broad and
relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that occurred in the state
during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making
29
recommendations for their redress and future prevention.
Freeman’s definition recognizes the evolution of the idea of a truth commission from a
commission of inquiry. It also focuses on the ‘victim-centered’ nature of a truth
commission. The potential for a truth commission to be able to address victims’ needs rests
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on moral theorizing about restoring equality and dignity.

30

Each of these values seeks to

create a space where the marginalized narratives are given voice.
Sarkin argues that part of the challenge in the definitional debate is the recognition
that definitions struggle to capture the characteristics of truth commissions of the past, for
comparative analytical purposes, and the normative features of truth commissions that may
guide their establishment in the future. He offers a distinction between these two
dimensions, outlining a “backward-looking” and “forward-looking definition” of a truth
commission. The “backward-looking” definition provided by Sarkin is:
(1) a temporary investigative institution that (2) focuses on understanding past
violence and human rights abuse and its causes, which can focus also on on-going
events if necessary; (3) usually investigates patterns of violence that took place over
a (usually relatively recent) period of time and the reasons for why they occurred;
(4) ordinarily issues a final report with recommendations; (5) is officially
authorized, empowered, or sanctioned by the State, but may be established by an
intergovernmental organisation or United Nations where the state is unwilling or
31
unable to do so.
The purpose of the backward-looking definition, according to Sarkin, is that “if a [truth
commission] is too narrowly defined, it can exclude some institutions that should be
classified as [truth commissions].”

32

Sarkin’s backward-looking definition is sufficiently

broad to capture most past variants. The caveats or exceptions provided in this definition
help to unify the cases of the past that have garnered consensus as being a truth commission
before the term came into widespread use.
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Presenting these three definitions illustrates that although there is a general
consensus on the idea of the truth commission, specific elements are still debated. Each
definition resembles the practice of a commission of inquiry applied to human rights
violations. Elements like gathering information and intending to create a report are usually
also expected of commissions of inquiry. Freeman’s definition specifies the truth
commission as a type of commission of inquiry explicitly. Freeman’s definition of a truth
commission is used in this project because of this embeddedness, which enables an
interrogation of the relationship between the concepts of commission of inquiry and truth
commission.

3.3

Why are Truth Commissions Used?

Generally, truth commissions are supposed to uncover information about past injustices,
or, as Rotberg puts it, “to uncover the past in order to answer questions that remain
unanswered.”33 A broad range of intentions, goals, and expectations have been associated
with truth commission processes. Justifications for using truth commissions during
transitions from authoritarianism, conflict, or mass human rights violations can be
separated into three thematic categories. First, they may be deployed as “fact-finding”
tools to uncover and acknowledge information about violence. Second, they are justified
as a means to achieve justice through acknowledgement and restorative practices. A third
explanation for their adoption centres on their being the result of political bargaining. These
categories are not mutually exclusive; indeed, most truth commissions are envisioned as
means to achieve justice and access information. However, it is helpful to separate out

33
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some of the reasons why states may opt to implement truth commissions to more clearly
map the perceived benefits.

3.3.1 Information Gathering
Truth commissions are designed to uncover and collect information about repression,
abuse, and conflict that is either not public, or not publicly acknowledged.34 Of truth
commissions, Crocker suggests that “their chief virtue is discerning overall patterns,
institutional context, and, to a lesser extent, the general causes and consequences of
atrocities.”35 Truth commissions gained recognition as effective tools to identify the nature
of crimes and whereabouts of victims in countries that relied on purposefully secretive
repression tactics. Teitel describes transitions in Latin America, for example, as “decades
of military dictatorship and brutal repression, involving widespread abductions, detention,
torture and disappearances, all carried out in the name of ‘national security’ and in absolute
secrecy.”36 According to Teitel:
The repression in 1970s Latin America revealed a singularly coercive state power—
to make the body disappear, making citizens vanish, rendering them desaparecidos.
During Argentina’s military rule, more than 10,000 persons were abducted,
detained, and tortured, vanishing without a trace. Like the secrecy of the abduction
and detention, the victim’s ultimate disappearance is endemic to the ‘impunity
crime.’ Every step of the military’s process—kidnapping, detention, and torture,
37
culminating in murder—is denied by the disappearances.
The secretive nature of state repression propped up these types of regimes. Similarly, in the
South African context, the ‘hidden’ mechanisms of state repression oftentimes meant that
34
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the perpetration of crimes and the location of victims left those close to the murdered or
disappeared without answers. Thus, the potential ability for the new regime and the public
to gain information about repression and violence carried out under the previous regime is
identified as one of the benefits of choosing a truth commission in South Africa. For
example, the South African TRC report states:
We know now what happened to Steve Biko, to the Pebco Three, to the Cradock
Four. We now know who ordered the Church Street bomb attack and who was
responsible for the St James’ Church massacre. We have been able to exhume the
remains of about fifty activists who were abducted, killed and buried secretly.38
In the aftermath of such violence, truth commissions offered a useful approach for
uncovering information. As Popkin and Roht-Arriaza outline, “while most people had at
least some inkling that human rights violations were occurring, the nature of the violations
themselves—especially of disappearances and killings by anonymous ‘death squads’—
entailed secrecy and deniability.”39 The goal of truth commissions convoked in these
environments was to “compile and present a historical record of the scope, means, and
victims of the prior human rights violations.”40 In these contexts, truth commissions offered
an effective means to access information about atrocities while being able to maintain
relative political stability, a theme that is considered further below.
Truth commissions are used to gather information about the abuses specified within
a truth commission’s mandate. Exactly how this is achieved differs across cases. Much

38
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attention is focused on public hearings on truth commission processes.

However,

information and facts are collected and collated through other means. Information can be
42

gathered through statement takers who record testimonies from individuals.

Statement

43

In addition,

takers may travel to different affected communities to record testimonies.

many truth commissions use investigation teams to corroborate information. These can
function in addition to statement takers to ensure the record reflects the ‘facts’ as accurately
as possible. In South Africa, for example, the TRC used investigation units to corroborate
statements provided in applications for amnesty, among other investigations.

44

State

records may be available to the new regime, and these may contain information about past
policies and tactics that have not previously been made public. However, in some cases
like South Africa, important state records have been destroyed by the outgoing regime
before a truth commission is ever convoked.

45

Truth commissions also use existing
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research or research conducted by the commission from to contribute to the development
46

of reports.

When operating at their best, truth commissions are valuable information gathering
and disseminating institutions. Compiling and releasing findings from proceedings enables
the period under investigation to be contextualized within a narrative that can work to
locate the voices and experiences of the oppressed and dislodge a discourse of oppression.
What is significant in these normative representations is the importance placed on the
collection and compilation of testimonies in the outputs of truth commission processes.
Within these collections emerge debates on the validity and malleability of the framing
exercised by truth commissions.
The value of information in times of transition is linked to several overarching ideas
including justice and acknowledgement. Foundationally, though, the idea of truth itself can
be difficult to conceptualize based on the intersection of perspectives, power, beliefs, and
meaning. Contestation of the idea of truth is pervasive. In their consideration on the
relationship between truth and reconciliation, Daly and Sarkin identify that truth is neither
“objective” nor “neutral,” making it difficult to communicate and difficult to communicate
accurately.47
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Important questions have been raised regarding whether the truth ascertained by
truth commissions can be truly representative of the facts. Chapman and Ball suggest that,
“in many ways, truth commissions ‘shape’ or socially construct rather than ‘find’ the
truth.”48 They base this reasoning on the necessary decisions truth commissions have to
make to present the information collected through the truth commission process. Often, in
transitional justice literature, the conceptual challenge of truth is demonstrated through the
South African TRC’s decisions and discussions of the type of “truth” found in its report:
truth that is “factual or forensic,” “personal or narrative,” “social or ‘dialogue’,” and
“healing and restorative.”49 With these distinctions, the commission sought to overcome
the challenges of contestation that are inherent in transitional processes by acknowledging
the value of each.
It is not necessary here to delve further into the constructivist nature of “truth”. The
project takes as a starting point that the truth is malleable, and that many shapes can be
made from the information investigated and uncovered. Parsing between variants of truth,
as the South African TRC did, is helpful in mitigating the critiques about the value of the
process itself based on the type of information presented by investigations. In this way,
distinctions could be made between information about particular facets of investigations
compared to information that emerged from individual testimony based on a person’s lived
experience without subordinating one to the other. It is necessary at the outset to
acknowledge the complexity of truth and truth commissions because similar charges can
be made with regard to other investigative processes. The investigative institutions that
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precede truth commissions, like the one under consideration in this project, do not face the
same symbolic demands made of truth commissions. Yet, the constructed critiques of the
nature of truth are important for this project because of the way emergent facts or hidden
facts influence governing and transition.
The field of transitional justice has focused centrally on the idea of truth as a means
of justice. One foundational text, Kritz’s Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies
Reckon with Former Regimes, includes a section on “Documenting the Former Regime:
Commissions of Inquiry” in its analysis of the considerations and prospects for the
addressing the past.50 In these early discussions, Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, recognized four
goals of such truth or investigatory commissions that help to situate their theorized value.
In their evaluation, the authors identified the following goals:
Creating an authoritative record of what happened; providing a platform for the
victims to tell their stories and obtain some form of redress; recommending
legislative, structural, or other changes to avoid repetition of past abuses, and
establishing who was responsible and providing a measure of accountability for the
perpetrators.51
The use of truth commissions has increased steadily from the 1980s onwards, in pursuit of
these goals.

3.3.2 Justice and Acknowledgement
As the use of truth commissions has increased, more attention has been paid to the
relationship between truth and justice. Truth commissions can operate as embodiments of
justice demonstrated through lenses of acknowledgement and restorative justice. A crucial
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distinction is made between knowledge and acknowledgement that sets up the utility of
truth commissions in various contexts. With reference to South Africa, du Toit outlines that
“even under the prior regime the truth of ongoing political atrocities or human rights
violations such as torture are in a sense already known… Officially, though, the occurrence
of these violations is often denied categorically.”52 Truth commissions offer a means
through which societies can acknowledge the past and access narratives of conflict
experience. Acknowledgment and narrative play an important role in understanding
“justice as recognition.”53
The theorized value of truth on its own, and truth-as-justice frame information
about past abuses as valuable to individuals and the transition. A ‘right to truth’ has been
cemented at the international level. In December 2013, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/68/165 Right to Truth. The resolution “Recognizes
the importance of respecting and ensuring the right to truth so as to contribute to ending
54

impunity and to promote and protect human rights.”

The truth commission is explicitly
55

recognized as a tool through which this can be achieved.

One fundamental rationale in

the development of the ‘right to truth’ is the recognition that the people victimized by past
repression, and the people left behind without information about what happened to loved

52

du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC," 133, emphasis in original.

53

Ibid., 136.

54

United Nations General Assembly, 68/165 Right to the truth, A/RES/68/165, (2013), 3, emphasis in
original.
55

Ibid., 3-4.

44

ones should, at the very least, be given some information about their fates.56 The
justifications go beyond this information focused endeavour.
In transitional situations, the idea of truth is bounded in concepts of change,
acknowledgement and non-repetition. The characterization of truth as acknowledgment
stems from the reasoning that the repressive and abusive policies and actions may have
been known, but denied.57 Boraine states that in the South African case, “the search for
truth and the recording of that truth exorcised the fantasy of denial that makes
transformation impossible.”58 As Hayner identifies, “for some victims and survivors,
therefore, a truth commission does not so much tell them new truth as formally recognize
and acknowledge the what has before been denied.”59 Furthermore, acknowledging by
investigating and publicizing information may help to circumvent future denial or
politicization of the past.60 In addition, in countries where violence and secrecy structured
regimes, that maintained control using repressive tactics, making public information about
these practices demonstrates a transparency shift—a move away from the old methods of
control.61
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Minow suggests that the “narrative project” of a truth commission enables a more
comprehensive account of a regime’s history.62 The critical element, as du Toit suggests, is
not simply being able to tell one’s story, but that it can enable the exercise of “justice as
recognition” that acknowledges equality “as equal sources of truth and bearers of rights.”63
du Toit also acknowledges the importance of “narrative truth” in truth commission
processes.64 According to du Toit, “what is at stake when victims are enabled to ‘tell their
own stories’ is not just the specific factual statements, but the right of framing them from
their own perspectives and being recognized as legitimate sources of truth with claims to
rights and justice.”65 The acknowledgement potential from truth commissions enables the
possibility of justice often sought in transitional justice processes. Proponents of truth
commissions also advocate their use for their ability to generate elements of restorative
justice.
The focus on the restorative aspects of truth commissions is rooted in earlier debates
in the field which assessed the justice element of truth-seeking and truth commissions. In
attempts to explain the utility of truth commissions, alongside or in lieu of prosecutions,
scholars appraised the intrinsic value of truth commissions, pointing to their potential as
arbiters of restorative justice. Often presented as a counter to hegemonic representations of
justice as retributive, restorative justice shifts the focus. Llewellyn defines restorative
justice as:
Fundamentally concerned with restoring relationships harmed by wrongdoing to
ones in which all parties enjoy and accord one another equal dignity, respect, and
62
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concern. Restorative justice understands wrongdoing in terms of the resulting
harms; restoring relationships requires addressing the harm(s) experienced by all
the parties involved in the wrongdoing.66
Llewellyn argues that restorative justice aims to restore relationships, viewing harm caused
by crime as a harm to relationships.

67

A shift in truth commission applicability is evident

especially since the South African TRC, which has been evaluated as a mechanism of
68

restorative justice.

Rather than focusing on the effects of not having prosecutions, using

a restorative justice approach focused attention on the value of using a truth commission.
The TRC offered a better option for reconciliation and societal mending in transitions.

69

3.3.3 Compromise and political constraints
An element of negotiation undergirds a number of transitions that end up using truth
commissions as a tool to address past wrongs.70 Early studies pointed to the structural
constraints on selecting certain mechanisms over others. For example, societies may have
opted to implement truth commissions because of the potential spoiler effects of power
holders who have the ability to derail transitions should they have to face prosecution.
Orentlicher outlines this puzzle faced by many Latin American countries undergoing
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transitions to democracy. Despite the transfer of power to democratically elected
governments, “armed forces continued to occupy an autonomous realm of power with the
potential for imperiling their countries’ fragile transition if the new government breached
their citadel of impunity.”71 With criminal prosecution perceived as the necessary response
to repression, some analysts perceived truth commissions as a manageable possibility when
trials were difficult or detrimental to pursue.72
In this conceptualization, truth commissions are viewed as a political compromise
achieved at the expense of criminal prosecution.73 Political constraints or destabilizing
forces may necessitate the development of processes of acknowledgement that do not
threaten the peace or stability that may have been achieved in transition.74 Identifying the
pattern of truth commission selection as an output of structural conditions does not detract
from the utility of these institutions. As articulated above, theorizing restorative
possibilities and acknowledgement as processes of justice can persuasively alter the
perception of a trade-off.

75

Despite the ability to justify truth commissions as useful tools in their own right,
there remains a semblance of their selection-as-compromise in some cases. Anecdotal
accounts of negotiation processes are useful sources of evidence here. Villa-Vicencio

71

Orentlicher, "‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited," 11.

72

Boraine, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way," 143; Llewellyn and Howse,
"Institutions for Restorative Justice," 356; Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 58; Orentlicher,
"‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited," 12-13.
73

David Dyzenhaus, "Debating South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission," The University of
Toronto Law Journal 49, no. 3 (1999): 312.
74

Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America: Uruguay and Chile
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 5, 6.
75

See for example: Roht-Arriaza, "The New Landscape of Transitional Justice," 1-16.

48

suggests that in South Africa, “to have insisted on prosecution would have been to
76

perpetuate war.”

In Liberia, Hayner identifies that while amnesty was not formally

written into the peace agreement, it was generally accepted among those involved in the
negotiations that ‘a witch hunt’ associated with the idea of criminal prosecution was not
going to happen. A truth commission was a useful compromise. She identifies that “the
trade-off between a tribunal and a TRC seems to have been explicit in everyone’s minds.
‘We chose a TRC because we didn’t want a war crimes tribunal. A tribunal would be seen
as witch-hunting’, was a typical comment.”

77

In Sierra Leone, a blanket amnesty was

offered to all combatants and the peace agreement included provisions for the creation of
a truth commission.

78

The structural constraints that favour the adoption of truth commissions also likely
influence the operation of the commission. The normative dimensions of truth
commissions can come into tension with the development of the truth commission in
practice. There often seems to be an element of altruism placed onto descriptions or
discussions of truth commission processes. In practice, while their use is advocated heavily,
a verdict on their utility and influence in achieving their intended outcomes has not clearly
emerged.
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3.4

Truth Commission Efficacy

There is little consensus about how truth commissions should be evaluated in the
79

transitional justice literature.

Evaluation has proven challenging given that truth

commissions are negotiating different environments. Some evaluate truth commissions
based on their outputs, or influences on measures like human rights, democratization, and
80

reconciliation.

Or, shifting to the procedures of a truth commission, Wiebelhaus-Brahm

suggests that elements like the number of victims heard or hearings conducted are valuable
indicators of truth commission success.

81

The flexible metrics for evaluating truth

commission processes temper the assessments of their impact. Without being able to
specify benefits and shortcomings across cases, it is difficult to evaluate conditions and
factors that lead to success across cases.
Two factors that appear to have garnered agreement for their impact on truth
commission operation are political will and resources. Political will has been identified as
a key informing factor of truth commission operation. Brahm argues that the temporary
nature of truth commissions means that they “rely on moral suasion, pressure from civil
society and the international community, and the political will of politicians to see most of
their impact realized.”82 In some instances, a dearth of political will is suggested to be a
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crucial factor in explaining the failure of certain truth commissions.83 With regards to the
Kenyan truth commission, Lanegran argues that “technical issues such as selection
processes are not [as] important as a broader challenge quite well known to observers of
truth commissions: political will to support an active truth seeking project.”84 Despite the
frequent recognition that political will impacts truth commission processes, as will be
discussed below, insufficient has been paid to how information-gathering institutions work
within these constraints and how political will can be cultivated.
The operation of truth commissions is also impacted by resources allocated to the
actual carrying out of the work of the truth commission. Financial contributions and
constraints are identified by many truth commission observers and scholars as significant.
While on the surface this is to be expected, there are still pressures to convoke these
institutions and funding often comes from a variety of domestic and international sources.
Truth commissions are expensive, but as Chapman and Ball identify, there can be a range
of operating costs. Over the tenure of its operation, the South Africa TRC received
approximately $33 million, in comparison to Haiti’s commission which had to operate on
just over $1 million.85 Despite this, Hayner identifies that observers critiqued the South
African TRC for being “insufficiently resourced.”86 Similar claims are made about the
Haitian truth commission and others.87 Brahm suggests that funding likely affects the
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impact of truth commissions. He suggests that “well-funded truth commissions seem likely
to be better able to hire more staff and, consequently, to investigate a greater number of
cases and do so more thoroughly. As a result, the truth reflected will likely be more
comprehensive.”88 This is significant because it increases truth-seeking capabilities. In
terms of human resources, Hayner suggests that:
Perhaps more than any other single factor, the person or persons selected to manage
a truth commission will determine its ultimate success of failure. Several
commissions have run into serious problems due to weak management, leading to
staff divisions, misdirected or slow-to-start investigations, and limited support.89
The design of commissions has to incorporate decisions that outline such dimensions as
who should serve, the number of commissioners, their location, their role and focus, and
expected time commitment.90 Like financial challenges, the selection of commissioners has
been implicated in the underperformance of truth commissions.91
Undoubtedly, these two categories, political will and resources, are related. A lack
of political will may be demonstrated or entrenched by not providing adequate financial or
human resources to carry out the component activities of a truth commission. Similarly,
governments may appoint personnel to the commission who may be more sympathetic to
their cause. There are, though, also resource considerations that may emerge less from a
concerted effort to undermine the process, than from the reality of operating in a political
environment of competing needs in times of transition.92
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Although these factors have been identified as difference makers, their absence is
easier to determine than their presence. Identifying a lack of political will is important to
beginning to understand what explains success in truth commission operations, but as
Brinkerhoff suggests, “political will exhibits a latent quality; it is not visible separate from
some sort of action. Measuring it can only be done indirectly.”93 With regards to transitional
justice and truth commissions, less attention has been paid to how to cultivate political
94

will.

This is problematic because advocates of transitional justice are succeeding in

entrenching practices of transitional justice across the world. While the intention is morally
justified, the push to implement truth commission processes does not adequately account
for leadership or environments that lack the capacity or will to undertake these processes
with intentions of justice or reconciliation. Despite the recognition of potential problems
with ill-conceived or weakly supported truth commissions, their general framework is
fairly standardized.
Scholars are turning to the institutional components of truth commissions. Nichols
points to components of legitimacy—authority, a break with the past, and transparency—
as key factors that affect truth commission operation and impact.
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Characteristics that are

linked to institutional efficacy are valuable indicators of success because they do not
depend on certain design features. Framing success in terms of the institutional legitimacy
helps navigate the problem that truth commissions are established in different contexts and
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thus have different institutional starting points. Similarly, Sarkin’s efforts to better define
truth commissions offers a helpful metric for evaluation, shifting the focus from outcomes
to institutional dimensions.

96

Sarkin argues that it is the institutional dimensions of truth

commission design that set up truth commissions for success:
The best chance of success is one that is independent, publically supported and
accessible to everyone, especially usually marginalised and excluded groups. A
[truth commission] needs to be created after research and dialogue with all actors.
It needs to be well structured and individually tailored to deal with the issues of the
97
country in question.
This definition of success, or the most likely features to achieve success, accounts for the
diversity of situations in which truth commissions are established but relies on expectations
about well-functioning institutions. This helps to account for the recognition that there are
significant differences in truth commission design and operation across cases.
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These

metrics are revisited in Chapter 5 to substantiate the success of the South African TRC.
It is necessary to acknowledge a critical tension with truth commission operations.
The recognition that transitional justice processes need to be adjusted for individual
contexts is ubiquitous in the field. Yet, despite these claims, there is a core group of
transitional justice mechanisms that are advocated for, and implemented, in varied
99

contexts.

Procedural elements of truth commissions can be altered to accommodate
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different local needs or wants. For example, the design of truth commissions can be tailored
to particular contexts with choices involving whether testimonies will be given in public
or private; whether perpetrators will be named in reports, and in the selection of
commissioners.100 However, the variation in structure of these processes, designed to
achieve particular goals pertaining to justice, truth, and reconciliation are what have made
them desirable in transitional situations in the first place.
The above analysis points to truth commissions as transitional projects. Despite the
recognition that conditions shape some particular designs of truth commissions in practice,
the transitional justice literature often presents truth commissions as a product of the
decision to pursue transitional justice. Distinguishing the ‘menu’ or toolbox of transitional
justice and analyzing or assessing these institutions as components of transitional justice
often results in their presentation as appearing or emerging as a unique response to
transitions; as neatly contained instruments.
Beattie’s account of what he terms the German Bundestag commission, two
commissions of inquiry created by the German government in 1992 and 1995, offers an
important analysis of the influence of historical evolution on the process of truth101

seeking.

These commissions, the Commission of Inquiry for the Assessment of History

and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany (1992-1994) and the Commission
of Inquiry on Overcoming the Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in the Process of
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German Unity (1995-1998), were established by the German Parliament.

These

commissions were established by the German government to provide a thorough
investigation into the Communist regime and opposition to it and relied heavily on
103

research.

The membership of both Commissions were parliamentarians with

representation reflective of parliamentary composition, and external experts.

104

Beattie explains the unique elements of the Bundestag commission based on the
contextual elements that informed its establishment. For example, he suggests that the lack
of victim testimony ought not detract from its value as a truth commission, but should he
acknowledged that in light of the existing records of the regime, the commission operated
on the basis of a “more discursive, analytical, evaluative and symbolic understanding.”
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Beattie argues that the commission’s adjustments in light of tensions regarding how to
achieve its mandate help to explain the development of the process itself.
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This account

of the Bundestag commission is important because it identifies a different explanatory
pathway to explain the design of a truth-seeking process.
Beattie contends that accounting for the Bundestag Commission’s emergence “over
time is crucial, for such bodies are not static, inert institutions but rather events and
107

processes whose evolution is not automatic.”

This is significant because it acknowledges

how earlier influences shaped the design of truth commissions. Specifically, this
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demonstrates how institutions can be repositioned to respond to emergent needs. This is
important because it demonstrates an element of agency and institutional agency in the
process of truth-seeking. Truth commissions may have some standard features, by
definition, but how they are designed or undertake their work retains an element of
flexibility.
To be sure, scholars do not ignore the context or structural dynamics at play, but
insufficient is paid to the role of how histories and earlier institutional arrangements matter
for truth commissions. Many analyses recognize the influence of judicial and security
institutions affecting the operation of truth commission processes and in this way embed
truth commissions within specific contextual dynamics. But, frequently the analysis begins
without reference to how information or truth-seeking may have been carried out prior to
political transition. The mechanics and optics of these processes may not be conducive to
legitimate truth-seeking practices, but taking them into account can help to illustrate in
what ways history matters.

3.5

Institutional foundations

This section explores what it is that sets truth commissions apart from other domestic
inquiries into violence but why these elements may help us understand later truth
commission operation. It argues that the shared features like investigations, the collection
of testimonies, reports of findings and, often, policy recommendations make establishing
a marked distinction between these categories of investigation difficult. This section
outlines that the difference between truth commissions and other investigative processes is
the symbolic rhetoric of justice associated with their use. Given that the value imposed on

57

the truth commission has entrenched their use to redress past injustice, their institutional
lineage is more compelling in understanding the operational effects.

3.5.1 Commissions of inquiry
In non-transitional political spaces, commissions of inquiry are used by governments to
address critical or concerning events/incidents in an official, non-judicial capacity.
Commissions of inquiry are a means to uncover information and identify shortcomings in
existing government or societal practice. A commission of inquiry falls under the umbrella
of public inquiries, which may take different forms under different government systems,
108

but that share similar features.

Salter defines a public inquiry as “any body that is

formally mandated by a government, either on an ad hoc basis or with reference to a
specific problem, to conduct a process of fact-finding and to arrive at a body of
109

recommendations.”

With regard to information gathering specifically, Stanton suggests

that commissions of inquiry “investigate an issue by gathering a broad spectrum of
information in order to see the larger context that gave rise to the problem.”

110

These

conceptualizations highlight the investigative purposes of inquiries that resemble truth
commissions.
Manson and Mullan suggest that defining a commission of inquiry is usefully done
by focusing on the mandate an investigation receives. This includes:
all forms of inquiry directed to inquire into, and report on, the circumstances and
causes of an event or series of events, or an issue of public importance… the
108
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common feature is whether the vehicle is intended to be an element in the
development of public policy by uncovering facts and generating
111
recommendations.
In Canada, New Zealand, and Britain, commissions of inquiry are often categorized into
112

two broad types: those that investigate conduct and those that inform policy.

However,

as Salter suggests, “at stake in almost all inquiries is public confidence in institutions with
a public purpose, and thus is a matter fraught with political consequences. In short, almost
all inquiries are policy inquiries, at least in some respects.”

113

By setting up inquiries of

this sort, governments have a venue through which to identify shortcomings and rectify
policy and institutions. Inwood and Johns characterize commissions of inquiry as “extragovernmental institutions” that are “established specifically to address issues beyond the
existing branches of government and are invoked when the regular machinery of
114

government or policy process is broken or fails.”

While dissatisfaction or an emergent

issue may inform the implementation of a commission, the existence of these factors does
not always result in the initiation of an investigation.
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Significant attention has been paid to how commissions affect changes in policy in
democratic states. Inwood and Johns investigate how the institutional design of

111

Allan Manson and David Mullan, "Introduction," in Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise, ed.
Allan Manson and David Mullan (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), 4.
112

K.J. Keith, "Commissions of Inquiry: Some thoughts from New Zealand," in Commissions of Inquiry:
Praise or Reappraise, ed. Allan Manson and David Mullan (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), 156.
113

Liora Salter, "The Complex Relationship Between Inquiries and Public Controversy," in Commissions
of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise ed. Allan Manson and David Mullan (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), 186.
114

Gregory J. Inwood and Carolyn M. Johns, "Why Study Commissions of Inquiry," in Commissions of
Inquiry and Policy Change: A Comparative Analysis, ed. Gregory J. Inwood and Carolyn M. Johns
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 8.
115

See for example, Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, "Reflection in the Shadow of Blame: When Do Politicians
Appoint Commissions of Inquiry," British Journal of Political Science 40 (2010): 613-634.

59

commissions of inquiry in Canada influences policy changes.

116

Rather than identifying

specific combinations of factors that lead to policy change, the authors identify different
factors that structure commissions of inquiries—ideas, institutions, actors, and relations—
to map the impact on policy change, differentiating between “transformative and direct,”
“transformative but diffuse,” and “marginal and limited” policy changes.

117

In a study on pension commissions, Marier similarly explores the policy changes
that resulted from investigations. Marier differentiates those with strong policy outputs that
are accepted by the government or, “policy engineers,” from those whose outputs are not
the policy accepted by the government for the issue under investigation, or, “alarm
118

raisers.”

A further distinction is made among those with minimal short-term policy

impact but with longer term influential ideas, or “idea shakers”, and those that do not result
in change, or “a source of the status quo.”

119

Marier identifies specific variables that are

related to a commission’s influence: a commission’s membership, terms of reference,
independence (with support), institutional environment, and the viability of the report (in
political, economic, and administrative terms).

120

The study of policy influence from

commissions of inquiry is important because it demonstrates the impacts of the design of
the commission themselves. By identifying features of commissions, and the conditions
under which these components influence the effectiveness of commissions, the
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significance of the institutional design component of investigatory commissions is
highlighted. It also demonstrates a similarities to such adjudications of truth commissions
as discussed above.
The rhetoric around commissions of inquiry can often be cynical. Justifications or
explanations for the appointment of inquiries may centre on avoiding addressing particular
issues. As Schwartz points out, “it is a paradoxical fact that a government can use public
121

inquiries to deflect political accountability.”

Marier categorizes efforts to delay, avoid,

and influence support for particular policy ideas as partisan motivations for the
122

appointment of inquiries.

Governments create the mandates and as such can choose the

scope of the investigation, the people to carry out the investigation, and a general
timeframe.

123

In situations where public or political crises are the impetus for the

implementation, investigations can be riskier, as the response from the public can be much
124

less certain.

Despite the rhetoric associated with commissions/investigations as simply doing
something, a symbolic dimension of commissions of inquiry has been identified. Parker
and Dekker identify a symbolism of processes in investigations. They argue that
investigations themselves help to illustrate that the government is working as it should.
Additionally, Parker and Dekker suggest that investigation and deliberation into crises or
121
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disasters enables “meaning-making” of the events.

Ashforth describes commissions of

inquiry as “schemes of legitimation” wherein commissions play a discursive role in
shaping state power.

126

By engaging in investigation, soliciting feedback from experts and

compiling a report, the state produces “a realm of discourse in the terms of which the
knowledge necessary for power can be discovered and expressed.”

127

His argument about

the state’s value of commissions of inquiry “beyond their expressed purposes” is
particularly compelling given his recognition that “although governmental inquiries
typically engage in fact-gathering and argumentation in order to produce policy-oriented
recommendations, their labours rarely produce policy results commensurate with the effort
128

and expense of inquiry.”

Here, the parallels between investigatory commissions and

truth commissions become increasingly apparent.

3.5.2 Conceptual challenge of truth commissions
The institutional foundations of truth commissions are often overshadowed by the framing
of truth commissions as a unique way to achieve a moral requisite of transitional justice.
As a tool that has garnered consensus as a morally acceptable option during periods of
“extraordinary” politics, to use Teitel’s phrasing, truth commissions are often presented as
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an emergent phenomenon of the 1980s.

129

The similarity in the institutional skeletons that

frame truth commissions and commissions of inquiries is evident from early analyses of
truth commissions. This overlap is apparent both in terminology and lineage.
Some of the earliest investigations that fall within the realm of ‘truth commissions’
130

were also referred to as “investigatory commissions”.

As these types of investigations

emerged, they became valuable as alternatives to what Popkin and Roht-Arriaza refer to as
“‘normal’ investigatory channels.”

131

The justification for using truth commissions has

focused more on how they could negotiate a path contiguous to judicial processes without
destabilizing the transitions and less on how their institutional predecessors may be
implicated in their use.
Hayner acknowledges that there are other types of investigations distinct from truth
commissions and suggests that these non-truth commission forms of inquiry may better
serve the needs of investigation. Presenting a variety examples from Australia, the US, and
Canada, Hayner identifies that “there are a range of other kinds of official inquiries into
past human rights abuses that have not been understood as truth commissions, but they
have served a very important role and may be a better approach than a truth commission,
132

in some moments and in some contexts.”

How these processes affect truth-seeking

warrants further attention and this project engages with this gap, recognizing the
institutional lineage.
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Freeman observes that “commonwealth commissions of inquiry greatly resemble
the modern truth commission.”

133

His observation of commissions in Uganda, Zimbabwe,

Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria is that “in their particular contexts, they resembled
something older and more familiar: standard commissions of inquiry into public
134

controversies.”

Freeman classifies truth commissions as one type of “ad hoc national
135

human rights-related commissions of inquiry.”

He distinguishes between four other

types—“event-specific, thematic, sociohistorical, and institutional.”

136

Commenting on

each of these variations, Freeman differentiates them from truth commissions based on the
centrality of victims in the event-specific and thematic variants. Freeman argues that the
time elapsed between violence or crises and investigations distinguishes truth commissions
from commissions of inquiry, the latter of which tend to be more immediate. In addition,
the breadth of institutions under consideration by a truth commission compared separates
it from an institutional commission of inquiry which tends to have a narrower focus.
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For

Hayner, what sets apart a truth commission is the “their intention of affecting the social
understanding and acceptance of the country’s past, not just to resolve specific facts.”

138

This distinction is one way that analysts differentiate between the two investigating bodies.
Stanton, however, makes a strong case that truth commissions are a “specialized
form of commission of inquiry,” in her study explaining why truth commissions are not
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frequently established in established democracies.

Stanton acknowledges that,

generally, two features set truth commissions apart from commissions of inquiry: a truth
commission’s “symbolic acknowledgement of historic injustices and its explicit social
function of public education about those injustices.”

140

Suggesting that it is the context or

implications of the type of environment that truth commissions are usually implemented
that hinders their adoption by democratic regimes, not the design or operational
distinctiveness, Stanton argues that when undertaken in a certain way, the commission of
inquiry can achieve what a truth commission is expected to achieve. Thus, Stanton argues
that while the “social influence” and the symbolic nature of the truth commission set it
141

apart from the commission of inquiry, this need not be the case.

Rather Stanton suggests:

The truth commission is expected to do explicitly what a commission of inquiry is
capable of doing but which it is not obliged to do: to acknowledge the existence of
the historical injustices and to embark upon a process that educates the public about
those injustices in order to prevent recurrence… whichever form is used, both are
142
capable of fulfilling this social function.
That the commission of inquiry can fulfill the functions associated with a truth commission
is a reasonable assessment of its institutional similarities to the truth commission. The
operational features of both forms of inquiry are similar and thus it is persuasive that
through an engaging and socially focused investigation, acknowledgement can occur
through the commission of inquiry.
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Stanton’s conceptualization is specific to established democracies, but the
argument is applicable more broadly, in terms of the distinction between the commission
of inquiry and truth commission (and less so the focus on the democratic adoption). To
moderate this characterization to the context under consideration in this dissertation, the
relationship between pre-transitional commissions of inquiry and post-transitional truth
commissions, the negative fulfillment of mandates, or the negative experience with
commissions of inquiry is also likely to bear on the truth commission process. Thus, the
question here is not whether it is possible for commissions of inquiry to fulfill the role
associated with truth commissions, but how the earlier operation of a commission of
inquiry affects the operation of a truth commission in both potentially positive and negative
ways.
Even in advanced democracies, commissions of inquiry are not necessarily ‘gamechangers’. Boin et al. identify that the learning that emerges from investigations after crises
143

is varied and difficult.

Critically, other factors informing the environment at the time of

crises and associated investigations can change how the public, and the government,
respond.

144

For example, to expect significant change from governments that are

investigating human rights abuses in which they are known to be, or discovered to be,
complicit, raises serious doubts about their ability to investigate violations and violence.
However, such investigations are still likely to have some effect—be they positive or
negative—on later truth commissions should they be convoked.
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Freeman recognizes the relationship between commissions of inquiries as
predecessors of truth commissions. Freeman identifies parallels in the existing legislation
for inquiries and the legislation for truth commissions in countries that had a history of
commissions. Importantly, though, Freeman identifies that “their long experiences with
commissions of inquiry also made the countries cognizant of the commissions’ habitual
limitations,” which helps to explain why governments sought new legislation for the
145

creation of truth commissions in these environments.

The significance of this pattern

suggests an important potential influence of previous commissions on truth commission
processes. By framing this project using a definition of a truth commission that
characterizes it as a variation on the commission of inquiry, the potential that commissions
of inquiry are implemented in a more skeptical vein, or in a repressive manner, must be
addressed.

3.5.3 Institutional histories
Under certain conditions, commissions of inquiry or investigations are implemented with
little output, and with potentially negative effects. Governments have initiated
investigations into abuse or violations under both democratic and repressive regimes.

146

Such investigative commissions may be initiated under conditions that are not necessarily
conducive to a credible investigation; for example, by a government complicit in violence
or that purposefully undermines investigatory processes. Additionally, countries that
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frequently use commissions of inquiry may undermine the value of such investigations.

147

This may be problematic for truth-seeking practices. The case of South Africa is taken up
in more detail in from Chapter 5 onward. Other examples are presented here to illustrate
situations in which commissions of inquiry may impact truth-seeking measures. For
instance, a report evaluating the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in Ghana,
suggests that the practice of using commissions of inquiry to “discredit preceding
administrations” impacted the operation of the NRC as a transitional justice mechanism,
identifying that “it has been argued that the Commission did not do enough to break with
the legacy of these past commissions.”

148

In Zimbabwe, for example, the government implemented the Commission of
Inquiry into the Matabeleland Disturbances to investigate violence perpetrated by the
military against civilian populations in the Matabeleland district. Not only did the
government not release the report from this commission, the government’s denial of 1500
civilian deaths meant that family members of the victims were unable to claim
149

compensation.

Zimbabwe’s case is instructive in this regard because it demonstrates the

use of a commission of inquiry that had little impact on information gathering or
dissemination for the people affected.
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For example, Marier identifies that, “overusing commissions can backfire and send a signal that a
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While Hayner argues that the government did not release the report allegedly based
on fear of increasing violence between ethnic groups, Grodsky’s interpretation is that the
contents of the report were simply “inconvenient” for then President Robert Mugabe.

150

The government’s refusal to release this report is unsurprising, given its use of repression.
Carver argues that “the government was able to use the formation of the Commission as a
151

device to divert criticism, at the same time as escaping any awkward consequences.”

The Zimbabwean example illustrates engagement with a commission or investigation that,
though seemingly investigated, had little in the way of desire to uncover and rectify
systemic or institutional shortcomings. In the Zimbabwean case, human rights abuses
152

continued to be committed in the decades of Mugabe’s rule.

Mugabe was only

153

succeeded in Zimbabwe in 2017, after coming to power in 1980.

The Zimbabwean case provides an illustration of the types of investigations that
may be undertaken without intention of redress to begin to situate the discussion of the
institutional lineage. While Zimbabwe has not implemented a truth commission, it
demonstrates the undermining potential of investigations in contexts of human rights
violations. This type of influence is problematic when a truth commission is under
consideration or later established. Earlier commissions of inquiry may undermine the
potential information gathering or symbolic acknowledgement anticipated with a truth
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commission. It is this type of pattern that is under consideration in this project. The Kenyan
case is unpacked briefly here as an example.
In Kenya, a somewhat unconstructive history of commissions of inquiry preceded
the truth commission. Some accounts suggest that this continuity of institutions affected
the perception of the truth commission. Significant in this case is the use of commissions
of inquiry in Kenya in such a way as to obfuscate responsibility for government misdeeds
or perpetration of violence.
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As Lynch identifies, “commissions of inquiry in post-

colonial Kenya have become a performance of state power in a blunter sense, namely, the
power to investigate and respond to problems, but also dismiss and ignore them if that suits
155

vested interests.”

This lineage has been identified as important in understanding the

Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) that followed.
According to Lynch, there was a concern among people in Kenya that “in the
absence of a political transition, the TJRC would likely replicate previous commissions of
inquiry in that it would write a detailed report that would then be relegated to dusty
shelves.”

156

In terms of operation, this lineage appears to have been reiterated with the

TJRC. Bosire and Lynch speak to the “credibility crisis” of the TJRC.
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Factors

contributing to this crisis included little support from civil society organizations at the time,
and the problematic appointment of the chairperson, who had been implicated in
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allegations of past abuses.

158

Hayner suggests that advocacy groups critiqued the

legislation enacting the truth commission for being unclear and the institution itself not
impartial.

159

Furthermore, a scandal on the appointed leadership of the Commission
160

affected the perception of its operations.

In the Kenyan case, a commission of inquiry was established at the same time as
the agreement to establish a truth commission. The Commission of Inquiry into the PostElection Violence (CIPEV), also known as the Waki Commission, was implemented as a
component of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation. The negotiating parties
agreed to CIPEV, and another commission into electoral irregularities, the Independent
Review Committee, on March 4, 2008.

161

The Waki Commission itself completed its

investigations, issued its report and even built in mechanisms to try and ensure its
recommendations would be heeded. As Brown and Sriram outline, the Waki Commission
attempted to prevent its recommendations from being ignored. It did this by including a
‘stick’ should the government not implement the recommendations; the Waki Commission
provided a list of alleged perpetrators to Kofi Annan and the other international mediators
to give to the International Criminal Court.

162

This is significant because there was a
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recognition that the recommendations might be ignored, which raises questions about what
the truth commission project could be expected to achieve.
The institutional lineage for investigations or truth-seeking is compromising in the
Kenyan case. The Waki Commission’s efforts to mitigate these experiences are
compounded by another commission that was established specifically to determine whether
163

a “truth commission was necessary for Kenya,” five years earlier in 2004.

After broad

consultation with the Kenyan population and research into other countries that had
established truth commissions, the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission, presented over twenty recommendations outlining the
necessity of a truth commission and the operational parameters advocated based on these
164

consultations.

This is significant because this case demonstrates how the need for truth-

seeking might be set apart from the willingness or commitment to truth-seeking.
Canada, with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 2008 to
investigate the abuses of the Indian Residential School system, provides another example
of a country that has used commissions of inquiries and established a truth commission.
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Some commissions of inquiry may set a positive example for truth commissions that
follow, as Stanton argues in the case of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry carried out
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by Thomas Berger, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Canada.

166

As an

instance of the pattern under consideration in this dissertation, this example is illustrative
of the potential for commissions of inquiry to act as a means to change structural
components of investigations rather than perpetuate the status quo. Although established
as an investigation into the potential effects of a pipeline in 1974, and not established as a
formal investigation into violence, the inquiry resulted in an interrogation of the structural
and cultural dimensions of the relationship between Canada and Indigenous people in the
167

North.

Stanton’s focus is on the social function, the public education dimension, of both
commissions and the innovative way that Berger conducted the Inquiry. The Inquiry held
community hearings in communities that would be impacted by the pipeline, broadcasted
hearings and sought to educate non-Indigenous people about the potential effects and
existing injustices facing Northern communities.

168

Berger also identifies that funding was

made available to Indigenous groups to participate in the Inquiry’s hearings.

169

Important

for this discussion is Stanton’s recognition that “many of Berger’s innovations were
incorporated into subsequent inquiries,” although these did not transform other political
shortcomings with either the inquiries that followed, or the government’s response to
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historical injustices against Indigenous people.170 This is still significant because it
demonstrates both the continued use of the commission of inquiry and the ability to
enhance the process.
Although the Canadian TRC was established decades after Berger released his
report, Stanton suggests that the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry had lessons for the
Canadian TRC with respect to how to engage this social function of education and
171

engagement.

Stanton also identifies the legacy of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry

on the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples that followed, and the eventual TRC
suggesting that Berger’s report “began to lay the groundwork for their legacy to be
discussed in public life.”

172

This brief example cannot explore the depths of structural

injustice imposed on Indigenous people in Canada, nor can it elucidate all the instances in
which government investigations or inquiries fundamentally oppressed Indigenous people.
However, this example illustrates the potential for negative experiences with investigative
institutions to be addressed in order to lay a foundation for future investigations.
These examples illustrate that institutional lineage may both enable and constrain
truth-seeking measures that follow earlier investigative efforts. Experiences with measures
of truth-seeking that serve as window-dressings, or as obfuscation, may set a different
foundation for later truth-seeking measures that are used as a method of transitional justice.
Alternatively, the commission of inquiry may itself be a vector of change. This dissertation
engages this observation to explore this pattern in South Africa. Before moving to the
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discussion that explores this relationship as it plays out in the South African case, and the
conditions under which negative histories can be adjusted, it is necessary to briefly discuss
the colonial roots of the commission of inquiry.

3.5.4

Colonial histories

The commission of inquiry also has a colonial legacy. As such, conceptualizations of
commissions/investigations can be understood as structures that aim to perpetuate the
status quo. In this vein, they may do little to address structural factors that contribute to
crises or investigations, but are rather framed as a legitimating tool. Balint, Evans, and
McMillan identify that commissions can reinforce the status quo without dismantling
structural inequality. The authors argue that “official discourses created through such
commissions serve to produce and reproduce racialized identities that legitimise elite
173

power and interests.”

At the same time, such commissions work to commit legacies of

violence to the past, failing to acknowledge ongoing structural injustice.
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Commissions of inquiry established by the Apartheid state in South Africa offer a
clear example of this. The Theron Commission, officially called the Commission of
Enquiry into Matters Relating to the Coloured Population Group, presented
recommendations that could be construed as an attempt to rectify some of the inequalities
under Apartheid in 1976. Waldmeir’s reading of this is as follows:
So another government commission - that unlikely but effective instrument of change
- was set up to study the problem. And in the very week that Soweto began to burn, it
issued its report. Professor Erika Theron’s commission recommended that the National
Party restore to coloureds what it had taken away in the heyday of Apartheid - direct
173
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representation in Parliament… No one, not least Professor Theron, was suggesting that
175
whites would have to live with, or learn with, coloureds.
While Waldmeir offers this as a demonstration of marginal change, the underlying power
structures of Apartheid remained entrenched, since the state’s power over its racially
delineated groups of citizens did not change. While acknowledging the recommendation
for direct political representation, the perpetuation of classification according to racialized
categories continues the injustice of Apartheid. Ashforth’s “scheme of legitimation”

176

is

clearly represented here in the normalized reproduction of the discourse of Apartheid’s
population classification and segregation.
Adam Sitze traces the roots of the truth commission in South Africa through its
colonial legacies. By focusing on South Africa’s use of commissions of inquiry prior to the
TRC, Sitze explores the possibility that the TRC may not have been a departure from the
status quo, although it is often claimed to be so. Sitze frames this discussion in critical
Foucauldian terms, questioning the representation of the truth commission as a break with
177

the colonial institutions of Apartheid.

Sitze’s treatment of the truth commission and

previous commissions is an illuminating account of power and hegemony in government
inquiries in South Africa. This work draws parallels between the institutions and offers an
account of the historical lineage of the truth commission’s influence in light of the
178

influence of earlier investigations.

175

Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa
(New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 31.
176

Ashforth, "Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation," 1-22.

177

Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 193, 254.

178

On amnesty for example, Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 23-49.

76

If truth commissions are a type of commission of inquiry, the presence of an earlier
investigatory commission could be expected to alter the expectations and operation of the
later commission, since it provides a template for what to expect and how to operationalize
a mandate, among other things. For example, if regimes and civil society have practice
implementing such investigations, they may be better equipped to carry out the
investigation on a larger scale. Yet, if the state has engaged numerous
commission/investigations as more of a façade to appease international or public
audiences, it seems plausible to continue this line of behaviour, particularly if there is
continuity in regime structures.

3.6

South Africa and the Truth Commission Literature

South Africa’s TRC has been “hailed in many parts of the world as a new model for
confronting a troubled and divisive history.”

179

Rotberg claims that the “South African

commission has become the model for all future commissions.”

180

also is the first of Hayner’s “Five Strongest Truth Commissions.”

South Africa’s TRC

181

The South African

TRC is one of the most well-known and heavily studied among the universe of cases of
truth commissions. According to Freeman, “it was only with the experience of the South
African TRC in the mid-1990s that truth commissions, for the first time, attained a
worldwide prominence… to this day the South African TRC remains the most well-known
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truth commission.”

The operation of the South African TRC has influenced the adoption

and design of truth commissions elsewhere. This is significant because much of the
knowledge of truth commissions that been developed and assessed has relied heavily on
this case. As Brahm notes, “much of what we do know about truth commissions comes
from a small subsample of cases, most notably South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), which raises questions about the generalizability of truth commission
expectations.”

183

The conditions of its emergence were unique, as is the case in all

countries in transition.
The themes under consideration in earlier parts of this chapter and as representative
of the literature are particularly important for the South African TRC. While there is a
significant literature on the South African TRC process, less attention has been paid to the
significance of the historical institutional developments for truth-seeking in South Africa.
This project makes a contribution to the literature on truth commissions by taking into
account historical influences. Looking further back highlights additional explanatory
factors in understanding how the South African TRC was able to operate with the
successful institutional efficacy that it did. This ties into to a second contribution, which is
to probe the influence of the prominence of the TRC itself in shaping the transitional justice
literature. This is not to say that the TRC should not receive the praise or stature that it has
secured, but rather to demonstrate how earlier unique and institutionally embedded features
facilitated the TRC in the form that it took. In this way, this research joins existing literature
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that dismantles assumptions or expectations that other countries can construct a similarly
effective/effaced truth commission.
Descriptive, empirical and theoretical work on truth commissions has centred
significantly on the South African TRC. The influence of the South African TRC has been
examined and articulated in terms of the increased adoption of truth commissions,
particularly in African countries.184 In addition, analyses identify the influence in terms of
design choices that countries make in establishing truth commissions. For instance, public
hearings in truth commission processes gained significant notoriety based on their impact
in the South African TRC process.

185

The South African TRC’s approach to amnesty has

influenced discussions elsewhere. Hayner’s report on the peace process in Liberia points
to the South African experience as a reference point for discussions on amnesty.

186

Slye

suggests that elements dealing with amnesty in the Kenyan Truth, Justice, and
187

Reconciliation Commission, were “cut and pasted from the South African legislation.”

This, despite the fact that the two commissions dealt with the question of amnesty very
differently.

188

While Freeman suggests that the South African TRC serves as a “starting

point” for discussions on truth commission design in other countries, its impact on the
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discourse and practice of truth-seeking is significant.

189

Quantitative analyses of truth

commission use, and effects, include the South African TRC as a dummy variable to
190

account for its influence.

The TRC’s role in the development of the field is crucial to

understanding the bases of many assumptions about truth commissions.
Despite the South African TRC’s weight in the field, there are still significant gaps
in our understanding about the impacts of truth commissions, even in the South African
case. The influence and notoriety of the TRC persists despite what Borer describes as
“aspiration with empiricism.”

191

The impacts of the South African TRC remain unclear in

terms of the TRC’s influence on measures like reconciliation, democratization, and human
192

rights.

There is still little consensus on the impacts of the TRC on South African society.

Despite the numerous investigations, there are still gaps in understandings of the more
micro-level processes of the truth commission.

193

While many have worked to elucidate

the complex innovations, impacts, and challenges of the truth commission, less attention
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has been paid to the development and emergence of the TRC, specifically in light of the
continuation of the previous regime.
The treatment of the TRC as a ‘miracle’ or ‘novel’ institution in studies or accounts
of its operations reproduce a tautological account of its emergence. The idea for a truth
194

commission is recognized as emerging prior to the 1994 election.

But, the influence of

earlier commissions and investigatory bodies is not well attended, Sitze’s exploration
195

aside.

As discussed above, Freeman recognizes the institutional similarities, and that

countries’ previous experience elucidated limitations in their use, but the focus of his
analysis is on assessing fairness in truth commission processes.

196

Other references to

earlier commissions of inquiry point to the relevance of the internal investigations carried
out by the African National Congress in the early 1990s that were conducted before the
197

truth commission was established.

This project focuses on these earlier influences on the truth commission process. In
line with du Toit’s recognition that the literature on reconciliation in South Africa often
neglects important political developments in the earlier 1990s as the transition began, this
project engages with this time period to identify how this period matters for understanding
198

the truth commission.

In so doing, it speaks to the literature on truth commissions more
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broadly by clarifying how these earlier developments created conditions more favourable
to truth commission. This is important because, as one ICTJ report states, sometimes truth
commission “successes have been presented as a panacea, and some country experiences,
especially South Africa’s, have been seen as universally applicable.”

199

To be sure, the

recognition that truth commissions ought to be constructed based on specific contextual
factors and not transplanted is frequently recognized. However, specifying more clearly
the process and highlighting that the timeframe of influence ought to be extended furthers
this discussion.
There is a question of periodization that affects these considerations. The
confluence of norms around transitional justice more recently shifts some pressures for
accountability to external and international actors as transitional justice has become
institutionalized and spurned transnational advocacy efforts.

200

The contemporary

presence of transnational advocacy groups and experts on transitional justice adds
additional interests to considerations of transitional justice.

201

Given that the South African

case influenced the debate and adoption of truth commission processes and that it was
implemented prior to the normative uptake, these considerations may be less problematic
for this project as it is framed. To be sure, there was international presence in civil society
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Jamie Rowen, "Searching for Truth," in Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement
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discussions about the prospect for truth commissions.

However, the scale of the South

African influence and the expertise developed from academics and practitioners has
increased, leading to the consolidation of a what Theiden has referred to as a transitional
203

justice “industry”.

This illustrates the value in better understanding the process and

relationship under consideration in this project.

Conclusion
This chapter has defined the truth commission and explained its use as a tool of transitional
justice. The chapter identified how the literature on the South African TRC has shaped the
field and associated assumptions about truth commissions. The chapter also used the
literature on commissions of inquiry and truth commissions to position the difference
between a truth commission and a commission of inquiry, albeit arguing that the truth
commission is indeed a variation of a commission a commission of inquiry. With this
recognition, the chapter explored examples in which commissions of inquiry have preceded
formal truth-seeking processes and suggested importance in further understanding this
relationship. The next chapter explores the potential relationships between earlier
investigative practices and truth commissions, presenting a theoretical framework rooted
in historical institutionalism, to specify the explanatory value of path dependence and
incremental institutional change.
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Chapter 4

4

Theoretical Framework

The previous chapter identified similarities in the institutional framework of commissions
of inquiry and truth commissions. These similar institutional features are theoretically
interesting in light of the potential for truth-seeking processes to retain positive or negative
attributes from previous experiences with commissions of inquiry. Many of the historical
institutionalist explanations of institutional operation broadly recognize the persistence of
institutional practices once adopted, based on increasing returns that make change more
1

difficult once a certain path is chosen. As Thelen recognizes, these explanations are
“intuitively attractive” and help to explain why institutions often seem to be resistant to
2

change. This historical institutional framework of path dependence helps to situate the
problem of entrenchment of investigative practices under different regimes but does not
satisfactorily account for the change under consideration in this project.
Instead, theories of incremental change can be used to help explain how institutions
that used the same institutional framework facilitate adjustments to strengthen informationgathering measures. In order to explain changes in institutional configurations once
established and entrenched, analysts identify changes in environmental features, the
incorporation of actors with sufficient resources, different ideas and interests, or unforeseen

1

James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," Theory and Society 29 (2000): 512; Paul
Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science
Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 252.
2

Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the
United States, and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 27-28.
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emergent issues as explanatory factors for gradual institutional change. This approach
4

highlights institutions as a site of contestation, not simply accepted practice. The empirical
chapters that follow in the dissertation demonstrate that the successful development of the
truth-seeking process in South Africa can be explained in part as a process of gradual
institutional change. Framed as a process of incremental institutional change, changes
made to the design of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation contributed to the successful redeployment of information-gathering measures
leading up to the TRC by rebuilding credibility in the commission of inquiry in the
transitional period, and, through the adoption of witness protection measures. The most
celebrated component of the TRC, amnesty, is also explored as a process of incremental
institution change. In each of these institutional modalities, existing institutions are put to
work in different ways than how they had been used by the Apartheid regime, in this case,
to strengthen information-gathering capacities.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the transitional environments in which
truth commissions are established, articulating theoretical justification for truth
commissions and the influence of the transitional setting on their implementation. The next
section analyzes the theoretical underpinning of institutional continuity within the
historical institutionalist school of thought. The third and final section introduces theories

3

James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining
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of incremental institutional change and demonstrates how the model of conversion helps
to explain changes in the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation and articulates a potential impact on the TRC.

4.1

The Canvas for Transitional Truth-seeking

Existing theoretical accounts for the establishment and design of truth commissions can be
characterized as functionalist. A functionalist perspective usually takes as a starting point
5

that institutions can be explained based on their apparent purpose for existing. In other
words, institutions exist in the form that they do in order to solve particular problems. On
the surface, truth commissions fit this characterization easily. Truth commissions are
established for a particular purpose, such as truth-seeking and redress. Ideally, they are
6

designed by actors to meet that purpose. Because of their narrowly defined mandates—
both in duties and scope—taking the truth commission as a rationally designed institution
of redress, is in some ways, warranted.
However, as Pierson outlines, functionalist accounts do not adequately consider
three potential issues that affect institutional development and design. First, those
establishing institutions may not be acting in terms of efficacy or rationality necessarily.
Second, short-term payoffs in institutional development may have unintended
consequences for later institutional operation. Third, there is no guarantee that those

5

Paul Pierson, "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change," Governance: An
International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 13, no. 4 (2000): 477.
6

Subotić notes that this instrumentalism has expanded beyond the pursuit of justice and into the realms of
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Justice Advocacy," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 1 (2012): 122.
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establishing institutions get it right at the beginning. Similarly, in thinking about truth
commission processes, a functionalist approach does not enable an accounting for truth
commissions that are established without sufficient political will or as instrumental
8

political maneuvers.

The transitional setting also influences how truth-seeking and information
gathering can be undertaken. Theoretically, members of an outgoing regime are likely to
be interested in minimal accountability measures for past human rights violations, and as
Skaar recognizes, want to “avoid being given public blame for the violations.”

9

Significantly, in transitional settings, there is an element of flux or flexibility in political
conditions, including the institutional configurations.

10

O’Donnell and Schmitter identify

that the rules shaping transitions are usually still those imposed by the previous regime,
and that a transition is recognizable when these rules begin to be adjusted to extend rights
11

guarantees.

Critically, however, as Thelen observes, it is important to recognize that
12

institutions persist in spite of transitions.

7

Pierson, "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change," 483.

8

On instrumental dimensions of transitional justice more broadly see Jelena Subotić, "The Paradox of
International Justice Compliance," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 362383.
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The crucial element here is that the process of transition opens the possibility for
change, although which institutions change and how they change is not universal.

13

Thus,

the setting matters in the impetus to pursue information because outgoing regimes or
powerholders have an interest in not exposing past deeds. The commitment to a truth
commission, or the political will to facilitate truth-seeking, is influenced, at least in part,
by the actions and behaviour of the old regime.
The opening of a transitional space thus provides an opportunity for different ideas,
conceptualizations of rules, and institutional praxis. These rules may represent popular
demands, or may reflect a recognition of the need for reform from the “soft-liners” in a
regime, in order to maintain regime durability.

14

Many accounts of the South African

transition focus on the role of elites in negotiating the transition, with both the National
Party (NP) leadership and the African National Congress (ANC) leadership recognizing
15

there were few other pathways forward without negotiation. Others do highlight different
factors in precipitating the transition, but the transition itself is still identified as an eliteled process. Wood, for example, investigates South Africa as a case of ‘transition from

13

Geddes reminds us that the difficulties for “theoretical synthesis” in explanations for transitions to
democracy is that the types of autocratic regime from which transitions are occurring also differ. See
Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?," Annual Review of
Political Science 2 (1999): 121. This logic extends to the discussion here given that transitional justice
measures are established in different types of transitions.
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below,’ identifying the role of the masses in pressuring towards a transition. Price focuses
17

on the economic structural conditions impelling the parties toward negotiation.

This project focuses on institutional persistence and change during the transition
period. Concentrating on successive negotiated agreements and their associated
institutional deployment means that the transitional explanations that focus on the political
elite and associated institutional structures is beneficial for framing the patterns under
investigation. The theoretical framing begins with the recognition that South Africa’s
transition was negotiated by elites and that the measures towards the eventual democratic
election were negotiated arrangements, agreed to successively until consensus could be
reached on transitional arrangements themselves. The case is treated as a pacted
18

transition.

In pacted transitions, the increased maneuverability of the elite actors theoretically
enables greater bargaining potential and guarantees of participation.

19

This is particularly

relevant to the study here because of the origins of the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation within a pact, the National Peace Accord.
A pact is defined by O’Donnell and Schmitter as:
An explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a
select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing

16

On popular pressures, see, Elisabeth Jean Wood, "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular
Mobilization, Economic Interests, and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador," Comparative
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the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of
20
those entering into it.
Elite-driven models focus on the decision-making influence of those in positions of power.
This perspective reflects the belief that “the origins of democracy are to be found in
political choices rather than in structural conditions—and these choices are made by
21

elites.”

This is important because although transitional decisions are influenced by the

structural and economic realities of the political realm at the time, the agency of elites in
making agreements and compromises, in addition to the potential to renege, can change or
alter the trajectory of political transitions.
Pertinent to this discussion is the manner in which the transitional space enables
the prospect of reform. de Klerk, in his moves to liberalize and dismantle the Apartheid
system, can be characterized in O’Donnell and Schmitter’s terminology as a “soft-liner”;
working within the regime to make changes toward transition.

22

The transitional

environment characterized by ongoing negotiations contributed to an overlapping space of
governance and negotiation that persisted from 1990 to the eventual election in 1994.
Offering an analysis of the potential pathways for a transition to democracy in 1992, Van
Zyl Slabbert suggests that “there [was] nothing inevitable, nor arbitrary, about the
23

transition in South Africa – it came about by deliberate political choice.”

Giliomee also

identifies a purposeful characterization stating that the National Party, “deliberately
20
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embarked on a process that would end white minority rule.”

24

The process of negotiations

that began in 1990 and culminated in the 1993 Interim Constitution, which helped to
facilitate the democratic election of 1994, thus opened a period of domestic politics which
saw the structures of governance being used to respond to emergent issues in the
negotiation period—including state-initiated investigations. These were the conditions that
facilitated the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation. The decision to implement this information-gathering
institution, and the design of the process had impacts that continued through the transitional
period and its aftermath.

4.2

Institutional Continuities

The historical institutional approach adopted for this study enables a better understanding
of the persistence of institutional patterns through the transitional period in the form of a
commission of inquiry. It also offers a framework for exploring how information-gathering
institutions shape, and are shaped by, past use. Finally, it enables a way to account for
gradual change in institutions that persisted through Apartheid and the transition. An
historical institutionalist account is specifically useful as it expands the time-horizon under
investigation and, in so doing, allows for the incorporation of potentially overlooked
variables in explaining strengths in South Africa’s truth-seeking process.
Historical institutionalist accounts of continuity and change highlight two
important features in expectations about institutional behaviour. First, historical
institutionalism recognizes that “history matters” in understanding later political

24
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developments. Second, the literature on institutional persistence and change highlights a
recognition that, once established, institutional practices are entrenched and become more
25

resistant to change. These theoretical underpinnings help to articulate the applicability of
historical institutionalism to the pattern identified in the previous chapter: although the
truth commission is often deployed in a symbolically-laden and contextually specific
manner, conceptually, it looks similar to, and borrows heavily from its institutional relative,
the commission of inquiry. Taking more centrally the possibility that institutions may
persist in transitional politics offers a different lens to consider factors influencing the
operation of truth commissions.
Within the historical institutionalist approach, stability is framed in terms of path
dependence. Path dependence is rooted in the idea that decisions and actions made at an
earlier point in time shape later decisions—based on positive feedback which makes it
26

difficult to alter a path once a certain one is chosen.

Positive feedback and institutional

“stickiness” are central causal factors in institutions maintaining structure and stability over
27

time. As Pierson suggests, the key causal mechanism at play in this explanation is rooted
in the notion of “stickiness”:
Exploring the sources and consequences of path dependence helps us to understand
the powerful inertia or ‘stickiness’ that characterizes many aspects of political
development – for instance, the enduring consequences that often stem from the
28
emergence of particular institutional arrangements.
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Path dependence as a framing mechanism is useful in this context because it re-frames
common assumptions about the establishment of truth commissions. It lengthens the time
periods considered important from transition and post-transition periods to include
elements in the pre-transitional phase that may have been overlooked in how truth
commissions are structured.

29

In addition, the stickiness of institutions helps to explain

why investigative practices take similar shapes. Arguably, these earlier political institutions
remain remarkably significant. Unless states experience full-fledged collapse or are placed
under United Nations trusteeship, it is only possible to construct a transition using whole
parts or pieces of these already existing institutions. As much as ethically and morally there
is an urgent need to move away from corrupt or exclusive institutions, in many cases these
are the very institutions charged with constructing transitional justice processes. Or else, it
is through these institutions that incremental change is initiated towards peace and/or
democracy. Advancing an argument that implicates the role of earlier institutional
developments in the later functioning of truth commission processes seems somewhat
incompatible with the “transitional” nature of their intended use, but the persistence of the
investigatory institution over time warrants more attention.
If patterns of path dependence are taken as a theoretical starting point for
understanding the persistence of inquiries in relatively different environments, how then
can the differences in their use be explained? Commissions of inquiry were used by the
Apartheid regime to reinforce the Apartheid system, and also used during the transitional
period to begin to address the legacies of that same system. The Goldstone Commission
did this somewhat effectively and thus it is necessary to account for some variant of change.

29
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Accounts of relatively rapid changes associated with path dependence are framed as critical
junctures, which are defined as:
relatively brief episodes during which: (a) the range of possible outcomes that
might take place in the future briefly but dramatically expands; and (b) events occur
that quickly close off future possibilities and set into motion processes that track
30
specific future outcomes.
While the initiation of a political transition in South Africa may well be characterized as a
critical juncture, this decisive moment did not bring about the implementation of an entirely
new institutional configuration to investigate violence. Instead, the government returned to
existing models of commissions of inquiry that were in many ways delegitimized by the
Apartheid regime. Despite this persistence, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention
of Public Violence and Intimidation was able to operate in a manner very different to its
predecessors. This was in part based on the design of the Commission. Other innovations
emerged through its operations. Further, its innovations had important influences on later
truth-seeking process. This tension suggests a need to direct more focus to the institutions
for investigation and information gathering to explain why, despite institutional
persistence, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation operated more credibly.
Incremental accounts of institutional change developed by Mahoney and Thelen as well
as Streeck and Thelen argue that change can occur more gradually than is often afforded
by proponents of critical junctures.

31

Rather than seeing change as a result of moments of

30
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Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia Gabriela Faletti, and Adam D. Sheingate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016),
77.
31

Streeck and Thelen, "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," 1-31;
Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 1-37.

94

significant change, this approach to understanding institutional development focuses on the
process of gradual and cumulative changes over time to explain changes in institutional
composition and purpose. The value of the incremental change framework, in part, lies in
is its complementarity to the observations of path dependence. Institutions change
gradually because they persist over time. How this change occurs in light of the persistent
or entrenched nature of institutions is demonstrated in the below discussion of theories of
incremental change.

4.3
Redeployment and Adjustment: Theories of
Gradual Institutional Change
Turning to historical institutional theories of incremental change offers a compelling lens
to explain how an earlier investigative institution was deployed with a similar institutional
framework to previous commissions of inquiry but contributed to the strength of the South
African TRC, rather than repeating status-quo operations. Gradual or incremental change
approaches to institutional change identify how and why institutional arrangements can be
adjusted, in spite of the persistence of institutions. Thelen argues that path dependence still
informs incremental change explanations, but “embed[s] these elements in an analysis of
ongoing political contestation over institutional outcomes.”

32

In doing so, incremental

change frameworks highlight the processes through which institutional arrangements
persist, yet are renegotiated periodically in ways that alter their form and functions, or
continued use.

32
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This incremental change approach explains change in more gradual patterns, and
offers insight into the smaller adjustments that are made to institutions that allow them to
adapt or alter their function or purpose. Thelen, and, Mahoney and Thelen offer four
models or variations to explain incremental change in institutions: “displacement,” “drift,”
33

“layering,” and “conversion.”

As is articulated below, the mechanics of conversion help

to explain institutional persistence and redeployment of information-gathering institutions
in South Africa.
Displacement is conceptualized by Mahoney and Thelen as “the removal of existing
34

rules and the introduction of new ones.”

During the transitional period in South Africa,

many of the institutional rules for information gathering stayed formally the same. As the
coming chapters illustrate, although other Apartheid legislation was repealed, the effects
on information gathering cannot be characterized as displacement because these remained
intact. In processes of layering, existing institutional features continue to operate and
structure relationships and decisions, but additional rules and features are added to these
structures.

35

Layering “occurs when new rules are attached to existing ones, thereby

changing the ways in which the original rules structure behavior.”

36

Analysts point to the

addition of private pension rules in addition to public pension systems as an example of
37

layering.

In this example, although a public system often remains in place, the addition
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of a private system can change the behaviour of individuals and associated interest groups,
which will ultimately introduce change to the institution itself.

38

In the South African case

under consideration, the tension is that the same institutions were deployed and redeployed,
despite the transitional opening that may have facilitated the incorporation of new
institutions that might illustrate other variations of change.
Drift and conversion neither remove old rules, nor do they see new rules
implemented. Rather, these incremental change processes occur when the impact or
enactment of the existing rules changes.

39

Drift occurs when institutional configurations

are not adjusted to reflect changes in the environment.

40

Institutional arrangements have

41

different impacts because of the changed context. Onoma argues that the development of
42

land-buying companies in Kenya is an example of “drift.” The initial purpose of the landbuying companies was to enable Kenyans to purchase land that became available, yet
remained unaffordable, as settlers left in 1960s and 1970s. However, as Onoma explains,
in the years that followed, these companies were taken over by fraudsters who continued
to engage in land transactions, which turned out to be false, channeling money into political
43

campaigns and becoming tools to pressure shareholders for political support.

In this

example, the manipulation of the land title process was worsened by democratization given
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the political value in fraudulent land holdings.

44

The mechanics of ‘drift’ illustrate how

institutions created for one purposes can end up serving entirely different ends.
Conversion is defined as a change in goals, where institutional rules themselves are
45

not changed. In this variant of incremental institutional change the “rules remain formally
the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways.”

46

Institutional ambiguities can be

used by well-positioned actors to change how institutional elements are implemented. As
Mahoney and Thelen argue, “lacking the capacity to destroy an institution, institutional
challengers may be able to exploit its inherent ambiguities in ways that allow them to
47

redirect it toward more favourable functions and effects.”

In each of these variations, Mahoney and Thelen identify the role that actors have
within particular institutional settings and the degree of ambiguity in the institution in order
to explain the type of change that occurs. In settings where actors have the power and
capability to change institutional configurations, layering and drift are possible. When
actors are not positioned to make outright changes to institutions and rules, ambiguity in
the design may enable actors to make adjustments in how institutions are deployed.

48

Mahoney and Thelen argue that high or strong veto capabilities exist when actors have
49

“access to institutional or extra-institutional means of blocking change.”

44
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no such capabilities to prevent or block change, gradual institutional change is likely to
take place through displacement and conversion. Whether institutional change takes the
form of displacement or conversion depends on the degree of ambiguity in interpreting or
50

enforcing the rules.

Low levels of space for interpretation and low veto capabilities are

associated with displacement. High levels of interpretation and low levels of ambiguity are
51

associated with conversion.

The four types of incremental institutional change are also differentiated based on
52

their treatment of existing institutions and response to external environments.

Two of

these, displacement and layering, include the introduction of new rules or institutions.

53

Displacement is considered to occur when new rules are introduced and old ones
54

removed. Since displacement involves the replacement of an old institution by a new one,
its explanatory utility is limited for this discussion. Each of the institutions under
consideration in the project—the commission of inquiry, witness protection, and
amnesty—were adjusted, but not replaced outright.
In the South African case under consideration, conversion offers a useful and
relevant framework for assessing and explaining both the persistence of the commission of
inquiry as an institution of information-gathering, and a process of gradual change, given
the difficulty in changing the ‘locked-in’ institutional arrangements that structure state-led
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investigations. The context of institutional enactment, including the circumstances of
decision makers, influenced both the opening for change or persistence and the type of
incremental change that may be attempted. This is significant for understanding change in
the institutionalization of information-gathering measures because of the balance of power
of the negotiating parties. In the transitional space under examination, neither side had
strong veto capabilities given the negotiating environment and the persistent potential to
derail the process without agreement and concession. This is not to suggest that there were
no attempts to push their own interests, but rather that the negotiation environment itself
was constrained by the shared pursuit of a democratic dispensation, thereby making some
degree of change more likely.
The value of the framing of conversion depends on the fact that the commission of
inquiry was well-entrenched and “sticky” before and during South Africa’s transition. As
will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7, the recurrent use of commissions of inquiry under
Apartheid and the decision to adopt another commission to investigate violence during the
transition demonstrate the persistence of the institution. In this case, the characteristics of
conversion, the deployment of the same institutional rules but with sufficient ambiguity for
actors to make adjustments, helps make sense of the emergence of a change-inducing
commission of inquiry that remained housed in the existing institutional structures.
Conversion helps to explain how the flexibility and opportunity in the opening of the
transition were used to implement a familiar institution that was sufficiently malleable
because of the changing environment. This opportunity was seized by Commission
leadership in order to investigate ongoing violence. The effects of this gradual change are
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evident in the Goldstone Commission’s mediating of the shortcomings of the commission
of inquiry as an institutional practice.
In addition, once the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence
and Intimidation was deployed, the process of conversion continued to be identifiable in
its operation. The Commission engaged other measures to change the way information
gathering was carried out. As such, once established, the Commission underwent its own
change variations; using the structures of the commission of inquiry to facilitate witness
protection. Additionally, conversion is valuable in explaining how the institutions of
indemnity and amnesty were used in different ways during the transitional period. As will
be demonstrated in Chapter 9, the institution of amnesty itself did not change, but rather,
was used by actors in different ways to achieve different ends. Thus, the persistence of
indemnity/amnesty throughout the negotiations and through to the truth commission
process presents, on the surface, as institutional continuity, but when unpacked, the
justification for the use of this institutional modality suggests a gradual variation over time.

4.4

Institutional Design

The framework of path dependence and gradual institutional change situates the
institutional continuities and the environment conducive to change in the institutions under
consideration. Another important element in locating the potential for gradual change
within the information-gathering institutions is the design of the Commission of Inquiry
for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation at the time of its implementation in
the early 1990s. The notion of institutional design is also important in understanding the
adjustments that were made to the institution during its operation. The establishment of the
Goldstone Commission within the negotiation period in South Africa helps to explain the
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opportunity for gradual institutional change, but it is also important to recognize the
importance of institutional design. The mandate for the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was influenced by the Government’s shift
to negotiations which, in turn, helped to facilitate gradual institutional change.
In his overview of institutional design, Goodin relies on the following definition of
design: “the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a particular
55

context.” The potential for institutions to be designed in specific and varied ways to meet
social and political needs is a dominant concern in institutional theorizing. For instance,
institutional design has been identified as one contributing factor in managing ethnically
56

divided societies through constitutional engineering.

Institutional design matters because of the important role institutions play in
prescribing and facilitating interactions, making “behavior more stable and predictable.”

57

Characteristics of design influence how well an institution can perform its intended role,
and, what Goodin refers to as the “‘goodness of fit’ between the designed object…and the
larger context in which it is set.”

58

The malleability of institutional design is an important

consideration in the discussion of institutional persistence and change.
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Goodin uses Bobrow and Dryzek’s definition, see Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 31.
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Goodin suggests that institutional design matters not only in relation to the
institution doing what is intended of it, but also in relation to the larger context in which
59

institutions are embedded.

In this way, Offe’s recognition that changing context results

in critiques or the recognition of insufficiencies in existing institutions helps to explain
adjustments or changes in design.

60

However, Offe acknowledges that there are several

ways for institutions to be altered, or tweaked, either in response to broader pressures or in
order to survive.

61

Although the persistence of institutions can be seen as an indicator of

an institution that is well-established with regard to its domain or environment,

62

change

in the environment or social pressures may lead to changes in institutional design. This is
important for understanding the design of the Goldstone Commission given the state’s
initial efforts to begin dismantling Apartheid.
Similar to explanations of institutional persistence through path dependence,
theoretical accounts of institutional design recognize the importance of earlier institutional
developments in shaping later iterations or redesigning institutions.

63

A critical issue

however, is the degree of intentionality in the design of institutions and the locus of this
64

change.
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Offe recognizes, for example, that it is rare that an individual is pinpointed for

Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 37.
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Claus Offe, "Designing Institutions in East European Transitions," in The Theory of Institutional Design,
ed. Robert E. Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 223-225.
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Ibid., 219-220.
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Goodin talks about the evolutionary parallels that are often used to explain a good fit to their
environment based on institutional survival, Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 25.
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their establishment of particular variations of institutions.

Rather, design decisions

emerge from a combination of previous experience, fit within contextual needs, and the
66

interaction of accidents or unintended consequences.

Pierson also identifies that “actor-

centered rationalism” and other functionalist accounts for institutional emergence and
design are insufficient for explaining design outcomes over time because of the interaction
effects of other influencing factors.

67

However, how institutions are structured influences

how they achieve what it is they were implemented to do. The very possibility of
influencing design or adjusting institutions suggests some potential for intentionality in
design choices, acknowledging the interaction and unintended consequences that are also
68

at play.

Components of institutional design are addressed here because design alterations
were made in the creation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation. While the institution of the commission of inquiry itself
persisted, this specific iteration was designed with different powers, ostensibly to address
ongoing violence. The potential for the Goldstone Commission to carry out information
gathering in a credible fashion can be explained, in part, by these institutional design
features, as is argued in Chapter 7. Although certain institutional features were
incorporated into the original legislation for the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention
of Public Violence and Intimidation, an engagement with these design elements and the
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characteristics that enabled the introduction of gradual institutional change required a
recognition of the appropriate means and mechanisms to do so. Components of initial
institutional design, and efforts made to undertake incremental change reflected past
experience with these institutional modalities and the changing societal pressures on this
particular information-gathering institution. In addition, effective choices in the design of
these information-gathering institutions seem to have played a role in the design of the later
truth commission process.

Conclusion
This chapter has identified how institutional theorizing in terms of path dependence and
gradual institutional change structure this project. The chapter argues that the transitional
environment shaped the potential for institutional continuity and change. It argues that the
persistence of the commission of inquiry and eventually the adoption of a truth commission
suggests path dependence in institutions. Yet, the successful implementation of truthseeking measures at the TRC is a development that should also be understood as gradual
institutional change, specifically a process of conversion.
The next chapter provides a brief overview of the case of South Africa and its
institutions for truth-seeking. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that path dependence helps
account for the persistence of investigatory bodies over time. However, as these chapters
illustrate, while a path dependent framing helps to explain South Africa’s recurrent turn to
commissions of inquiry, it does not adequately account for the adjustments made to the
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation in its
deployment and operation nor its component institutional modalities. These considerations
are taken up in the chapters that follow.

105

Chapter 5

5

South Africa: Context and History

The previous two chapters have established two elements that undergird the analysis of
gradual institutional change in information-gathering institutions for this investigation of
the South African case. First, Chapter 3 identified a tension in the literature in
conceptualizations of truth commissions and commissions of inquiry and potential patterns
in their successive use. Second, Chapter 4 articulated the theoretical value in this line of
investigation into gradual change and the institutionalization of truth-seeking.
This chapter provides a brief overview of South Africa’s Apartheid system, the
political transition, and the information-gathering and truth-seeking institutions established
1

during and after the transition. There are many different possible narratives that could
explain the Apartheid state and the eventual democratic transition. Not all of these can be
explored in a study of this length. As such, the chapter is structured around violence and
the responses to violence during Apartheid and during the transition. The chapter begins
by considering the nature of Apartheid and resistance to it, and then identifies the state’s
response to that resistance. The chapter then provides an overview of the peace and

1

The Apartheid system and other policies were developed, implemented, and maintained based on
determinations of race. With regards to terminology, following Gibson, I point to Stephen R. Graubard’s
commentary in the preface to a journal’s issue about South Africa. Graubard writes, “Editorial note: In
South Africa as in the United State, racial terminology is politically charged—and constantly changing.
Many of the author in this issue observe the South African convention of dividing the country’s population
into four facial categories: white (of European descent), colored (of mixed ancestry), Indian (forebears
from the Indian subcontinent), and African. The official nomenclature for “Africans” has itself varied over
the years, changing from ‘native’ to ‘Bantu’ in the middle of the apartheid era, and then changing again to
‘black’ or, today ‘African/black.’ All of these terms appear in the essays that follow.” See Stephen R.
Graubard, "Preface to the Issue “Why South Africa Matters”," Daedalus 130, no. 1 (2001): VIII. See also,
James L. Gibson, "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 3
(2006): 410-411, footnote 417.
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constitutional negotiations that effectively brought about the end of Apartheid. The chapter
ends with a discussion of the two institutions examined in this work: the Commission of
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.

5.1

Apartheid, Conflict, and Violence

Apartheid refers to the “system of institutionalised racism and racial social engineering” in
2

South Africa. The National Party in South Africa implemented Apartheid as a policy in
1948, although racism existed in the political system prior to Apartheid’s formal adoption.3
The purported purpose of Apartheid was to ensure the strength and survival of the minority
4

white Afrikaner population and the white population more broadly. Systematic legislation
prevented the black majority from participating in political and economic structures.
Apartheid policies were precisely legislated to create and reinforce racial segregation and
dominance. In some ways, Apartheid policies drew upon or solidified earlier segregationist
policies, although the National Party developed other elements that contributed to the
totality of the system after their election in 1948.5 The systematic exclusion depended on
the state’s ability to ensure its policies permeated all levels of society. Broad legislative

2

Deborah Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," in The Cambridge History of South Africa, ed.
Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 319.
3

Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, First ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 11; Kristin
Henrard, "Post-Apartheid South Africa: Transformation and Reconciliation," World Affairs 166, no. 1
(2003): 37.
4
5

Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," 321-322.

See Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 37. South Africa, since its union had been built on policies of
exclusion and segregation. While Apartheid as a comprehensive policy was implemented in 1948,
systemized racism had already been institutionalized to some degree.
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developments affected personal freedoms, shaped society spatially, and created cleavages
and disadvantage for the duration of the regime.
One of Apartheid’s undergirding pieces of legislation was the Population
Registration Act of 1950.6 The law stipulated that “a white person, a coloured person or a
native, as the case may be, and every coloured person and every native whose name is so
included shall be classified by the Director according to the ethnic or other group to which
he belongs.”7 By cementing racial categories, laws could then be enforced based on a
person’s skin colour. These and other laws and policies dictated all facets of peoples’ lives.
The legislation, Sitze suggests, “criminalized the very existence of ordinary Africans...”

8

Restrictions limited where the black population could live and when and under what
9

conditions black people could travel into designated white areas. Legislation dictated
racially specific educational institutions, demarcated hospitals, and prohibited relationships
between races. Signs delineated spaces and services that were designated for whites only—
from post offices, to public transport, and most places in between.

10

These restrictive

policies stripped the majority of the population of political and civil rights and entrenched
a disparate socio-economic system.

6

Van Zyl Slabbert notes that the other legislation depends on this piece of implementation, see Frederik
Van Zyl Slabbert, The Last White Parliament (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers and Hans Strydom
Publishers, 1985), 43.
7

Union of South Africa, Population Registration Act 1950, §5.
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Adam Sitze, "The Opposite of Apartheid: Further Notes on Mandela and the Law," Discourse 40, no. 2
(2018): 149.
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For a comprehensive discussion of Apartheid laws see John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African
Legal Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).
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To enforce Apartheid policies and maintain this prescribed order, a heavy state
11

bureaucracy and security establishment developed.

Posel captures the intersections

between enforcement and governance under Apartheid:
For an African person, all the minutiae of everyday life – where and with whom they
lived, worked, had sex, travelled, shopped, walked or sat down, what they owned and
consumed – were governed either by issue of appropriate permits or passes or by
public prohibitions and proscriptions. So, encounters with police, charged with
enforcing the racial boundaries that animated these regimes of surveillance, were
12
inevitable, and breaches of the myriad regulations were legion.
State institutions, the bureaucracy, and policing expanded to enforce Apartheid policies.
Opposition and resistance to the structures of oppression endured as Government
entrenched regulation and enforcement.
With varying levels of organization, opposition to Apartheid developed early on.
Apartheid resistance and opposition organizations including the African National Congress
(ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC), and the United Democratic Front (UDF), for
example organized and campaigned against the government with different approaches
(violent and non-violent), levels of organization, and impact. In general, early largely nonviolent means including strikes, sit-ins, and protests characterized early opposition to
Apartheid laws. The Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws of 1952 is one example.

13

During this campaign, volunteers broke Apartheid laws to go to jail, rather than pay the
fines associated with the criminalized acts they had committed.14 Dubow identifies that

11

Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 37, 60.
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Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," 347.
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Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 42.
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Anne Kelk Mager and Maanda Mulaudzi, "Popular Responses to Apartheid: 1948-c. 1975," in The
Cambridge History of South Africa, ed. Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 372.
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“the hope was that by inviting arrest and imposing intolerable burdens on the state’s
capacity to police its own regulations, the system would be rendered inoperable.”15 The
government responded to the campaign not by loosening Apartheid restrictions but rather
with a re-entrenchment through the passage of laws that strengthened the Government’s
hand in responding to resistance.16
The intersection of the forces of control and opposition is embodied in the 1960
Sharpeville massacre, a critical turning point in South Africa’s history. A demonstration
organized by the Pan-Africanist Congress to protest the pass laws resulted in 69 deaths and
hundreds of injuries after the South African Police (SAP) opened fire on the crowd. Though
the gathering was large, the protesters were unarmed. Many had been shot in the back,
prompting the TRC to make the finding that “police deliberately opened fire on an unarmed
crowd…the SAP failed to give the crowd an order to disperse…the police failed to facilitate
access to medical and/or other assistance to those who were wounded immediately after
the march.”

17

This police response to protest was not novel, but the Sharpeville massacre
18

had significant impacts.

Frankel suggests that:

The massacre was not, in the end, simply a question of the white police ‘getting at’
the people… On the contrary, Sharpeville is an example of wider moments in the
universal experience where the political rulers and their ruled have been locked into
tension, antagonism and irremediable conflict, elements which so frequently form
the tragic backdrop to human atrocities.19
15

Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 43.
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Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 43-45. As Dubow outlines, despite non-violence underpinning this
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17
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Commission of South Africa (29 October 1998), Chapter 6, 537.
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23-26.
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University Press, 2001), 12-13.
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The government responded to the events at Sharpeville by criminalizing opposition through
the banning of organizations deemed to be threats (including the ANC and PAC); a formal
20

inquiry into the massacre through a Commission of Inquiry; and the passing of indemnity
21

legislation for state actors involved.

The consensus of analysts is that after Sharpeville,

Apartheid resisters decided that non-violent collective action was not likely to dismantle
Apartheid.22
In the year following Sharpeville, the ANC formed a separate wing, Umkhonto we
Sizwe (MK), with which to engage in armed struggle against the state.23 In the initial stages,
MK directed its campaign of violence against the Apartheid state at symbolic government
infrastructure.24 The rebellion against the regime became increasingly violent.

25

Rallies,

protests, and bombings were accompanied by profound violence targeting those alleged to
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be allied with the government.

The state responded by driving police and security forces

beyond the mere enforcement of Apartheid’s rule to the adoption of a counter-revolutionary
approach that brought with it differing degrees of repression.
During the late 1980s, the security forces in South Africa had wide powers and
reach. As the nature of the conflict between the state and opposition forces shifted, the
state’s tools to enforce order and respond to opposition forces shifted. In the public eye,
the ebb and flow of opposition and uprisings saw police and security forces gain significant
27

power in their ability to arrest and detain without trial. Both ‘regular’ and covert policing
operations demonstrated elements of violence. From the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, the
security apparatus of the state developed the capabilities required to carry out organized
and effective counter-insurgency operations often beyond the purview of the public. As
Ellis states, “both Police and army were in time to create units, or adapt existing ones, to
carry out the job of undertaking internal repression of the robust nature which the
government required.”

28

Vlakplaas, for example, was a covert police operation that

conducted targeted assassinations, comprising the ‘hit squads’ of Apartheid.

29

The pattern of violence changed with the initiation of the transition period. Guelke
notes that “the period of the transition was [the] bloodiest in South Africa’s existence as a

26

Davis, The ANC's War Against Apartheid, 5; see also, Jeffrey, People’s War: New Light on the Struggle
for South Africa.
27

Stephen Ellis, "The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force," Journal of Southern African
Studies 24, no. 2 (1998): 266.
28
29

Ibid., 274.

Anurima Bhargava, "Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission," Columbia Law Review 102, no. 5 (2002): 1319; Piers Pigou, "The Apartheid
State and Violence: What Has the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Found?," Politikon 28, no. 2
(2001): 212; Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 175.

112

political entity.”

30

Political violence encroached on most elements of society through

violent conflicts between opposing groups, assassinations, state and non-state attacks on
civilians, and the destruction of infrastructure. It is estimated that approximately 15,000
people died in political violence in the negotiation and transition period, between February
1990 and April 1994.31 This number does not include the deaths that occurred through
opposition and state response during the preceding decades of armed resistance. Violence
increased dramatically during the transitional years.32
Classifying political violence during the transition in terms of dominant actors
engaged in conflict assists in analyzing institutional responses to it. Guelke identifies four
categories of violence during the transition: “aggressive action by the security forces;
conflict between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC; racial attacks by the
Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA)…; and the spoiler violence by the extreme
right.”33 These categories are not mutually exclusive nor do they capture the pervasiveness
of violence within society. The value in this framing is a narrower scope to discuss the
investigative institutional developments that followed because they illustrate the breadth
of actors and associated violence. The conflict between the ANC and IFP, the security

30
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forces, and the third force are examined briefly below. This is not an exhaustive account
of political violence in South Africa’s transition, these are representations to contextualize
the institutional responses that are discussed in the next chapters.
The violence between the ANC and IFP was a conflict over potential political power
for black South Africans.

34

ANC supporters and IFP supporters engaged in conflicts,

35

clashes, and raids. Most often this violence took place within South Africa’s townships,
where both groups created self-defence units.

37

36

In some cases, violence erupted between

ANC-aligned residents and IFP aligned workers housed in accommodation for workers,
38

known as hostels, in the township areas.

In his study of the Thokoza and Katlehong

townships, Kynoch describes the violent interaction between IFP aligned hostel residents
and ANC residents in the township: “political marches and funerals were frequently
interrupted by fighting; train and taxi commuters were slaughtered; prominent officials

34

Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence," 250; Gary Kynoch, "Reassessing Transition Violence:
Voices from South Africa’s Township Wars, 1990-4," African Affairs 112, no. 447 (2013): 285. There are
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were assassinated; and, on many occasions, state police and soldiers contributed to the
39

violence.”

Investigations and the compilation of accounts of violence suggests that the

conflict between the ANC and IFP is difficult to disentangle from the influence and support
from state security forces. In numerous examples there is a web of complicity that
complicates the representation of violence.
The security forces, comprising the police and the military, were associated with
elements of the political violence that accompanied the South African transition. The
security forces were implicated in transitional violence by providing weapons to the IFP,
using problematic (and often fatal) tactics of crowd control, and failing to sufficiently
40

investigate violence.

Political detainees continued to die in police custody.

41

Protests

were dangerous for participants; the TRC Report indicates that “killing by the security
forces, primarily in the course of public order policing, numbered 518 between July 1991
42

and June 1993.”

Beyond these tactics, the security forces were accused of participating

in, and instigating violence, as a part of allegations of a “third force,” which had significant
implications for investigations into violence. An example in which these elements are
represented can helpfully elucidate the types of concerns associated with violence in the
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South African transition, though one example does not portray the breadth of the issues.
The Boipatong massacre can be used to illustrate these various elements of police
involvement and negligence. Considerable attention has been paid to this event, but
accounts and findings differ. The purpose in presenting this example is to illustrate the
components and complexity of the violence.
The Boipatong Massacre occurred on June 17, 1992, when armed hostel dwellers
from the KwaMadala hostel attacked residents in Boipatong killing 45 people and injuring
22 people.

43

In the TRC’s reporting of the incident, it is alleged that the police role in this

violence included charges that the police were called to the scene and did not intervene,
had been tipped off ahead of time and did not intervene, that police were near the centres
of violence as the group carried out the attack, and that the police completed poor
44

investigations. Accounts of the police’s role in the attack vary; implicated in this variation
is the lack of concrete evidence of police involvement but eyewitness accounts recalled
police vehicles near to, and white men participating in, the violence. Both accounts have
45

been probed.

43
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The police investigation of the Boipatong massacre was itself problematic. James
Simpson identifies that even after the attack, “no immediate effort was made to investigate
its causes, beyond escorting a detective photographer.”

46

The Goldstone Commission

conducted an investigation assisted by two international experts: a judge and policing
47

expert.

The latter, P.A.J. Waddington, investigated allegations of police involvement in

the massacre.

48

The admission that police had taped over the recordings from the night of
49

the massacre increased suspicion of police involvement.

Waddington’s report outlined

extensive policing inadequacies and incompetence, but did not find evidence of police
50

complicity.
massacre.”

Sixteen KwaMadala residents were convicted for “involvement in the

51

The massacre at Boipatong illustrates one type of violence that accompanied the
transition and the complex interaction of police in the violence. Witness accounts and
follow up investigations differed in the perception about the role of police. The police were
implicated not only in the violence but also in the conduct of the investigation, giving the
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air of bias or indifference. This is significant when considering that investigations during
the transitional period and in the preceding years relied upon the police.
James Simpson notes that “the Boipatong massacre is broadly viewed as evidence of
a third force, comprising elements within the state security working covertly and illegally
52

to undermine the ANC and its allies.” This view persists despite the different conclusions
drawn by Waddington and the TRC. However, Boipatong is a symbolic reference point in
the discussions of violence in South Africa and the third force is a persistent thread in these
53

discussions.

Discourse around the involvement of a “third force” in violence in South Africa
54

emerged in the early 1990s.

The third force remained a central feature on the discourse

of violence before and during the transition. The “third force” refers to the belief that
violence and destabilization efforts were being carried out covertly, particularly by the
government, to weaken opposition. Ellis characterizes the third force as “state-organised
or state-connected covert and clandestine networks” that developed from the mid 1980s.
It was “a nexus of SADF and Police units experienced in covert warfare.”

56

55

At the time,

efforts to establish the existence of a third force proved elusive. However, as investigations
continued, evidence emerged of the security forces’ involvement in violence. The
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Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation played a
57

central role in uncovering evidence in this regard.

Guelke criticizes the TRC report’s focus on the third force to interpret political
violence as an effort to weaken the ANC’s hold on power because it does not account for
persistent political violence after the election and the government’s response to violence
58

during the ongoing negotiations.

Ellis’ account, tracing the third force, suggests that

specific security force units were involved in a centralized manner, but this organizational
structure waned in 1992.

59

Even without agreement on the extent of these operations, the

allegations of a third force affected the perception of violence in the transitional period and
the associated investigations.
The state’s perceived and actual role in carrying out violence and its role in violence
through collusion or improper investigations are critical issues for understanding the statemandated investigations that inquired into these allegations. Negotiating the past will be
an ongoing venture for South Africa, and the contested narratives of violence will continue
60

to be part of the conversation.

It is the institutional mechanisms that developed around

the violence that are the focus here. The nature of the violence between the ANC and IFP,
and the role of police in that violence are important to take into account in the establishment
of investigative institutions to address these issues. As is illustrated below, some of the
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components of the National Peace Accord (NPA) aimed to prevent and investigate violence
that had taken hold in much of the country.

5.2

The Political Transition

The late 1980s and into the early 1990s saw the beginning of transformation and transition
in South Africa. Major milestones in South Africa’s transition to democracy punctuate the
political narrative of the transition. President de Klerk’s 1990 speech to parliament in which
he announced the decision to remove the ban on the ANC and South African Communist
Party (SACP), release Nelson Mandela from prison, and begin to repeal other elements of
Apartheid legislation, was the turning point in the transformation of the South African
political system.61 After 27 years, Nelson Mandela was released from prison and
negotiations continued towards an inclusive, and non-racial democracy. Over four years,
major political parties and groups in South Africa negotiated an Interim Constitution in
1993 and held the first democratic election in April 1994. Despite the violence that had
pervaded the country during the negotiations, the election itself was largely uninterrupted
by violence. The 1994 democratic elections were cemented through a series of negotiated
agreements that, at different stages, engaged government leaders, delegates of previously
banned political organizations, and representatives of the independent homelands.
The negotiations toward a democratic transition were precipitated by a number of
62

core issues that suggest a “stalemate” brought the leadership to the negotiating table. The
ANC was the Government’s most prominent negotiating partner. The survival of South

61
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Africa and the continued inclusion of the white minority induced the Government to the
negotiating table. On the other side of the table, the ANC’s fight against the Apartheid
regime had reached a point in the late 1980s where “winning” the struggle was increasingly
63

unlikely.

The ANC’s struggle against the regime using tactics of guerilla war and
64

insurrection to overthrow the regime was proving untenable and unsuccessful.

In

addition, the costs of coercive response to opposition to Apartheid were becoming
increasingly problematic for the regime.

65

As Friedman outlines, “as long as order could

be maintained by force alone, and sanctions remained, the country faced an inevitable
66

economic decline.”

The dynamics precipitating the negotiations and the process of

negotiation itself illustrate that the transition in South Africa was neither imposed by the
67

government nor a result of the overthrow of the government.

Negotiations were

recognized by both sides as the best chance at what Friedman calls “a post-apartheid
68

order.”

As such, the process of concession and agreement through which the transition

was crafted is important for the development of the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.
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According to Rantente and Giliomee, initially the government “assumed it could
initiate a process of democratization on terms determined by the government.”

69

These

scholars suggest that the external pressures facing the Government were acted upon in such
a manner as to try to ensure the government maintained control over the transition process,
through a power-sharing arrangement with the ANC. Crucially, however, the negotiations
did not unfold like this and the Government “needed the consent of the ANC for all kinds
of transactions ranging from an interim government, constituent assembly and the rules of
70

the first election.”

This negotiation environment in which the information-gathering

mechanisms were established and the forces affecting institutional entrenchment and
change are significant for the considerations of gradual institutional change that are
analyzed in the coming chapters.
Between the February 1990 release of Mandela and the start of the Convention for a
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in late 1991, several other pacts were helped to
facilitate the constitutional negotiations. Three agreements between the Government and
the ANC preceded the National Peace Accord. These agreements were: the Groote Schuur
71

Minute (1990), the Pretoria Minute (1990), and the D.F. Malan Accord (1991).
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In each of these agreements, there were provisions to manage violence. The
Government of South Africa and the African National Congress negotiated the Groote
Schuur Minute in Cape Town in April 1990. The Groote Schuur Minute established a
working group to investigate the release of political prisoners and identify legislation that
could be used to determine what constituted political crimes. The same two parties then
negotiated Pretoria Minute, which sketched the timeline for the release of political
prisoners and set parameters for release. The early agreements at Groote Schuur and
72

Pretoria included efforts to disarm MK.

In addition, in the Pretoria Minute the ANC

agreed to suspend activities of its armed wing in order to negotiate with the Government.
Through the D.F. Malan Accord “it was agreed that the ANC would no longer infiltrate
men and material into South Africa and that violence and intimidation accompanying mass
73

action had to be eliminated.”

These agreements were, in a sense, incremental steps

towards the larger agreement.
Friedman identifies that the National Peace Accord “was the first formal multi-party
accord, and it built sufficient confidence among the parties to persuade them to proceed to
74

constitutional talks.” Even with these incremental steps, agreement on the National Peace
Accord was not easily secured. Government proclamations and attempts at initiating
dialogue were often received with a reasonable amount of scepticism.75 More than 40
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groups signed the NPA on 14 September 1991 at the National Peace Conference in
Johannesburg, South Africa.76 The ten chapters of the NPA included a range of provisions
for political actors and members of various security forces, structured peace committees at
a local, regional, and national level, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation, and provisions for specific courts to deal with the peace
78

agreement.77 It was a comprehensive agreement.

The structures incorporated into the

National Peace Accord laid out standards of behaviour and measures for monitoring that
supported the next phases of negotiations, culminating in the multi-party negotiation
process to design and implement multi-racial democracy in South Africa. Once the peace
agreement was signed, it was anticipated that constitutional negotiations could proceed.
Prior to the formal negotiations that began in December 1991, the parties had to agree on
how the new democratic dispensation would be decided upon and designed.
Over the years of negotiations, the necessary persistence of engagement is evident.
Key issues in the negotiations included the issues of majority rule and the establishment of
an interim government. On these points the Government’s aim was to protect the white
minority interests and the ANC’s goal was securing full democratic rights for the majority
who had been disenfranchised.

79

From early on the ANC was persistent on the matter of

majority rule. In addition, the ANC was against the negotiation of a new constitution by
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unelected negotiating personnel.

80

With regards to the possibility of an interim

government, Rantete and Giliomee suggest that, “in the second half of 1991 the
government began to explore new options, signalling its acceptance that it was impossible
to dictate the process from above…”

81

On both sides, concessions are evident in the

eventual agreement.
The Government’s choice mechanism for establishing a democratic South Africa was
82

through “a multi-party conference.”

On the Government’s side, the critical issue

underpinning the initiation of negotiations was that it would maintain protections for the
white minority through a power-sharing arrangement, and did not want to agree to a
majority rule system.

83

As Rantente and Giliomee observed, “uppermost in De Klerk’s

mind was the need to balance the transition process in such a way that he gave enough
assurances to white without unduly alarming the ANC as main negotiating partner…”

84

The ANC’s stance was that the new constitutional order could only be established by a
constituent assembly that had been elected by a majority.

85

These issues persisted through

the eventual multi-party negotiation process established as the Convention for Democratic
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South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991, which brought together 19 negotiation
parties.

86

Two iterations of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I and
CODESA II) were established. These were multi-party talks for the establishment of a
democratic constitution.

87

The breakdown of the CODESA II talks resulted in the
88

development of another new round of negotiations. The renewed negotiations, the MultiParty Negotiating Process, composed of the Negotiating Council and the Transitional
89

Executive Council (as well as a Plenary body and Planning Committee). The transitional
90

process and a draft constitution were developed within these structures. The Transitional
Executive Council (TEC) administered the country in preparation for the democratic
91

election held in April 1994. One representative from each party to the MPNP could serve
on the TEC, and the TEC selected membership of the TEC sub-councils working in areas
like defence and finance.

92

In the end, in December 1993, an agreement to an Interim constitution was secured.
The Government and the ANC agreed to a limited power-sharing arrangement during
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which time a permanent constitution would be developed.

Lingering issues in the

negotiations were resolved late in the process of negotiating the 1993 Interim-Constitution,
including the amnesty clause.

94

While it is beyond the scope of this project to outline all elements of the negotiation
process, outlining some of the key preferences and demands of the negotiating parties
illustrates the context in which the Commission was established. In addition, the theories
of institutional change employed in this project highlight the significance of actors and
95

coalitional dynamics. Particularly important is an accounting of the ability or inability of
key actors and institutions to prevent change.

96

Here then, it is helpful to identify the key

actors in the negotiation process to illuminate the dynamic of the negotiation environment
in which the institutions under investigation were operating.
Both parties’ recognition that the only way to end the crisis was through negotiation
established a sort of balance, limiting each party’s ability to move forward unilaterally and
block changes without consensus.

97

As Sisk recognized, “the preliminary negotiations

phase shows that in the South African case it is political leaders who best understand the
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maxim that ‘the alterative in any event it too ghastly to contemplate.’”

98

This helps to

illuminate the potential for parties to initiate, refuse, or block proposed changes.
Despite this recognition, destabilizing violence threatened to move the negotiations
off track throughout the process.

99

Violence was an existential threat to negotiations with

the Government insisting that the ANC abandon its armed struggle and the ANC insisting
that it would not continue negotiations with ongoing violence continuing and with the
suspicion that the government was funding or instigating violence through the IFP.

100

As

Rantete and Giliomee identify:
Under severe pressure, De Klerk removed the ministers for defence and police from
their positions and appointed a standing commission to investigate instances of
violence. This cleared the air sufficiently for the government and the ANC to
participate, along with other parties and bodies, in the launching of a peace initiative
101
which culminated in a Peace Accord.
Sisk argues that the peace accord itself was a vehicle to manage violence, the structures
which “reflect[ed] a recognition that the control of violence during the course of the
transition [was] a long term prospect.”

102

This proved accurate: even after the signing of

the NPA, at several points during the constitutional negotiations that followed acts of
violence—such as the Boipatong Massacre of 1992—threatened to derail negotiations.
Indeed, the ANC suspended CODESA II after the massacre at Boipatong.

98

Ibid., 87.

99

See Sisk, "Violence-Negotiation Nexus," 77-94.

100

103

See for example. Rantete and Giliomee, "Transition to Democracy through Transaction?," 521. For a
more detailed overview, see Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 133-152.
101

Rantete and Giliomee, "Transition to Democracy through Transaction?," 521.

102

Sisk, "Violence-Negotiation Nexus," 89.

103

Rantete and Giliomee, "Transition to Democracy through Transaction?," 539.

128

The major negotiating parties had different ideas about how the negotiations should
unfold and how a new constitution would be established. Van Zyl Slabbert argued that de
Klerk’s efforts to initiate the transition and maintain control over it was not sustainable and
dependent on the other side. Van Zyl Slabbert recognized “the agenda is open-ended and
determined by the quality of interaction between the regime and the challengers to its
authority who have entered the bargaining space created by the regime.”

104

The process of

designing the new constitution required engagement on issues of institutional design and
processes of transitional decision-making and these issues were not easily settled.
Prior to the end of the negotiating period Sisk identified that the insecurity of the
105

security forces in South Africa was an important consideration.

This builds on

O’Donnell and Schmitter’s recognition that “no political actor in a transition from
authoritarian rule is more insecure than the old regime’s security forces.”

106

Several

sources have identified that the security forces’ pressure for amnesty was significant such
that threats were made towards the end of the negotiations that threatened to prevent the
election should amnesty not be provided.

107

Ellis argues that “the evidence suggests that

few senior officers actually wanted to sabotage negotiations for good simply because they
knew this would not help them win the war. If they had wanted to do so it would have been
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easy enough to sabotage the elections of April 1994.”

108

This is significant because the

negotiations and transition depended on the participation of the security forces and made
the security forces the strongest veto player in the process. However, as Lodge recognizes,
109

the majority of the state’s security forces remained loyal to the Government.

The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation
operating during the constitutional negotiations. This Commission was established to
investigate violence as part of the formal National Peace Accord in 1991. The Goldstone
Commission is introduced here, followed by the 1995 Truth and Reconciliation
Commission implemented after the democratic election.

5.3
The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of
Public Violence and Intimidation
The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation played
a crucial role in monitoring and reporting on transitional violence while South Africa
dismantled Apartheid and prepared for democracy. The National Peace Accord provisions
specified the establishment of this standing commission on violence. Chapter Six of the
National Peace Accord stipulated the creation of a “Commission of Inquiry Regarding the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (“the Commission”).

110

The text

introducing the provision for the standing commission rationalizes the inquiry based on an
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acknowledgement that investigations decrease violence by exposing it.

111

The agreement

states:
It is clear that violence and intimidation declines when it is investigated and when
the background and reasons for it is exposed and given media attention. There is
therefore need for an effective instrument to do just that. It is agreed that the
Commission established by the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation
Act, 1991, be used as an instrument to investigate and expose the background and
reasons for violence, thereby reducing the incidence of violence and
112
intimidation.
The Commission, chaired by Judge Richard Goldstone, conducted investigations
into prominent episodes of public violence plaguing South Africa. The Commission
produced over 40 reports (interim and final).

113

These provided information on

investigations into particular violent episodes, identification on causes where possible, and
included recommendations. The legislation stipulated that reports would be provided to the
State President, who would release them if “he deems necessary in the public interest.”

114

From the outset, the task ahead of the Commission was significant. When the
Commission’s initial investigation launched, one media report quotes Judge Goldstone
stating that the Commission “cannot possibly itself inquire into every incidence of political
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violence.”

Furthermore, the Commission recognized that it was “not the Commission’s

function to investigate incidents of public violence where the cause thereof is known.”

116

Despite these limitations, the Goldstone Commission conducted investigations into
117

significant and potentially destabilizing violent episodes and attacks.

This included such

incidents as the Boipatong massacre and the Bisho incidents, both of which impacted on
the negotiations because of the violence.

118

In addition, the Commission conducted

hearings and released reports pertaining to thematic issues of violence facing South Africa,
119

such as persistent violence on commuter taxis and trains.

The Commission’s investigations into violent episodes ascertained tangible
evidential information. In some instances, the Commission confirmed information publicly
for the first time. This was the case, most famously or perhaps most anticipated in the
allegations of a ‘third force’ operating and instigating violence.
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Careful in its approach
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to the issue of evidence, the Commission “consistently refused to make findings without
adequate evidence.”

121

However, when it was able to make findings, it did so.

122

Goldstone
123

later reflected that “the commission didn’t tell people things they did not really know.”

However, Goldstone also acknowledged that the commission played a role in creating the
124

conditions for the establishment of the TRC.

In addition to the recommendations in the reports, the commission recommended
guidelines to prevent future violence and intimidation. As per the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation Act, the Commission was to:
make recommendations to the State President regarding–
(i) the general policy which ought to be followed in respect of the prevention
of public violence and intimidation;
(ii) steps to prevent public violence or intimidation;
(iii) any other steps it may deem necessary or expedient, including proposals for
the passing of legislation, to prevent a repetition or continuation of any act
125
or omission relating to public violence or intimidation…
The Commission made a number of such recommendations relating to marches and
gatherings and the impending election. These are explored in further detail in Chapter 7.
The Commission’s investigation parameters are outlined here. Anyone could make a
request of the Commission to address an element of public violence by following specified
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procedures.

126

Given its independence from the government, the Commission decided
127

which incidences of violence to investigate.

When the Commission decided that an issue

or incident warranted investigation, it established a committee of the commission. These
smaller committees enabled a wider reach for the commission, rather than requiring all
members investigate all instances of violence.
The Commission was not a court and was only able to make recommendations to the
Attorney General when it was “of the opinion that the facts disclose the commission of an
offence by any person.”

128

Established to investigate emergent violence, the Commission

was precluded from investigating “any particular occurrence which took place and ended
before the Commencement of this Act” or “occurrences in respect of which a prosecution,
inquest or an inquiry by an official commission of inquiry was instated or completed before
129

the commencement of this Act.”

Not all earlier investigative inquiries laid a positive foundation for truth-seeking
and in South Africa, commissions of inquiry were frequently used to support the regime
rather than produce change. The conditions that structured and influenced the Goldstone
Commission were themselves distinctive, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 7. Having
already initiated a path of reform, the Government established the Goldstone Commission
as part of a negotiated agreement to address the increase in violence. That this Commission
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was part of a peace agreement, and that it operated as constitutional negotiations were
moving forward, resulted in a necessary consensus about its core operating components.
Through its operation, the Goldstone Commission distinguished itself from earlier
commissions of inquiry in important ways, thereby increasing its credibility. Furthermore,
some of the elements included in the design of the Commission’s legislation enabled
shortcomings that had been inherent in earlier commissions to be addressed. These
components of gradual institutional change that are taken up in Chapters 7, 8, and 9.
Adjustments in the institutional modalities of the Goldstone Commission help to explain
some of the institutional innovations in the South African TRC.

5.4
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
South Africa
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) continues to be heralded
as one of the most successful truth commissions to date. Its operation has been lauded as a
cornerstone of South Africa’s transition. Its notoriety as a response to the harms committed
during Apartheid popularized the truth commission as an institution of redress. Though
there were critics of the process at the time, the dominant perception, especially from
130

international observers, was a positive one.

The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 founded and
structured the TRC in South Africa. With the stated goals of “promoting national unity and
reconciliation,” the commission’s tasks were:
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a

analysing and describing the ‘causes, nature and extent’ of gross violations
of human rights that occurred between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994,
including the identification of the individuals and organisations responsible
for such violations;

b

making recommendations to the President on measures to prevent future
violations of human rights;

c

the restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of gross human
rights violations through testimony and recommendations to the President
concerning reparations for victims;

d

granting amnesty to persons who made full disclosure of relevant facts
131
relating to acts associated with a political objective.

The TRC was composed of three committees: the Human Rights Violations Committee
(HRV), the Amnesty Committee, and the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee.

132

The President appointed 17 commissioners to serve on the TRC, after public
consultation.

133

It is noteworthy that not only were the Commissioners selected based on

extensive public engagement, but the legislation passed by Parliament was also subjected
134

to extensive public debate and input.

The HRV Committee received statements and compiled information on abuses
perpetrated during the period covered by the mandate. This committee also facilitated the
public hearings and invited victims to testify. According to the TRC report, “the
corroborated allegations of gross violations of human rights contained in these 21 000
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statements form the basis for the Human Rights Violations Committee’s conclusions about
the nature of the conflict.”

135

The public hearings that captured significant public and

media attention were an innovation of the South African TRC. The HRV Committee and
its staff determined which cases would be heard in the public hearings. Selected as
“window cases,” these cases represented the breadth of abuses that took place, in an attempt
to provide a cross-sectional overview of the patterns of violations without an ability to
136

provide every case with a public hearing.

The TRC also relied on statement takers that

travelled to communities to record testimonies in written form.

137

The Amnesty Committee’s mandate was to receive and adjudicate applications
from individuals to determine whether amnesty would be granted. The Amnesty
Committee process and hearings were also an innovation in the realm of truth commissions.
The South African TRC was the first truth commission invested with the powers to grant
amnesty. The Amnesty Committee received applications for amnesty for crimes “with a
political objective” committed between March 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994.

138

Amnesty

numbers are categorized based on whether individuals met the eligibility requirement to
apply for amnesty and, whether those that met the criteria of political crimes were seeking
139

amnesty for “gross human rights violations” or not.

Public hearings were only required

for those who committed “gross human rights violations,” with the others addressed
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administratively.

In total, 7116 people applied for amnesty. Of these, 4500 applications

were “rejected administratively for mostly having no political agenda.”

141

Of the

142

remainder, 1167 people were granted full amnesty, and 145 partial amnesty.

The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee was responsible for “developing a
policy for long-term reparations as well as urgent interim relief.”

143

The Reparations and

Rehabilitation Committee was largely a recommending body, with Parliament responsible
for the final decisions.

144

As such, this committee engaged in processes to gather

information about reparations, including with non-governmental organizations and
churches and conducting research on the impact of human rights violations on victims.

145

The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee also developed witness support programs,
which worked to support those who provided testimony at public hearings, and associated
training for statement takers.

146

The public testimonies to the HRV committee and the amnesties that garnered the
most attention, and behind the scenes, the TRC collected, compiled, and investigated
thousands of testimonies. Investigative and research staff supported the hearings, as well
as a significant administrative staffing component. Despite the “serious powers of search,
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seizure, and subpoena,” bestowed upon the Research Department, and the “sizeable and
variegated structure established” in pursuit of the goals of the TRC,
difficulties in collecting and evaluating the information it received.

147

the TRC faced

148

The TRC also contended with a number of challenges that illustrate a significant
interaction with other accountability institutions, particularly the legal system. Individuals
and organizations brought a number of court cases against the TRC with regards to its
149

constitutionality,

150

review of amnesty decisions,

notification of the accused.

151

and parameters surrounding

In a high profile case, former president P.W. Botha was

charged and prosecuted after he “failed to appear” after being subpoenaed to appear before
152

the commission.

This is important when considering the variety of state structures that

supported the TRC to achieve its independence and reliability. In the South African case,
this demonstrates the availability and deployment of state structures to support truthseeking.
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In October 1998, the TRC produced a five volume report detailing an overview of
violence committed by the state and opposition forces.

153

The contentiousness of the

process is illustrated in these final moments of the commission:
Former president F.W. de Klerk successfully sued to block the commission, at least
temporarily, from naming him in the report. In addition, the ANC, unhappy with
the commission’s conclusion about its past actions, attempted to block publication
of the entire report with a clumsy, last-minute court challenge; the court ruled in
154
favor of the commission just hours before the report was due to be released.
The Amnesty Committee completed its operations in 2002 after the rest of the TRC had
concluded operations, and produced additional volumes to add to the Commission’s final
report.
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the South African TRC is considered one of the most
successful truth commissions.
157

means,

156

Despite the lack of agreement on what ‘success’

the South African TRC is still presented as a model. Whereas most accounts of

success look towards the impact of the TRC, this remains problematic because of a lack of
empirical assessments of the relationship between truth and reconciliation and the difficulty
assessing these claims.
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However, accounts of the TRC often speak to innovations in its
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institutional components. The inclusion of powers of search and seizure, witness
protection, and amnesty set the capacity of the truth commission apart from other truth
commissions.

159

The TRC had significant breadth of powers and was bestowed with

institutional features to carry out its truth-seeking endeavours including subpoena powers
160

and search and seizure powers.

The procedural and institutional components of the TRC

are indicators of success for its operation. The project does not extend the successful
operation of the TRC to the potential outcomes of reconciliation or justice.
Gibson articulates the TRC as a success because of the impact on reconciliation and
he focuses, in part, on the institutional characteristics that informed the process. Gibson
argues that the degree to which society engaged the process, the ability of the commission
to draw in the attention of citizens, the TRC’s impartiality, even-handed blame attribution,
the focus on restorative justice, and the leadership of the transition all contributed to its
success. It was the credible manner in which the truth commission operated that contributed
161

to reconciliation.

For Gibson, institutional legitimacy is essential for effective truth
162

commissions when explored in relation to reconciliation.

Gibson argues that the success

Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?," International Studies Review, no. 6
(2004): 355-380. For an empirical assessment of this relationship that finds a positive relationship, see
Gibson, "Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation," 409-432.
159

Ben-Josef Hirsch, "Ideational change," 817-818; Boraine, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa:
The Third Way," 144-153; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 27-28; Paul van Zyl, "Dilemmas of Transitional
Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission," Journal of International
Affairs 52, no. 2 (1999): 656.
160

Boraine, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way," 146. See also, Audrey R.
Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, "Introduction: Assessing the South African Transitional Justice Model
" in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver, ed. Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van
der Merwe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 10, 12.
161

Gibson, "Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation," 416-418.

162

Gibson, "On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions," 137, 141.

141

of the truth commission was potentially also related to the existing political culture in South
163

Africa that comprised rule of law and political pluralism.

He also suggests that the

proportion of victims and the leadership in the process contributed to its success.

164

According to Sarkin’s definitional components that are more likely to produce a
successful truth commission, South Africa’s TRC performs well. Revisiting these
institutional contributors to success, from Chapter 2, Sarkin includes characteristics such
as independence, public support, wide accessibility, established after engagement with
relevant actors, and designed in a way to meet the needs of the specific context.

165

The

South African TRC measures well against these metrics. Established by the Government
through Parliamentary legislation, the TRC was independent. That the TRC’s operations
and decisions were often contentious, is often used as an indicator that the TRC was not
bound to specific parties. For example, there were criticisms that the TRC unevenly
targeted the former regime, but on the whole the Commission operated independently.
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The legislation that established the TRC was deliberated upon and the Government
sought feedback from civil society.

167

Similarly, the process of Commissioner selection

was transparent and engaged the public.
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The Commission was also successful in its
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accessibility, having established offices throughout the country and taking statements in
communities.

169

Additionally, the public hearings had extensive reach on television, an
170

innovation which has contributed to the TRC’s public reputation.

Nichols identifies three characteristics that contribute to a truth commission’s
legitimacy. Nichols is interested in understanding how these features influence truth
commission impacts. With the supposition that legitimacy is a “precondition” for success,
Nichols outlines three characteristics or “components” of legitimacy related to truth
commission success.

171

These are authority, demonstrating a break with the past, and

transparency; higher levels of each make a truth commission more likely to be
172

legitimate.

The ability for the South African TRC to garner legitimacy is an important

indicator of its strength.
Nichols defines authority as being able to “carry out investigative functions, thus
differentiating those bodies that merely whitewash crimes of the past from those that reveal
difficult realities.”

173

The South African TRC employed these capacities with extensive

investigation and reporting as has been illustrated above. In Nichols’ analysis on effects,
this characteristic, authority, had the most significant impact on human rights and

It is important to note that the members of the Amnesty Committee were not appointed in the same way.
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violence.

174

The South African TRC was also established after a democratic transition,

illustrating the “break with the past” that Nichols identifies. Finally, on the issue of
transparency, which Nichols conceptualizes as a “holding public hearings and the release
of a [truth commission’s] findings in a final report”, the South African TRC measures up
175

well, having held extensive hearings and releasing a substantial report.

Against all of these metrics, the truth commission in South Africa can be considered
successful. This is, of course, not to suggest that there were not shortcomings with the
process. Some have questioned the degree to which the Commission actually used the
powers that were granted to it, suggesting that the Commission did not make sufficient use
176

of its powers to uncover information.

Pigou suggests that despite the Investigation Unit

having the right to conduct searches and the opportunities to do so, these provisions were
not well used.
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The amnesty process, dealt with in-depth in Chapter 9 also raised

concerns; the TRC faced criticisms for what seemed to be unequal applications of the
criteria for amnesty.
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One of the most prominent blunders was the decision to provide

amnesty for 37 ANC members, despite problematic disclosures and the criteria of
179

individual and conditional amnesty.

This decision was later reversed by the Courts.

180

Despite the prominence and significance of the public hearings, others point out that only
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10% of people who provided statements to the TRC were able to share their stories in these
hearings.

181

Further, the process of statement taking has been criticized for stripping the

narrative out of people’s statements to ensure consistency with coding.

182

Despite these shortcomings, the TRC was able to investigate violence of the past,
acknowledge some of the injustices, and produce a report that could serve as historical
record. Although the TRC captivated the attention of many in the field of transitional
justice, and efforts have been made to demonstrate its effectiveness, why it was as
successful as it was remains under-investigated. While the negotiations and political
constraints on addressed the past help to explain why a truth commission was established,
the particulars of the design decisions and operational dimensions warrant further attention.
As the next four chapters demonstrate, the strength of the TRC, in terms of institutional
innovations and capacities, can be explained in part with respect to its institutional
predecessors.

Conclusion
This chapter has offered an overview of the Apartheid system and outlined the context of
the negotiation process and the political transition. The chapter also examined measures to
manage political violence during the negotiating period and identified some of the main
actors associated with violence. In the final section, the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation and the South African TRC were
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introduced. The chapter concluded by specifying the parameters for success of the TRC
focused on the institutional credibility of the truth commission process.
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Chapter 6

6

The Commission of Inquiry and Apartheid Violence

Throughout its history, South Africa has used commissions of inquiry to respond to
incidences of public outcry or to pre-empt such outcry. The government frequently relied
on the commission of inquiry to be seen to be doing something about particular issues,
without actually addressing the underlying discrimination, repression, and sources of social
1

and political problems. There is thus a value is in situating the moments of change and
continuity in the commission of inquiry, specifying where it relied on its institutional roots,
and where there are indicators of gradual change. While the institutional framework and
guidelines for commissions of inquiry were well institutionalized, the analysis presented
here argues that the operation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation illustrates important changes away from the Apartheid
commissions of inquiry.
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the potential that the persistence of the commission of
inquiry is important to the operation of truth commissions. The commission of inquiry and
the truth commission share institutional features. As illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, there
are theoretical reasons to consider that the persistent or entrenched use of commissions of
inquiry can lead to the reproduction of the status quo in later truth-seeking measures. The
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South African case demonstrates another variation, the deployment of existing
information-gathering measures using the same institutional framework but that operates
differently to strengthen information gathering. This chapter explores how a system of
information-gathering in South Africa, the commission of inquiry, was entrenched and
maintained reflecting path dependent characteristics. This sets up the analysis in the next
chapter of the Goldstone Commission undergoing and facilitating gradual institutional
change to strengthen information gathering.
The chapter first outlines the structural constraints that developed from operating
commissions of inquiry under Apartheid. Then the chapter identifies the ways in which
the credibility of investigations were affected by their use under Apartheid. The chapter
briefly touches on the internal inquiries undertaken by the African National Congress.
Despite the fact that these were not state-led, the decision to implement a commission of
inquiry illustrates the entrenchment of the institution. These elements situate enduring
elements in the Apartheid regime’s recourse to the commission of inquiry to set up the
discussion of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation in Chapter 7.

6.1

Entrenchment and Maintenance

To demonstrate how the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation departed from its predecessors requires an investigation into how the patterns
of investigation were entrenched under the Apartheid regime. Within the South African
political system, commissions of inquiry were used fairly frequently. Between 1960 and
1994 alone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report identifies 34

148
2

commissions of inquiry undertaken by the government. The government used various
commissions of inquiry to respond to public crises and general questions of governance.
Some of these were high profile investigations, including the commission established after
the Sharpeville Massacre—the Commission of Inquiry into Sharpville, Evaton and
Vanderbijlpark Location Riots in 1960. Other high profile examples include the 1976
Commission of Inquiry into Matters relating to the Coloured Population Group, and the
1979 Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere from 16 June 1976
3

to 28 February 1977. These types of commissions of inquiry played a prominent role in
the entrenchment of Apartheid. As Sitze identifies:
It was also a Commission of Inquiry (or, to be precise, two such commissions) that
produced the epistemic field within which Apartheid policies would emerge and then
dominate white public opinion during the late 1940s and 1950s: in 1947 the Sauer
Commission would recommend ‘total Apartheid between Whites and Natives,’ and
in 1955, the Tomlinson Commission would plot out the industrialization of the
4
‘Black Areas’ created by the 1913 Native Land Act.
The Sauer Commission is often portrayed as the source of “blueprints” for the
5

implementation of Apartheid. For instance, it is suggested that the National Party’s Sauer
Commission was used to “add flesh to the bare bones of the concept” of Apartheid that
6

informed the party’s 1948 platform. There is some dispute about the degree to which the
Sauer Commission clarified the meaning of Apartheid, or instead reflected divisions in
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interpretations of how the idea of Apartheid might be implemented. The pertinent point
here is that the Government relied on commissions of inquiry to determine how best to
achieve and maintain white hegemony and economic success.
The recommendations emerging from these investigations were not evenly adopted
by the Government. This helps to explain their value as “schemes of legitimation”, as
8

Ashforth suggests. They produced findings through which the Government could justify
its actions. These power relations served as positive-feedback for the use of this institution.
As Pierson argues, “where certain actors are in a position to impose rules on others, the
employment of power may be self-reinforcing. Actors may utilize political authority to
9

change the rules of the game…to enhance their power.” These patterns help to explain the
Apartheid regime’s use of commissions of inquiry, deployed by those in positions of power
in order to strengthen and maintain that position.
The Tomlinson Commission, operating in the early 1950s, provides a useful
example. The Tomlinson Commission was established to examine how Government policy
toward the land-areas designated for the African population should be adjusted to manage
growing urbanization, poverty, and overcrowding in the cities.

10

The Tomlinson

Commission recommended continued “separate development” for the races in South

7
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Africa. As Posel notes, however, the Commission also recommended “a far-reaching and
expensive programme of economic rehabilitation and development in the reserves. But
12

these were rejected...”

The introduction to the Tomlinson report illustrates the degree to

which information was gathered and compiled in this endeavour. In just under five years,
the Commission accepted oral evidence and memoranda, conducted tours to the African
13

areas, and produced a 51 chapter report totalling almost 4,000 pages.

This is important

because it demonstrates state efforts to investigate, and illustrates that the machinery of the
commission of inquiry was, accordingly, well-entrenched.
As a product of the oppressive system and a mechanism of enforcing state power, the
commission of inquiry could be, and was, used over and over again to serve the aims of
white interests. This purpose for the institution helps to explain why it endured. Successive
uses of the commission of inquiry, as is demonstrated below, offered the government a
means through which to enforce racially motivated policies.

11
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The majority of South Africans had no legal avenue to protest against state laws and
policy, and as such, the recourse to voice dissent was often physical protest and marches.

14

Often, peaceful marches ended in violence. The accompanying violence demanded a state
response but did not, from the perspective of those in power, require redress or significant
adjustment to power relations. But, to demonstrate some response, commissions of inquiry
were often deployed. Their use strengthened government positions and often resulted in
more restrictions.
Adam Sitze provides a comprehensive assessment of commissions of inquiry as an
15

arbiter to reinforce state power.

In South Africa, Sitze suggests, “Commissions tasked

with gathering information about acts of violence committed by state officials were not the
exception but the rule.”

16

Freund points to the Beaumont and Godley Commissions as

having played important roles in the development of the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act,
which he describes as “the charter for racial segregation in the cities and towns of South
17

Africa.”

Both Sitze and Frankel recognize an underlying dimension of “balance” in the reports
of such inquiries. This type of pattern that persisted across numerous commissions in order
to reach conclusions that designated a shared blame—police were to blame insofar as

14
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civilians were to blame for their roles in violence.

18

Frankel argues that the context of the

inquiries shaped findings. According to Frankel, “while the police were technically under
observation for an act of gross public violence, this took place within the context of a
system with an inbuilt presumption that black protest was unacceptable if not demonic.”

19

This, despite the repressive nature of Apartheid’s enforcement. The legacies of these
commissions’ reports are the absence of responsibility assigned to the system itself, the
mechanisms of enforcement, and unsubstantial investigation and reporting on the role of
the police and military.
One of the effects of the events at Sharpeville in 1960 which saw unarmed protestors
shot by police was the international outcry that Sharpeville provoked.

20

Frankel’s

exploration of the Wessels commission, implemented to investigate the 1960 Sharpeville
Massacre, illustrates how commissions, even in situations that caused international uproar,
could be used by the Government to justify its use of force in maintaining the racist system.
According to Frankel:
The exact circumstances surrounding the actual shooting were never fully delved
into, while the Commission, to its very end, avoided, circumvented, or lightly
touched upon many of the important technical and brutal aspects of the killings - such
as the type of ammunition used by the SAPS and the actions of the black police whom
the SAP, in their official history of the events of the sixties, admit 'occasionally acted
without self-restraint and in an undisciplined manner'.
Many of these omissions could be put down to considerations of time rather than to
conscious calculation. Like the Diemont Commission which considered the
18

Sitze refers to this as ‘concomitant cause’ whereby all parties were to blame and restraint on the part of
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164-165. Frankel refers to the Wessel’s Commission production of an “inherent duality” about the events
of Sharpeville that have persisted, Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 199.
19
20

Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 193.

Saul Dubow, "Were There Political Alternatives in the Wake of the Sharpeville-Langa Violence in South
Africa, 1960?," Journal of African History 56, no. 1 (2015): 125.

153

simultaneous disturbances at Langa, the Wessels Commission was obliged to
produce a publicly palatable set of conclusions in a very short time. Still, its overall
findings, read four decades later, are so densely unintelligible, so ridden with doubletalk, qualifications, and refutable logic as to defy both legal reasoning and ordinary
21
comprehension.
The undercurrent in Frankel’s analysis is that the state’s actions at Sharpeville at this time
were not patently rebuked. The investigation found fault in the actions on both sides, but
22

police were not blamed. Instead, the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre saw increased
23

repression through existing legislation. It was in the aftermath of the protest and massacre
24

that the African National Congress and Pan-African Congress were banned.

Frankel’s

passage is important in highlighting how the state’s engagement with the commission of
inquiry could be used to strengthen its position on power. Sitze suggests that in the context
of the Wessels commission, the commission of inquiry became a tool through which the
government could achieve another dimension of control, “decreas[ing] the perception of
25

racial hatred abroad.”

This benefits of the commission of inquiry for the government

were extensive and this helps to explain their continued use.
In some cases, observers suggest that the commission of inquiry did result in some
change in government practice. That the commission of inquiry could open a space for
change or reform is a complex representation given the comprehensive structures of
Apartheid. Waldmeir, for example, describes government commissions as “that unlikely

21
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but effective instrument of change.”26 Waldmeir’s analysis of the Cillie Commission, the
Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere, appointed to investigate
the protest and police shooting at Soweto in 1976, illustrates this perspective:
From a government-appointed commission headed by an Afrikaner judge, one might
have expected a whitewash. But this, surprisingly, was never the National Party’s
way; throughout the 1970s and 1980s, government was advised by commissions that
told a fairly accurate version of the truth. The Cillie Commission presented
Apartheid, for the first time, as part of the South African problem, and government
accepted this diagnosis. Nearly a decade would pass before Pretoria would act on
Cillie’s analysis; nonetheless, it sowed doubts.27
This rather optimistic reading presents the commission as planting the seeds of necessary
change. However, it also includes several assumptions that are somewhat difficult to
connect, including a ten-year period between cause and effect.
The 1976 Soweto Uprising offers another example in which protest against Apartheid
laws and repression was met with further suppression. Student-organized protest against
the State’s enforcement of a law that stipulated that education had to be carried out in the
Afrikaans language prompted waves of student protests. Initially, protests by students took
28

the form of class boycotts. On June 16, 15,000 students began a march towards the school
in Soweto that had been a site of contestation against the education ruling.

29

According to

the TRC Report, after firing teargas, the police opened fire in response to students throwing
stones, and killed two students, which “fundamentally transformed the nature of the student
protest from a peaceful march into a violent confrontation with government’s security
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forces.”

30

The aftermath saw what Lodge describes as a “state of insurrection” in Soweto
31

but the protests continued into 1977.

The protests died down at the end of 1977,

32

with

575 fatalities and over 2000 injured during the period between 16 June 1976 and 28
33

February 1977.

Based on testimony it received and its review of the Cillie Commission testimony,
the TRC Report found “the police and the former state responsible for creating the climate
34

in which these deaths took place.”

Specifically relating to the police, the TRC identified
35

that “the police adopted a shoot-to-kill policy.”

With respect to the Cillie Commission

itself, the TRC made findings against the Commission for not taking student and
community evidence into consideration it determining cause and creating a culture of
36

impunity for the police. This is a significantly different assessment to Waldmeir’s above.
The tensions in these assumptions are magnified by Sitze’s reading of the 1979 Cillie
Commission into the police shootings at Soweto. The difference in the interpretations lies
37

in the overarching rationale for the commission of inquiry as an institution.

Rather than

interrogating the Apartheid system itself, as Waldmeir suggests, Sitze identifies that the
issue was to be solved by focusing on the “agitators, intellectuals, and ‘radical student

30
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groups’ who persist in calling racist laws into question.”

In Sitze’s evaluation, what

Waldmeir identifies as not a “whitewash” was not grounded in an even-handed approach,
39

nor did the commission of inquiry shed its repressive nature.

Rather, the performative

value of the commission of inquiry was, similar to the Wessels Commission, to speak to
the international realm, to demonstrate to foreign investors that there was sufficient
political stability.

40

Commissions of inquiry set up to address labour relations are also identified as
contributors to shifts in the economic dimension of race relations in Apartheid South
Africa, despite their embeddedness in the racist structures. The government established the
Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions in 1977, in the aftermath of massive worker strikes and
the development of then-illegal black unions.

41

Although the reforms proposed by these

Commissions are identified as turning points, these seem to be the result of unintended
consequences rather than concerted efforts at reform. Even these unexpected outcomes are
mired in repressive goals.
Wood, for example, points to the unintended consequences of labour reforms as a
factor that enabled mobilization towards democracy. She points to the labour inquiries as
a factor recognizing that, “significant changes to labor regulations, influx controls,
township governance, and other restrictions on African workers and residents were made
38
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at the recommendations of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions beginning in 1979.”42
However, these examples also demonstrate the restrictive nature of commissions’
investigations and recommendations in light of the Apartheid system. Vose, for example,
argues that the recommendations strengthened rather than loosened state control over
labour.

43

A recommendation from the 1977 Wiehahn Commission, that black unions be
legalized, had significant effects on the prospects for reform.44 As van Zyl-Hermann
argues, however, although the reforms were “hailed as ‘major’ at the time, these reforms
sought to offer concessions to sections of the African population in order to contain
resistance and safeguard continued white, Afrikaner-led control over the state and
45

economy.” The system of segregation itself was not addressed. For example, Vose’s 1985
review of the two commissions states that “Riekert thus failed to challenge the system of
46

separate development with its far-reaching labour policy implications.” The Wiehahn and
Riekert Commissions are important because they help to illustrate how commissions of
inquiry were established and conducted, efforts at reforms discussed, but with limited
change to the system itself.
42

47
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demonstrate their frequent use, with benefits for the government in terms of control.
Commissions of inquiry served to strengthen the origins of Apartheid rules, and addressed
protest and associated violence in a manner that protected the state. Some changes were
ceded—but with an end toward regime preservation, not in an effort to dismantle or
restructure the system of Apartheid itself. The frequent return to this institutional structure
in response to unrest suggests it was well-entrenched as a state response and usually
worked in the state’s favour. In line with Pierson’s argument that “the allocation of political
authority to particular actors is a key source of positive feedback,”

48

these outcomes

demonstrate the value of the commission of inquiry and its entrenchment over time. The
regime used commissions of inquiry to maintain its hold on power.
Given shortcomings in commission of inquiry use in response to violence, selecting
this same tool as part of the democratic transition raises important questions relating to
their value for credible information gathering in response to violence. Further, state
security forces were not only the subject of enquiries, these forces were also involved in
the conduct of inquiries. The next section outlines investigation issues associated with these
institutional structures in order to better situate the challenges facing the Commission of
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.

6.2

Credibility Problems

The Apartheid system depended on significant policing to uphold Apartheid laws. The
South African Police (SAP) had been used to enforce the unjust laws and segregation of
Apartheid since its implementation in 1948. Even before the formal institutionalizing of

48
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Apartheid, racially differentiated practices were forcefully imposed.

Policing and its

associated violence was justified as necessary for maintaining the racist system.

50

The

powers of the security forces increased as perceived threats to the state grew from
opposition forces. What limits there were on power decreased in the 1960s with the
development of legislation that allowed for detention without charge and vague rules about
51

the policing of opposition.

Posel captures the undergirding relationship in stating that

“the police were [thus] regarded as an arm of government, mandated to enforce its
52

authority, rather than as a relatively independent agency to protect the populace.”

As the

armed struggle and negotiations continued, the police-community nexus was evermore
enmeshed with distrust: under-resourced, disproportional responses, arbitrary arrest and
53

detention, and numerous deaths in police custody.

As a result, perceptions of police in

the community, and among anti-Apartheid actors, were frequently negative.

54

As discussed in the previous chapter, a significant problem facing South Africa
preceding and during the transition years were allegations—proven and unproven—of
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police involvement in violence leading up to the transition.

55

Allegations of police

complicity in violence were pervasive as were allegations of police involvement in
covering up the crimes that led to these allegations. The manner in which governance and
policing were enmeshed under Apartheid raise considerable doubts for meaningful and
impartial investigation capacities without a regime change.
A frequently cited example of security force involvement in violence is the case of
56

the Trust Feed Killings.

In this 1988 incident, 11 people were killed after an attack on a

house that has since been found to have been planned and executed by the police in
conjunction with Inkatha operatives. As the TRC report indicates:
An attack on the Trust Feed area was planned for December 1988, involving
members of Inkatha and special constables. After a police ‘clean-up’ operation to
disarm and round up UDF suspects, the police would withdraw, leaving Inkatha
57
members and the special constables to launch an attack on UDF members.
58

Sparks describes the aftermath as “an elaborate police cover-up”

with police stalling the

investigation until a “police officer with integrity and courage” got wind of the case and
had arrested the key police players within two weeks.

59

The Trust Feed case is significant

in that it demonstrates both police involvement in violence along with the internal coverups, but also the possibility that not all members of the security forces were complicit in
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the crimes committed. This last point is important for the analysis of gradual change to the
structural conditions in the next chapter.
The reliability of and public trust in the police are particularly important for the
current discussion, given that investigations conducted by commissions of inquiry were
supported, if not carried out, by investigators within the South African Police force. This
meant that the police were directly involved in conducting investigations involving
allegations against police and military personnel. Goldstone identifies that “the police had
little if any credibility among the majority of South Africans.”

60

Ellis suggests that even

after the transition, “a far more difficult task faces the Police, trained by the outrages which
61

they perpetrated before 1994…”

To rely on police to investigate violence thus presented

challenges for credibility and legitimacy.

62

This tension is particularly evident in the Harms Commission, the very purpose of
the which was the investigation of hit-squad activity allegedly tied to the state. As discussed
in Chapter 5, allegations of the so-called “third force” were difficult to prove though the
phenomenon seemed pervasively to be known.

63

Issues with investigations conducted by

commissions and the involvement of the police speaks to the crux of the issue this project
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is investigating. The establishment of the Harms Commission by de Klerk in 1990
illustrates the pervasiveness of the issue.
The government established the Harms Commission of Inquiry, the Commission of
Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders, to investigate the allegations of death squads in the
security forces. In the introduction of the Harms Commission report, the issue is taken up
directly:
At the opening of the commission I pointed out that it was valid question whether it
was proper to use police in the investigation, especially in respect of the part of the
investigation which deals with the allegations involving police. I said that I had no
other solution available and that in the absence of a factual basis one could not
condemn the SAP as a whole. I then stated that should any facts be brought to my
attention which reflect upon the ability of any officer to assist the Commission,
immediate action would be taken. Not once was the ability of any officer questioned.
No-one presented an alternative. I can say without fear of contradiction that the
Commission would not have been able to function properly without its officers. Their
64
dedication and behaviour was exemplary.
The Harms Commission reported that it was unable to find evidence of the hit squad
activity under investigation, based on the determination that witnesses were unreliable.

65

Evidence has since emerged that witnesses did not tell the truth to the Harms
66

Commission.

Media coverage of the report identifies that Harms “admitted it was likely

that the police had committed crimes of violence, but said he found no evidence that ‘a
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particular policeman committed a particular crime of violence for a particular purpose.’”

67

That the report claims that hit-squads did not exist was not surprising to civil society
organizations that had been reporting on violence with relative frequency. While the Harms
Commission reported inconclusively, civil society organizations like the Independent
Board of Inquiry continued to investigate and report on information related to such
68

allegations.

Media reports reported that “human rights and anti-Apartheid groups, the media
and political commentators have lambasted the commission for failing to issue any
indictments or shed much light on how so many activists over the past decade died under
69

mysterious circumstance.”

More pointedly, du Toit argues that with the Harms

Commission the “legalistic facade” of commissions of inquiry “finally began to come apart
70

in public.”

Thus, the Harms Commission could not lay the issue of hit squads to rest.

Moreover, the Harms Commission perpetuated the perception that the commission of
inquiry was a means to maintain the status quo and not a change oriented instrument. This
is important because it highlights the significance of the degree of change that the
commission of inquiry underwent through the Goldstone Commission. Allegations of hitsquads persisted and were later investigated by the Goldstone Commission when sufficient
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evidence came to light to confirm their operation shortly before the election.

71

Procedurally, the Goldstone Commission also addressed the policing perception problem
as is explored in the next chapter.

6.3

ANC Inquiries

Though the focus of this project is explicitly on state-initiated investigations, the issue of
credibility necessitates a brief consideration of the ANC’s own internal inquiries. This also
illustrates the entrenchment of the system of the commission of inquiry. When considering
why a commission of inquiry would be the vehicle of choice in the transition despite South
Africa’s history of oppression, it is worth noting that investigatory commissions could also
72

be carried out, and were, without presidential authorization.

They could be used by non-

governmental actors. Such commissions also played an important role in information
gathering and considerations into violence. Commissions created by non-government
bodies, had “no greater power or protection than that enjoyed by a private individual in the
73

conduct of his affairs and must rely on the voluntary cooperation of witnesses.”

This is

particularly relevant in situating the ANC commissions of inquiry that preceded the
democratic transition. The ANC established the Skweyiya and Motsuenyane commissions
of inquiry in 1991 and 1993, respectively, to investigate complaints internal to the ANC
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structures, particularly in military camps operated by the ANC.

74

The ANC’s initiative in

undertaking internal investigations has been praised, despite the criticisms levied by
external observers to the process.

75

While these commissions identified instances of

significant rights violations and made recommendations, the processes, outcomes, and
implementation of recommendations were entirely dependent on the ANC organization
itself.
It is notable that the opposition forces viewed the inquiries or investigations as a
mechanism that could shed light on the issues that were under investigation. While it has
been noted that the ANC demonstrated a certain initiative in investigating human rights in
this way, the chosen approach for the process has received less attention. Without the
constraints of state-led investigations or challenges of governance, the ANC could,
theoretically, have chosen any sort of investigation. In some senses, the ANC’s reliance on
this type of investigation re-articulated the continuing utility or legitimacy of this type of
institution. In the South African context, one indicator of the degree to which the
institutionalization of commissions of inquiry had become entrenched as an appropriate
means of investigation is its use even by non-state actors. This is significant because it
illustrates a sense of legitimacy in the process of the commission of inquiry, which helps
to demonstrate the degree to which it was entrenched.
Though the circumstances of their implementation and operation are remarkably
different from a state-led and state-financed inquiry, the value of this kind of unofficial
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investigation and reporting is still an important consideration. Key illustrations of both
continuity and change suggest the ANC-led inquiries follow similar patterns in
implementing successive inquiries. For example, as Ellis notes, the ANC established the
Motsuenyane Commission after the Skweyiya Commission based on continuing pressures,
76

“partly because of the limits to its terms of reference.” The Skweyiya Commission report
identifies in its introduction that Mandela wanted the commission to investigate complaints
and to “establish whether or not they are correct, and if they are, what action it should take
in consequence thereof.”

77

The investigation’s proceedings were not made public, though

a public report was to be released with names removed at the discretion of the
78

commission. According to an ANC circular, Mayibuye, the purpose of this was to ensure
79

that the organization adequately addressed people’s complaints.

The implementation of successive internal investigations, with panels of lawyers
investigating allegations of abuse, has an important implication for this study. The use this
type of investigative body suggests it had some legitimacy among members of the
organization and sufficient credibility to satisfy external pressures to do something about
the issue of potential human rights abuses against people in detention at the ANC camps.
Though compelling, the influence of these commissions is beyond the scope of this project.
They are mentioned here only to acknowledge the degree to which the commission of
76
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inquiry was entrenched in the political landscape in South Africa. The inescapable
discussions about the moral non-equivalence of forces struggling to end Apartheid and
those operating to enforce Apartheid suggest that disentangling this influence will be
80

difficult, though it is necessary.

Neither the ANC’s internal commissions, nor the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, nor the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, appear to be tools of acquiescence to the status quo despite similar
institutional frameworks. However, government-initiated commissions had to be
augmented for the transitional purposes for which they were intended, in order to avoid the
legacies of government partiality. The next chapter demonstrates how the Commission
achieved this credibility. Including the operating structure and mandate of the Commission
of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation in the National Peace
Accord, 1991, suggests that there was consensus on the utility of such an institution to
investigate violence during the transition. Furthermore, the Goldstone Commission became
operational within weeks of agreement to the National Peace Accord. This suggests that
the Government furnished the Commission with the necessary resources to support the
81

peace initiatives.

The relative readiness of the Commission’s mandate and operational
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capacity can be understood as a result of the familiarity with the process and available
legislation.

82

Conclusion
South Africa’s previous experience with commissions of inquiry was problematic. Used
by the state to entrench the Apartheid system and maintain order, the use of another
commission of inquiry to facilitate negotiations could have suffered the same institutional
problems, supporting the status-quo for the regime rather than acting as an agent of change.
This chapter has demonstrated that the commission of inquiry persisted during the
Apartheid regime because it served the interests of those in power. The institution had some
consensus as a means to investigate, as is illustrated by their use by non-governmental
actors. The next chapter investigates how this institutional foundation underwent a process
of gradual change, as illustrated in the operation of the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.
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Chapter 7

7

Gradual Institutional Change and the Goldstone
Commission

As the previous chapter illustrated, commissions of inquiry usually failed to find fault with
the system and state agents, police, and security forces were not held accountable for
violence. This chapter examines how the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of
Public Violence and Intimidation was able to address the legacies of the commission of
inquiry in South Africa in order to restore credibility to the investigation process, in turn
strengthening the operating conditions for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The
argument is presented in two steps.
First, the chapter argues that the context of the Commission’s establishment
provided space for adjustments to be made to the familiar institutional structures of the
commission of inquiry. The chapter argues that, as a product of the negotiated peace efforts
that followed the transitional opening in South Africa, the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was able to be molded to the needs of the
transition in a way that enabled the leadership of the Commission to strengthen the
credibility of the Commission as an investigative process, despite the inherited legacy. The
design of the founding legislation for the Goldstone Commission laid a necessary
foundation for the Commission to be deployed towards credible information gathering.
Second, the chapter articulates how the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation was able to mediate the entrenched problems associated with
similar such investigations into violence that preceded it and cultivate credibility in
investigations. These adjustments can be understood using Mahoney and Thelen’s model
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of conversion in their theorizing of gradual institutional change. To conclude, the chapter
analyzes the two-fold impact of the Commission’s operation on the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The Commission did not only lay the foundation for
the TRC by identifying the degree to which information was withheld. It also helped to
prepare the environment for truth-seeking, as a result of gradual institutional change,
demonstrating that investigations could be carried out in a credible and legitimate manner.

7.1
The Context for Change: Transition and
Negotiation
The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation had
important effects, both on the ongoing negotiations and on the credibility of investigatory
practices. Entrenched as an instrument to support the state’s power relations, a commission
of inquiry into violence could have maintained its stature as a partial government
institution. Rather, as this section illustrates, this commission of inquiry was redeployed in
a manner that enabled credible investigations into violence and served the ends of
negotiation and transition, rather than the state. Gradual change in the institution is evident
in the operation and institutional adjustments of the Goldstone Commission. The
conversion of these familiar institutional structures was facilitated, in part, by the
transitional setting in which it was established.
Mahoney and Thelen identify several dimensions that lead to gradual institutional
change through conversion. One component is lower veto potentials, or few actors with
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means to block change, and the another is higher levels of ambiguity in the enforcement or
2

implementation of rules. In addition, Thelen suggests that the incorporation of new actors
3

or coalitions helps to account for change through conversion.

The negotiating

environment that produced the National Peace Accord and the Commission of Inquiry for
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was important in creating conditions
that facilitated gradual institutional change. As is demonstrated below, the negotiating
environment lowered the veto points and veto players. The legislation for the Goldstone
Commission was negotiated as part of the process and had built in ambiguity. In addition,
the negotiating process brought new coalitions of actors into the fold.
Most accounts of the South African transition recognize that de Klerk’s ascension
to the party leadership in 1989 was significant in facilitating the transitional period because
he was more liberal than his predecessors and recognized the need to incorporate the black
4

majority into governing structures in order for South Africa to survive. In this way an
5

ideological shift was discernable, although the 1990 speech still took most by surprise. As
a soft-liner, who recognized that change was necessary, de Klerk thus endeavoured to
6

engage in a transition process that he and the National Party could control. The initiation
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of the transition in 1990 was a critical point, but the governance structures in South Africa
remained much the same. It was another two years before much of the Apartheid legislation
7

was actually repealed. Further, the negotiations continued with the recognition of the
8

sovereignty of the governance structures.

The political violence and unrest that had increased in 1990 played an ongoing role
in the direction, continuity and impasses of the negotiation processes. According to figures
from the South African Institute of Race Relations, the year 1990 had more than double
9

the fatalities as a result of political violence than the previous year. Distinct from the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, the earlier peace
negotiations were impelled by efforts to find solutions for the violence. Complicating
matters was the proliferation and multiple sites of violence. Recalling the dynamics of
violence discussed in Chapter 5, some pointed to issues of political rivalry between the
African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Yet, there were persistent
allegations that the state was also responsible for fomenting violence. To address the
10

increasing violence the National Peace Accord was signed in 1991, by over 40 groups.

The negotiating parties signed the 1991 National Peace Accord at a time when
political violence was rampant. Including the provisions for a commission to investigate
ongoing violence within the peace agreement itself conferred legitimacy on the process.
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This is important because the legislation for the establishment of a standing commission to
investigate violence had already been passed by the South African parliament months prior
to the signing of the NPA, but it had not been established. As such, the structures were in
11

place for the relatively quick deployment of the Commission.

In this way, the

Government could be seen to be doing something about the violence, but unlike the
commissions of inquiry of the past, established for similar such reasons, the Goldstone
Commission was structured differently to increase its efficacy.
The de Klerk government introduced legislation for a standing commission on
violence to Parliament and discussed the proposed commission at a peace conference held
by the government in early 1991.

12

However, the ANC did not participate in the
13

government-initiated conference, citing illegitimacy of the proceedings.

It is notable,

then, that the NPA provisions for a commission to investigate violence used the Prevention
of Public Violence and Intimidation Act passed in April 1991 to structure the institution.
Rather than simply being appointed by the Government at the time, the implementation of
the legislation as part of a negotiated settlement demonstrated, at the outset, mutual
agreement to this institution to address violence. According to media coverage, earlier
drafts of the peace agreement included provisions for the Commission suggesting:
It would link up with the proposed standing judicial commission on violence and
intimidation proposed by President FW de Klerk in mid-June... The exact nature of
11
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the link is still being discussed but it is expected that it would be the chief
14
enforcement mechanism of the peace code.
This demonstrates the significance of the inclusion and the continued discussion of this
type of commission throughout the peace negotiations.
In the memorandum that accompanied the publication of the bill in the Government
Gazette, the commission is presented as an instrument to identify the causes of violence in
order to address and reduce said violence. The Gazette reads:
Provision is being made for the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry
Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. The object of the
Commission will be to strive for a community free of public violence and
intimidation. The main function of the Commission will be to inquire into the
phenomenon of public violence and intimidation in the Republic and the nature of
15
causes thereof.
It should also be noted that various organizations were calling for something like the
Commission that was ultimately established. The ANC’s open letter to de Klerk of early
1991 stipulated a standing investigatory commission into police and security force roles in
violence.

16

This is significant because not only did the NPA apply the already developed

institutional framework, but this type of response had previously been identified as suitable
by extra-parliamentary powers. Employing the commission out of a procedurally inclusive
and negotiated dialogue lent credibility to the information-gathering process.
From the outset, its inclusion in the Agreement gave the Commission legitimacy. A
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media report from 1992 quotes Brian Currin, executive director of Lawyers for Human
Rights, stating that “unlike the others it was born out of a process of negotiation which
included the most relevant political actors. It’s a highly credible commission and has the
support of the majority of people.”

17

Beyond the structures being included in the NPA

provisions, the appointment of commissioners and other important decisions stemmed
from the negotiated arrangement. The NPA identifies:
Fully aware of the fact that the composition of the proposed body will determine its
relevancy and legitimacy, the Minister of Justice indicated during the Second
Reading Debate of the Act that no appointments would be made without consultation
and negotiation with the relevant role players. Consensus will be the key word. The
18
group agrees that for this system to be effective, it needs to be credible.
Both the ANC and NP agreed upon the leadership of the Commission, thus cultivating an
19

integral joint perception of credibility.

7.2

New Legislation, Similar Institutional Framework

In South Africa, the implementation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of
Public Violence and Intimidation during the negotiations for a democratic South Africa
was unique in the timing of its application and the capacity of the commission. As
demonstrated in Chapter 6, it was not exceptional in its institutional application to address
elements of South African violence particularly. In 1990 alone, the Government the
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders, the Commission of Enquiry into the

17
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Incidents at Sebokeng, Boipatong, Lekoa, Sharpeville and Evaton on 26 March 1990, and
the Commission of Inquiry into the Death of Clayton Sizwe Sithole.20 As is demonstrated
below, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation
was distinctive because of the breadth of its powers and the extension of its guiding
provisions beyond the Commissions Act that had structured previous inquiries.
The Commissions Act (1947) and the Inquests Act (1959, amended 1977 and 1990)
stipulated the processes, structures, and resources through which the government
conducted inquiries into events and unexplained deaths. The investigations conducted
under the Inquests Act were also particularly renowned for their cover-ups through the
processes of investigations.21 The long term consequences of the partial and often absurd
conclusions drawn to explain deaths are still playing out today as family members are still
searching for information and acknowledgement.22 It is beyond the scope of this project to
interrogate the influence of the Inquests Act, although it is necessary to recognize the
pervasiveness of state involvement in manipulating the official record on repression.
The Commissions Act 1947 still informs the structure of commissions of inquiry in
South Africa. The disruption of the transitional period did not lead to an overhaul in the
legislative framework of these inquiries. Though there were innumerable issues to address
in the transition to a multi-racial democracy, the adjustments made to the Commissions
Act included the removal of reference to “South-West Africa” and left the rest of the

20
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legislation generally intact.23 Interestingly, the legacy of commissions outlined in the
previous chapter did not upend their structuring framework. For example, Freeman argues
that in South Africa “the influence of the Commonwealth commission of inquiry
tradition…is apparent,” pointing to the Commissions Act of 1947 and the 1995 Promotion
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act.24 This suggests that it was the usage and
operation of commissions of inquiry, not just the legislation, that was responsible for the
less than impartial outputs of investigations.
What needed to be undone in response to the legacies of earlier commissions of
inquiry was societal distrust in the investigatory bodies and institutions. The potential for
similar types of investigations and institutional components that had been used to
consolidate repression to be used to monitor and redress that repression required a
modification in delivery. The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence
and Intimidation, established in 1991, demonstrated gradual change than enabled a
commission of inquiry to stimulate change, through adjustments to processes of
investigation and reporting, and through engagement with the negotiating parties. One
manner in which this can be assessed is the passage of new legislation for the standing
commission into violence.
Though operating as a commission of inquiry, Government established the Goldstone
Commission under the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act (1991) and not
the Commissions Act (1947). This new legislation suggests that the Commission needed

23
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to be differently structured to investigate ongoing violence in the country. An introduction
of the Bill, by the State President in a Joint Sitting of Parliament, locates the commission
within a discussion of other negotiation efforts. The President’s statement included the
following:
Discussions following on the recent summit on violence and intimidation are
continuing and will hopefully bear fruit soon. At the same time the hon members
of this Parliament will be asked to dispose of legislation this week in order to
establish a standing commission on violence and intimidation. The aim is the
creation of an objective instrument to combat violence and intimidation which will
have sufficient powers to be able to evaluate State action and evaluate unbiased
security action.25
Hansard debates days later illustrate discussion surrounding the necessity of the proposed
commission and its legislation. Government rhetoric surrounding the proposed legislation
indicated an acknowledgement of the toll of violence and government responsibility in
addressing violence.26 It also acknowledged the lingering perception of past investigations
with the Minister of Justice, suggesting that:
This commission must not merely be seen as another State-instituted body. The
commission will not only look into the conduct and involvement of those bodies,
organisations or persons who have no ties with the State, but also at State
institutions. In other words, if a State organisation is allegedly involved in violence,
the commission will be able to and will indeed take cognisance of that.27
The minister continued, demonstrating the fragility in the context of negotiations:
However, I do want to emphasise again that the commission should not be seen as
an instrument to bring the security forces into discredit. If mistakes have been made
on that side, the commission will be failing in its duty if it does not bring its finding
to the attention of the hon the State President.28
25
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In response to queries about the creation of new structures, the Minister of Justice
responded, “then the hon member must not come and tell me that I am building up a number
of institutions, while he knows that a commission—according to the Commissions Act in
its present form—is an imperfect legal concept.”29
The Government assented to the Bill on 27 June 1991.30 The provisions for a
standing commission to investigate violence were already legislated when the National
Peace Accord was negotiated and signed. Thus, the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, was both the product of existing
government structures and the product of negotiation. The text of the National Peace
Accord specifically recognizes the value of having the commission ready to go, and, the
Commission launched its first investigation within about a month of the NPA being
signed.31 The violence that had persisted in South Africa—and which was the impetus for
the peace accord—increased the urgency of a response. It is difficult to dismiss the value
of the familiarity with the inquiry method, more so given that the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991 granted the commission expanded powers compared
to the previous commissions of inquiry in South Africa, in addition to the fact that it was
envisioned as a permanent commission.32
The negotiating process led not only to the agreement to the Commission of Inquiry
on the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, but also to agreement on the
29
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appointed leadership. This had been recognized as an important dimension of credibility
early in the process.33 There was an agreement between the Government and the ANC to
choose someone perceived to be credible at the outset, given that “no appointments would
be made without consultation and negotiation with the relevant role players.”34 This was
not without contention. Prior to the signing of the peace agreement, opposition parties
expressed dissatisfaction with the ANC involvement in an appointment. One critic in the
discussion asked, “Why is the ANC at the fore when it comes to being consulted?... The
ANC is not supposed to be governing the country, and I cannot understand this government
behind the scenes.”35 However, the decision to ensure agreement on his appointment
helped to shore up support for the Commission. According to Goldstone:
de Klerk suggested to the negotiating bodies that he should set up that commission.
Well the ANC and Mandela in particular didn’t want another government
commission. And they agreed to it I think fairly reluctantly but on condition only
that the chairman and four members would be appointed unanimously by all of
the…parties of the negotiating process.36
This was a significant distinguishing feature from earlier commissions of inquiry.
The agreement to use the commission as a tool towards peace and negotiations as
well as the consensus underlying the appointment of commission personnel are some of
the components that did the most to address the legacies of ineffective, and often
uninformative, inquiries of the past. Timothy Sisk’s early assessment of the National Peace
Accord identifies the value in the approach:
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A standing commission is constituted for three years to fully investigate the
underlying causes of violence, specific incidents, and steps required to prevent
further violence. The “independent and nonpartisan” commission is chaired by
widely respected Appeals Court Judge Richard Goldstone. The commission
includes members implicitly nominated by the major political parties, including the
ANC and IFP, and is thus seen as much more representative than previous judicial
commissions.37
This is significant because the formal process of the state, and the institution it produced
in the Goldstone Commission, were supported by important forces that had no
representation in government. This agreement created the space for an independent
investigatory body to operate.
Procedurally, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation was bestowed with significant powers that other earlier commissions were
not. Significantly, the Commission had the power of search and seizure.38 As will be
explored further in the next chapter, the non-cooperation of state-aligned witnesses at the
Harms commission resulted in significant limitations in that commissions investigations
and findings. In briefly justifying the inclusion of more robust subpoena powers, The
Minister of Justice continues to explain the adjustments made to the Bill, so that it would
not be subject to the same criticisms leveled at the Harms Commission:
We were criticised because the Harms Commission had no teeth, because it did not
aim at more concrete results, because it revealed shortcomings, according to the
hon members. I must say that I felt the same way. The protection of a commissioner,
for example, is not adequate. I am not quite certain whether this commissioner is
going to have adequate protection. This is something which I have to look at. It is
one of the points that are worrying me, but the fact remains that here we are dealing
in a bona fide way with the shortcomings in the Commissions Act and
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supplementing them in a way which still protects the right of a person to remain
silent.39
This account highlights the recognition from the government that the Harms Commission
did not satisfy the calls for investigation that had been made. While the media reports of
the Harms Commission and the report focused on the ‘toothlessness’ of the process, the
government recognized existing limitations.
The Goldstone Commission’s legislative framework allowed for the search and
seizure of documents, and thus it could move beyond voluntary witness testimony in
gathering evidence for its investigations.40 This power proved invaluable in uncovering the
links between the South African Police and violence. The Goldstone Commission’s report
on the issue directly referenced the powers of search and seizure in the ability to link the
elements of violence under investigation.41
Perhaps one of the most valuable features of the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation Act was the built-in capacity for the Commission to request adjustments and
additions to its mandate as shortcomings became evident. Through these provisions, the
Goldstone Commission adjusted its operating capacity by establishing additional units to
gather information and report on ongoing violence. This illustrates a degree of “discretion”
in the implementation of the process, which is significant in explaining the manner in which
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the commission could enhance investigation credibility.42 The rationale for this component
of the legislation is difficult to determine given the lack of access to documents surrounding
this decision-making process.43 The impacts, however, are significant. Through an
amendment to the legislation, the Commission was able to establish more committees to
investigate violence.44 Other adjustments included the incorporation of investigation
units,45 and the establishment of witness protection measures.46
The passage of legislation for the standing commission illustrates that the previous
forms of the commission of inquiry were not likely to be sufficient for the task at hand.
Decades of experience with commissions created by the racist and repressive system
resulted in the inclusion of different provisions in a Commission which was to eventually
form a pillar of the negotiated agreement. The structure of the legislation meant that when
the Commission faced operational limitations, there were provisions in place for requests
and adjustments. In addition, at the outset, the Commission had more powers than previous
commissions of inquiry. These features enabled the Goldstone Commission to operate
within the parameters of the system but to achieve a greater degree of credibility than had
been seen in previous commissions of inquiry. Iterative adjustments could be made to
existing powers of investigation rather than attempting an entirely new investigative
42
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institution during a period of upheaval. Although the relationship between the Commission
and the negotiating parties’ leadership was not always smooth and straightforward,47 the
Commission was able to develop trust and credibility through its operation.48

7.3
Innovations in the Prevention of Public Violence
and Intimidation Act, 1991
The innovations in the structure of the Commission were the result of the design of the
legislation itself, alongside the implementation and operational decisions undertaken by
the leadership of the Commission. These institutional design elements set the Commission
apart from its predecessors and enabled the Goldstone Commission to demonstrate a
different modus operandi for violence investigation. Three distinguishing features of the
Commission will be taken up in turn. First, the legislation itself was designed in a way that
increased the powers of the commission at the outset and that enabled modifications
illustrating a degree of discretion in implementation. Second, and closely related, this
amendment potential enabled operational innovations to be implemented. Finally, the
element of timing and duration is important. The Commission’s mandate did not limit its
operation to a specific time frame and thus the Commission had the time to determine its
own limitations and suggest improvements. Each of these elements demonstrates a higher
degree of interpretation which allowed the Commission’s leadership to interpret the rules
49

towards stronger investigations, facilitating a process of conversion.

The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation
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was not established under the usual Commissions Act, but through newly promulgated and
specific legislation. It is difficult to trace the emergence and development of the Prevention
of Violence and Intimidation Act of 1991 through Parliamentary channels. It is evident that
the Government presented a draft of the bill at the Government’s April peace summit in
50

order to solicit feedback.

However, exactly how the decisions were made on what was

included in the final version of the Bill is not clear. Despite this limitation in understanding
of the processes’ development, parliamentary records indicate that, although there was
support for the purpose of the Bill, political representatives expressed unease over the
manner in which the Bill was developed and presented.

51

In terms of procedure, parliamentary debates do indicate some concern by members
of parliament over the applicability of the commission itself, the potential for self52

incrimination, and a lack of witness protection.

The government justified the bill based

on the need to do something to curb the violence, and identified that existing statutes may
not have given the proposed Commission sufficient capacity to carry out the necessary
53

functions in the face of ongoing violence.

Thus, the development of the Act recognized

the limitations of the existing legislation and that the ongoing violence needed to be
addressed differently than it had been historically. This suggests that intentions behind the
investigation and information-gathering process for the Goldstone Commission were
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different than those that had informed previous commissions. Although this intentionality
is difficult to determine, the remainder of this section illustrates the different structure of
the Commission for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation and the impact
these institutional design elements had on its operation and later truth-seeking processes.
The degree of power granted to the Commission in the establishing legislation is important.
While there are similarities between the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation Act and the Commissions Act 1947, there are key differences. Both legislative
frameworks allow for the summoning of witnesses and the production of relevant
54

documents or items.

But, beyond this, the legislation diverges in substantial ways. The

1991 Act conferred significant powers on the standing commission it crafted. The
memorandum attached to the bill states:
With a view to assisting the proposed Commission in the exercise and performance
of its powers, duties and functions, provision is being made for –
(i)
the establishment of ad hoc committees and institutes; and
55
(ii)
powers of investigation.
The first element listed under the powers of the Commission is the ability for the
56

Commission itself to determine the “nature and extent” of its mandated inquiries. This is
significant because it illustrates the breadth of independence conferred.
Additionally, the Commission was bestowed with strong ‘powers of investigation.’
The provisions for search and seizure were, an “”unusual authority.”
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that, “The Chairman or any member of the staff of the Commission may, for the purpose
of an inquiry, at all reasonable times enter upon and inspect any premises and demand and
58

seize any document on or kept on such premises.”

Such powers were unique for a

commission of inquiry. These provisions were invaluable in eventually helping the
59

Commission discover evidence on security force involvement in violence. Evidence of a
third force significantly impacted the recognition that further information gathering was
60

necessary, as is discussed later in the chapter.

The potential for modifications to the Bill under the purview of the Minister of Justice
also had meaningful implications for the operation of the Commission. Entrenched in the
Bill itself were stipulations enabling the Minister to make additional provisions:
15. (1) The Minister may make regulations as to–
(a) any matter required or permitted to be prescribed in terms of this Act
and
(b) generally, all matters which in his opinion are necessary or expedient to
61
be prescribed to achieve the objects of this Act.
With this inclusion, an element of ambiguity was built into the Commission that enabled
adjustments to strengthen information-gathering capacities—enabling the addition of
institutional components or adjustments to those incorporated into the Bill at its
58
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establishment.
The witness protection program was established under these provisions. As will be
explored in detail in Chapter 8, the Commission’s recognition of the limitations of witness
protection for its investigations was thus addressed through the structures governing the
legislation. Another institutional feature that aided the investigative capacities of the
Commission was the establishment of the investigation units as part of the Commission. It
is not clear whether the investigation units were established under the Section 15 provision,
62

only that they were established in consultation with “relevant parties.”

Also important was the Commission’s ability to create committees that would help
the Commission complete its work.

63

While the Committee structure was originally

included in the bill, in April 1992, the Government amended legislation to adjust the
Commission’s committee composition and structure. Where the initial legislation
stipulated that each committee required a member of the Commission to sit on it, the
amendment enabled committees to be established without a Commission member. The
purpose of this expansion was to “make it possible to appoint committees more quickly to
64

investigate violence where it may arise.”

The composition of the committees was under

65

the purview of the Commission itself.

The permanent nature of its operation is the third element that set the Commission
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apart from earlier commissions of inquiry. This permanence is specified in the Prevention
of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, and in the National Peace Accord text. Thus, the
adjustments to the Commission’s operation can be situated in the ability to learn from
investigations. For example, multiple investigations into violence at Mooi River illustrated
limitations in the earlier engagement of the Commission.

66

The killing of witnesses who

had testified during an early investigation and the difficulty in ascertaining evidence of the
‘third force’ illustrated a need for witness protection measures.

67

The creation of an

independent investigation unit and bringing in international experts moderated limitations
in investigations, which is discussed in further detail below. In addition, the longer timeline
meant that public hearings could be held on multiple issues, strengthening the outputs of
the Commission.
Its permanent nature also enabled the Commission to report more frequently since
the reports did not have to wait until the end of the mandate. The Commission was thus
able to demonstrate its work throughout its operation. Crucially, that incremental changes
were made in light of these emergent limitations points to (1) the opening provided to make
the desired changes, and (2) the leadership acting on these needs. The interaction of these
elements is explored below.
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7.4
Building Credibility and Demonstrating
Effectiveness
The incremental changes associated with negotiations and concessions enabled the space
for the Goldstone Commission investigations to change the status quo. That an
investigation could be more than a government-centric initiative changed the purpose of
investigation, but relied on the associated structures through which investigations had been
conducted previously. In his personal reflections, Goldstone acknowledged that:
It was essential to demonstrate to the people of South Africa that this commission
was different from preceding ones, all of which had been presided over by white
male judges. It was essential that we conduct the affairs of this commission, to the
extent possible, in a nonracist, nonsexist and impartial fashion.68
Arguably, the Goldstone Commission succeeded in overcoming the state-centric legacy of
the commission of inquiry, in part, because its investigations benefitted from the structures
of the state but did not answer to them. From Judge Goldstone’s perspective, “I think the
important thing was that I was sensitive to the importance of gaining the confidence of all
South Africans in the independence of the Commission and its investigation units.”69 Not
only was the Commission designed with sufficient ambiguity to facilitate the process of
gradual institutional change, the leadership of the Commission capitalized on these
measures to strengthen truth-seeking through the Commission’s operations.

7.4.1 Consensus Building
Throughout its period of operation, the Commission cultivated credibility, thus positioning
itself to contribute to further investigations and other measures to address potential
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violence. Writing close to the time of the Commission’s operation, Sisk suggests that the
Goldstone Commission was one of the only elements of the National Peace Accord that
70

could be described as an “unqualified” success.”

Sisk recognized that:

The Goldstone Commission’s investigations and reports are widely viewed as
serious attempts to determine the nature and causes of political violence, including
specific incidents. They appear unbiased, and the Commission has earned
enormous legitimacy (judicial commissions have historically been perceived as
biased toward the government). The investigations have been speedy and thorough,
recommendations practical, and blame is perceived to be apportioned in a generally
71
even-handed manner.
The Commission also received praise from Secretary-General of the United Nations. A
1992 Report indicates that:
It is neither necessary nor possible here to recount the far-reaching work being
undertaken by Justice Richard Goldstone, Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry
into Public Violence and Intimidation. Suffice it to say that it commands
72
widespread respect in South Africa and abroad.
Goldstone recognized the significance of the participation of the various political groups.
With respect to how the Goldstone Commission distinguished itself from its predecessors,
Goldstone states:
I suppose it’s a combination of things—certainly my independence, my concern for
democracy in the future in South Africa, and crucially the cooperation of all the
major political parties. Without all of them on board it would have failed. It
wouldn’t have had credibility if I didn’t have the support of both the government
and the ANC and Inkatha for that matter and that’s much to the credit of Mandela
73
who immediately embraced the Commission on its appointment.
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The negotiated foundation on its own was not sufficient for its credible operation, as
suggested in this passage. The independence in approach and operation further legitimized
the process.
The readiness of the Commission to conduct investigations when needed and the
relative trust in the institution to do so when needed illustrate its importance. A report of a
Multi-National Panel investigating and making recommendations for the election, speaks
to these qualities in considering the role for the Commission through the election period:
It is difficult to imagine that it would be possible, in the short time remaining before
the election, to create another entity imbued with the credibility enjoyed by the
Commission. Over the past two years, the very fact of the Commission’s existence
and its availability to accept referrals of the most difficult and sensitive matters has
provided an outlet for political tension. The investigation and hearing process itself
has given the public some assurance that serious misconduct, even by the State,
74
would be pursued.
Its contribution was also partially a result of both its ability to quickly deploy to
troublesome situations and the powers granted to the Commission. One illustrative
example of this was the Commission’s deployment in response to the “Events at the World
75

Trade Centre on 25 June 1993.”

During this incident, 3000 right-wing Afrikaner

protestors forced their way into the World Trade Centre where the CODESA negotiations
were taking place.

76

The protest had been approved by the local authorities, with caveats

to the location and a prohibition on firearms.

77

The State President requested that the
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Goldstone Commission investigate the matter. Significantly, though, the Negotiating
Forum had debated implementing its own investigation/inquiry into the matter but decided
to delegate the investigation to the Goldstone Commission because of its statutory
78

powers. This is significant because it demonstrates the Commission’s response potential.
It is notable that the Commission presented its report on this incident to the State President
79

on 13 July 1993,

only a few weeks after the incident itself had occurred.

One of the strengths of the commission was its ability to cultivate support among
key parties to the peace agreement, beyond the initial appointment on leadership. In this
way, during its operation, it also acted as a legitimate source of ‘new rules’ that helped to
structure behaviour conducive to peacebuilding and negotiation. Perhaps the clearest
example of this is the role that the Commission played in the development of the guidelines
and draft legislation for the Regulation of Marches and Gatherings. The Commission
established a Committee to investigate “procedure to regulate the organisation, conduct
and policing of mass demonstrations,” given that “in South Africa unpredictable or
undisciplined behaviour by mass demonstrators or other members of the public and the
police present at mass demonstration create a very real potential for violence.”
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The Commission recognized the necessity of the investigation into these
regulations in its first interim report, reporting the establishment of the Committee and the
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value of international experts acknowledged.

Soliciting feedback and operating hearings

for parties to participate, the Committee first established guidelines to which the ANC and
82

the SAP agreed to adhere.

In the Final Report, the Commission recognizes the “almost
83

universal adherence to the Interim Agreement.”

From these guidelines, the Commission

84

drafted and circulated draft legislation. This is an example of the Commission’s utility in
establishing parameters for what it deemed to be a democratic right.

85

It demonstrates the

Commission’s ability to engage with the public and secure incremental agreements until
consensus could be reached. The Commission first secured an agreement between the ANC
and SAP and then worked to develop more comprehensive legislation. This example also
illustrates gradual institutional change within the Goldstone Commission.
The characteristics conducive to conversion within the commission of inquiry are
also illustrated in this example. The element of interpretation is present on several levels.
The mandate’s ability to propose legislation sets out the parameters for engagement with
such regulations to prevent violence. However, the manner in which the Regulations on
Gatherings guidelines were proposed itself demonstrates the flexibility in interpreting the
process. The Commission engaged in a process of negotiation, soliciting feedback and buy81
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in from those with vested interests. Not only were the police consulted, but the engagement
also incorporated the preferences of the former liberation movements, bringing different
coalitional actors into the fold. The use of the commission to develop legislation to prevent
further violence is a significant change from their use under the Apartheid state to reinforce
unjust laws.
The recognition that including all parties in the process would benefit investigations
into violence illustrates how the leadership of the Commission navigated the ambiguity of
the transitional environment to strengthen its credibility. Goldstone recounts that, “I
decided that it was important politically for me to promptly report what the commission
was doing. We were legally obliged to report to de Klerk so he would know what was
86

happening and I decided to do the same with Mandela.”

Accounts of Goldstone’s

conversation with de Klerk, with respect to briefing Mandela on the Commission’s
operations, suggest that despite de Klerk’s hesitancy, Goldstone advised on the need to
keep Mandela informed given his likelihood of being in the government in the future.

87

This illustrates not only the choices made by Goldstone to deploy information-gathering
measures in a more credible fashion to the historical use of commissions of inquiry. It also
reiterates the degree to which the established rules were in-flux during the transitional
period.
The Commission was positioned such that when necessary, decisions could be
made to investigate incidences with little delay. While the findings and recommendations
were not binding, having an institution ready to investigate provided some immediate
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acknowledgment of the incident. Additionally, simply having something done, some
independent action taken, indicated a change in approach, given the circulating allegations
of state involvement in violence. With respect to the political leadership of de Klerk and
Mandela, Goldstone states, “in no way did either of them in any way try to influence what
we were doing or which way we should go. But it was useful to get their input and
obviously I needed more and more goodies from the government.”

88

The government demonstrated important commitment to the process, providing
funding and provisions for adjustments to the mandate, as will be discussed further below.
One Interim Report ends with a recognition that:
The Commission’s needs with regard to staff, material and facilities are met by the
Government. No important request in that regard from the Commission has been
refused. For that the Commission would like to express publicly its appreciation to
the Mister of Justice, Mr H J Coetsee, and to the appropriate members of his
89
Department.
Here it is important to recognize that its actual capacity to operate influenced the credibility
of the Commission. The capacity of the Commission, however, needs to be distinguished
from the adoption of recommendations by the Government, which is beyond the scope of
this discussion.
This section has provided an overview of the elements of the Goldstone
Commission that made it a credible violence-investigating institution during the
negotiation period. This focus does not suggest that the process was without challenges or
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shortcomings. It, like many other such investigative commissions lacked “teeth”.

90

Sisk

identifies deficiencies in witness protection and investigations, as well as the lack of
implementation powers for its own recommendations.

91

Wilson equates the Goldstone

Commission with the Harms Commission when suggesting that neither really
demonstrated the Government’s willingness to do anything about violence. Wilson argues
that both commissions were “under-resourced, overly legalistic, misled by police evasions
and political party cover-ups, and disappointing in their conclusions.”

92

Given other

government decisions pertaining to the negotiations and information gathering, such as the
destruction of records or the police’s reticence and partiality in investigations, it is difficult
to determine why, specifically, the Goldstone Commission received the Government
93

support it did.

Though these tensions cannot be resolved here, they are noted because

they will benefit from further consideration in the future. Despite these shortcomings, the
Goldstone Commission still had an impact on the institutionalization of truth-seeking in
South Africa.

90

Independent Board of Inquiry Memoranda, 16 August 1993, 10. Wits Historical Papers, AG2543, IBI
Memoranda, File 3.3-3.7, Item 3.7, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South
Africa.
91

Sisk, "South Africa’s National Peace Accord," 56-57.

92

Richard A. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the PostApartheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 65.
93

Sriram identifies that the Commission was under-resourced, though does not expand on this. On this
point, Mallinder suggests that perhaps Justice Goldstone did not request sufficient resources given that de
Klerk contends the Commission got what it asked for, and much of the evidence suggests that it did. This
contention is thus noted here. See: Louise Mallinder, "Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution
Guidelines in South Africa," in Working Paper No. 2 from Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and
Conflict Transformation (Queens University Belfast: Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2009),
31-32; Chandra Lehka Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs Peace in Times of
Transition (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 157.

198

In order to investigate the mechanics of this impact in more detail, it is necessary
to illustrate how the Goldstone Commission differentiated itself from earlier commissions
of inquiry through gradual institutional change. Given the facilitating conditions for
institutional change, one can trace evidence of conversion further in the investigative
process. In the South African case, the Goldstone Commission played an important role
in the institutionalization of truth-seeking, by mediating and adjusting to the constraints
imposed on investigations by the earlier use of commissions of inquiry. The constraints of
the previous commissions of inquiry are reflected in the TRC Report’s accounting of
political violence and the covert involvement of the state. The Report states that for many
in the security forces the Harms and Goldstone Commissions, among other state
investigations, “were seen by many as public relations exercises rather than determined
initiatives to root out ‘dirty practices’. The long history of cover-ups and condonation of
94

lying to such commissions merely reinforced this perception.”

The next section argues

that this mediating effect is illustrated in the change made to the investigation process.

7.4.2 Investigative Credibility
Demonstrating a recognition of the constraints on investigations, the Goldstone
Commission instituted numerous provisions so that investigations could be conducted in a
credible manner, even though it was difficult to move away from relying on the state
security forces. The issue of police relations is addressed directly in the second interim
report when presenting findings on information on the causes of violence that had been
presented to the Commission to that point. The report identifies:
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A police force and army which, for many decades, have been the instruments of
oppression by successive White governments in maintaining a society predicated
upon racial discrimination. This involves a police force and an army that for the
majority of South Africans have not been community based or orientated. For many
South Africans, the police and the army are not perceived as fair, objective or friendly
95
institutions.
The report continues to address the issue of state involvement in violence, particularly:
A history over some years of State complicity in undercover activities, which include
criminal conduct. Those activities have enabled critics of the Government and others,
fairly or unfairly, to place the blame for much of the current violence at the door of
the security forces. That and the well-documented criminal conduct by individual
members of the South African Police and the KwaZulu Police exacerbate the
perception of so many South Africans that the Government or its agencies are active
96
parties responsible for the violence.
The Goldstone Commission did not have an operational investigation unit at the outset of
its operations. The development of the investigation units demonstrates additional efforts
by the Commission to interpret the mandate in a way that developed stronger informationgathering capacities. The Commission established investigation units in Johannesburg,
Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town in October of 1992.
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Each unit was

composed of officers from the South African Police Service and at least one attorney. Most
also had an international observer.
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Between October 1, 1992 and September 30, 1992,

the investigation units conducted 245 investigations.
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An ex post facto accounting of the investigation process of the Commission suggests
that clear evidence of the benefits of the investigation units is the number of investigations
and reports completed before and after the establishment of the investigation units.
According to Newham:
Whereas in the first year of operation the Goldstone Commission had only completed
four inquiries and released 11 reports, by the time the commission had come to an
end three years later, four hundred and sixty seven investigations had been conducted
100
and forty seven reports had been completed.
Reflecting on the constraints of police involvement in earlier investigations, the means by
which the Goldstone Commission seconded police investigators in order to increase
credibility and trust reflects adjustments in recognition of these earlier issues.
The Goldstone Commission used a public vetting process to identify investigators
when the investigation unit was established. The Commission announced publically the
names of potential appointees from the police force and solicited feedback on whether
anyone objected to any of the individuals so named. Through this process, the public had
101

a chance to object to the credibility of particular officers.

Rather than simply relying on

existing state institutions, the Goldstone Commission publicized the names of police
officers offered to it by the Commissioner of Police in order for any concerns to be raised
by the public of the participating officers. Engaging the public in this way prevented one
officer from joining the Commission and ensured the public were aware of who would be

100

Gareth Newham, "Investigation Units: The teeth of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission," The
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (1995): 3.
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conducting the investigations.

A 1994 press release suggests that the Commission

followed a similar process to expand the team in the lead-up to the elections.

103

The addition of investigators was not the only factor that facilitated an increase in
the number of investigations. Once the Government amended the legislation to enable
single-member committees to undertake investigations, the overall number of ongoing
investigations increased. Thus, the demand for, and adjustment to allow for, more
investigators can be understood with respect to the ability to amend the legislation.
The Commission also distinguished itself from its predecessors by using
international investigators in partnership with local investigators. International
investigators increased the credibility of investigation teams.

104

Goldstone notes the

significance of the government agreeing to this request given the reticence of any
105

international involvement in the domestic affairs of South Africa under Apartheid.

In

particularly difficult cases, like the Boipatong Massacre, the Commission sought assistance
from external sources as well. In this case, where multiple sources alleged police
complicity—but insufficient evidence was available due to erased recordings—an external
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policing expert was appointed by the Commission to try to recover the recordings and to
106

write an independent report.

The decision to turn to external experts is innovative

compared to earlier investigations into violence that were constrained by the regime. The
Government’s agreement to international investigators reflects the opening in the regime
that created the conditions for gradual institutional change undertaken by the Goldstone
Commission.
The Goldstone Commission was not set up as a precursor to the TRC at the time it
was established. Despite this, the Goldstone Commission did influence the TRC in
important ways. Framed in this way, the operation of the Goldstone Commission provided
important lessons for the TRC. The innovations of the Goldstone Commission served as
an example for later institutional modalities because of how the Commission changed to
achieve its goals.

7.5

Value as a Precursor to the TRC

The transitional context and the pressure to do something about violence saw the
implementation of a recognizable form of investigation, the commission of inquiry.
However, it was implemented in such a way that demonstrated a departure from the statusquo. In this way, it pre-empted some of the work that needed to be done by the TRC. The
preceding discussion has illustrated one way that the Goldstone Commission laid a positive
foundation for the TRC, by identifying and rectifying shortcomings in information-

106
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For another interpretation, see James G.R Simpson, "Boipatong: The Politics of a Massacre and the South
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gathering institutions. The Goldstone Commission made adjustments to the commission of
inquiry and associated investigation practices. In so doing, the Commission of Inquiry for
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation adjusted its approach to investigation
and rebuilt crucial credibility in investigations.
The Goldstone Commission also demonstrated the need for further investigation.
In this way, the information the Goldstone Commission investigated and made public
played a valuable role in demonstrating the need for further truth-seeking. Richard
Goldstone identifies that “it really laid the foundation and [in a] way it took the rug from
under the feet of de Klerk in opposing it. You know de Klerk could credibly have argued
to his people that there were no serious human rights violations for a TRC to
107

investigate.”

As Judge Goldstone identified after the election, there was a perception

that violence was ethnically or politically motivated but in certain cases this violence was
fomented by the security forces.

108

Thus, he states, “the Commission uncovered third force

activities from within the military and national police. Yet, it did nothing more than scratch
the surface.”

109

These initial investigations were themselves important. According to Judge

Goldstone, “But I think the evidence we brought out, particularly the third force, made it
110

impossible for de Klerk to say there’s nothing to investigate.”

This demonstrates the

value in the initial investigations.
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Even prior to the TRC, efforts to further investigate information uncovered by the
Goldstone Commission emerged, indicating in part, the degree to which further
investigations were necessary. For example, there was an investigation unit headed by the
Attorney-General of the Transvaal, Jan D’Oliviera, to inquire into hit-squad activities.

111

The value of information and truth in the transitional period had been evident in discussions
112

by civil society and activists.

Entwined with the advocacy for truth for reasons of

morality and acknowledgement then, was a recognition of the depths of the efforts to
prevent this information from coming to light. Government destruction of records and
security force efforts to disrupt Goldstone’s investigations highlight the interests in
113

preventing information from being made public, let alone acknowledged.

Finally, the adjustments made by the Goldstone Commission demonstrated a
change in institutional modalities used for information-gathering. Institutional components
that worked well re-appeared in the TRC, for example, the inclusion of investigation units
resembling those used by the Goldstone Commission. The institution of witness protection
will be taken up directly in the next chapter to illustrate this continuity, but the example of
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the investigation unit components in the two institutions is illustrative here. A comparison
of the legislation for the creation of the Goldstone Commission and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission does not specifically highlight a legislative overlap in the
inclusion of investigation units, because the Goldstone Commission added its
investigations after it had been established. However, the Promotion of National Unity Act
contained the provisions for an investigation unit, along with the codification of the power
of search and seizure, which were unique to the Goldstone Commission. The Promotion of
National Unity Act stipulates that the commission “may establish an investigating unit.”

114

Section 28 outlines the provisions for such a unit though most functional components of
115

the investigation units are left to be determined by the Commission itself.

The structure of the TRC’s investigation units was different from the Goldstone
Commission’s. Both civilian and police personnel made up the TRC Investigation Unit.
The civilian category included lawyers, researchers, NGO personnel, and journalists.
Seconded members of the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the National
116

Intelligence Agency comprised the police category.

Whereas the Goldstone

Commission developed its investigative arm through which investigation powers could be
more frequently exercised, this feature was built into the TRC’s design at the outset.
What stands out starkly in considering the South African TRC in light of its
institutional framework is the resemblance to the earlier commission of inquiry in South
Africa. The experience with commissions—unsatisfactory investigations and findings, and

114
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difficulty separating state involvement in violence and investigations—suggests that the
choice of tool could have been ill-suited to produce or engender change. The nature of the
commission of inquiry in South Africa was well entrenched, sufficiently so to have a
narrow set of expectations for what a commission of inquiry could be expected to produce.
Significantly, efforts to address this particular type of investigatory commission
established by the state at a critical turning point during the transition demonstrate that the
limitations in the structure could be addressed and adjusted in a way that addressed past
omissions and practices in the use of earlier inquiries. While the commission of inquiry in
Apartheid South Africa was in many ways knowingly unjust, the means and mechanisms
through which its operations could be adjusted to undo these structural injustices were not
clear cut.

117

The provisions made for the operational capacities of the Goldstone

Commission, and the cultivated legitimacy by the leadership of the commission helped to
build credibility in light of the earlier investigations.

118

Conclusion
Efforts taken by the Commission leadership, in combination with the space provided in the
mandate for adjustment, created conditions conducive to gradual change, specifically
conversion, within the commission of inquiry. The Goldstone Commission is an important
nodal point in the institutionalization of truth-seeking in South Africa. This chapter has
argued that the operation of the Goldstone Commission facilitated a process of gradual

117
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institutional change in the commission of inquiry. At the outset, in its creation in the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, and then negotiation into the National
Peace Accord, the Goldstone Commission was bestowed with wider powers than previous
commissions of inquiry, including search and seizure. These institutional innovations
provided the Commission with stronger information gathering capabilities. The legislation
had built-in provisions for amendments illustrating interpretation possibilities that were
used by the Commission leadership. With these capacities, the Commission developed
credible investigation practices that helped to uncover information about political violence
during South Africa’s transition. The Commission’s investigations contributed to the
recognition that there was further information that needed to be uncovered. Gradual
institutional change in the Goldstone Commission laid a foundation for South Africa’s
TRC, demonstrating effectiveness in institutional design and innovative institutional
modalities. In the next chapter, one of these modalities, witness protection is explored in
depth.
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Chapter 8

8

Gradual Institutional Change: Incorporating Witness
Protection

The previous chapter argued that through the Goldstone Commission, the commission of
inquiry underwent a process of gradual institutional change in order to serve the purposes
of violence investigation during the transition. This chapter analyzes the institutional
modality of witness protection to explore, in more depth, the way that institutions that had
been utilized by the state for some time were redeployed for truth-seeking purposes. The
chapter argues that the incorporation of witness protection measures illustrates the
conversion process that took place within the Goldstone Commission. This saw the
deployment of witness protection as a truth-seeking measure within the Goldstone
Commission and eventually within the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC). Although highlighted as an innovation of the South African TRC for
its formal use as part of a truth commission process, the inclusion of witness protection can
be better explained by taking into account the changes in the Goldstone Commission that
laid the foundation for its deployment in the TRC.
In the historical institutionalist vein that directs attention to the significance of
history, the institutionalization of witness protection in South Africa suggests its use less
as an end towards information gathering than as a by-product of control measures in the
context of Apartheid. The shortcomings of witness protection highlighted by the Goldstone
Commission’s operations resulted in the development of measures of witness protection
more conducive to truth-seeking. Thus, the institution of the commission of inquiry was
adjusted to better meet the needs of information gathering by incorporating witness
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protection measures. These adjustments were made possible by the structure and operation
of the Goldstone Commission.
The chapter beings by discussing the role of witnesses and witness protection in
truth-seeking and truth commission processes. The next section identifies how the
protective structures of the state created conditions that prevented the uncovering of
information based on the design of witness protection measures. Then, it provides an
analysis into the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation, which recognized the need to have protective measures to facilitate
uncovering information based on the shortcomings in the existing processes. The final
section identifies that these adjustments were adopted by the TRC process in South Africa.

8.1

Truth-seeking and Witness Protection

Many states that pursue truth-seeking do so in conditions of crisis and instability. As de
Greiff identifies, “truth commissions have become ‘normal’ responses in both postauthoritarian and post-conflict transitions. Indeed, some countries have implemented
transitional justice measures not just in the absence of a political transition, but while
1

conflict is still ongoing.” Truth commissions and other truth-seeking endeavours depend
on the willingness and ability of witnesses to participate in the proceedings. However, for
people to participate in truth-telling processes, there needs to be a reasonable expectation
of their safety.

1

Pablo de Greiff, "“Truth without Facts”: On the Erosion of the Fact-Finding Function of Truth
Commissions," in The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding, ed. Philip Alston and Sarah
Knuckey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 283.
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In this chapter, witness protection refers to both the policies and programs used to
protect witnesses who provide evidence and testimony to fact-finding and truth-seeking
2

institutions. This includes formal witness protection programs operated by police within
countries, or, organizations conducting investigations. It also includes other dimensions,
such as adopting investigative practices that do not put witnesses at risk, structuring
testimony collection in a way that can protect the identity of those who do not want to be
identified, and reporting in a way that reduces the risk of intimidation or retribution for
3

witnesses.

International human rights organizations, fact-finding missions, and international
commissions of inquiry rely on witness testimony to make determinations about ongoing
human rights violations. Rothenberg identifies that “testimony infuses fact-finding reports
4

with a sense of political and moral immediacy.” International commissions of inquiry
depend on witness participation to collect evidence in order to make findings about human
rights violations and abuses. Boutruche suggests that although witness testimony may
suffer from concerns about objectivity, “first-hand accounts by direct eyewitnesses often
constitute the easiest or most accessible way to clarify and establish the narrative and

2
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witnesses, see United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Commissions of Inquiry
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United Nations (New York and Geneva, 2015), 14.
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 193.
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circumstances of what happened.”

5

In addition, these inquiries often depend on the
6

availability of witness evidence given the lack of other types of evidence. Unlike truth
commissions, in international and domestic commissions of inquiries, the focus on
testimony shifts. The focus is less on victims being given an opportunity to tell their story
than it is about investigation and fact-finding to draw conclusions about cause and
attribution of responsibility in public crises.

7

Testimony from witnesses as a component of evidence is most frequently associated
with legal proceedings. In the transitional justice realm, understanding and considerations
of the role of witness testimony largely developed with the operation of international
prosecutions particularly in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The prosecutorial
approach of international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court, for
8

example, often rely on witness participation to make findings of guilt or innocence.

The availability of witness testimony can have a significant influence, including on
the selection of cases for prosecution and the outcomes of trials. Wald, for example,
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recounts a case at the ICTY in which a massacre that had no survivors meant that “the
episode could not be corroborated sufficiently to be included in the prosecutor’s case.”

9

Bass’s account of the first trial in the ICTY includes the observation, somewhat in passing,
that “the tribunal had hoped to make history with rape charges, but they were dropped on
10

the morning the trial started because a witness was afraid to testify in The Hague.” These
brief examples help to illustrate the necessary role that witnesses play in making findings
in legal settings.
In transitional justice, much of the focus on witness testimony in prosecutions has
been on its limitations: the rather narrow amount of information accessible through trial
proceedings and the constraints on the courts as a venue for victims to be heard.

11

A

distinction in the type of information being sought through these different venues helps to
explain how the role of testimony can serve such different needs. As du Toit explains:
The procedures typical of law in the determination of justice have different objectives
and assumptions, and require a distinctive sense of forensic evidence and truth, on
the one hand, compared to, on the other hand, the methods developed by historical
12
or scientific inquiry in the quest for narrative or nomological truth.
Truth commissions are celebrated for their ability to include victims, to engage in a
13

“narrative project” that identifies the structures and abuses of regimes.

9
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identifies that “victims and other witnesses undergo the ordeals of testifying and facing
cross-examination. Usually they are given no simple opportunity to convey directly the
14

narrative of their experience.”

The truth commission, with its focus on collecting

testimony, provides a different opportunity for participation from witnesses.
Crucially, though, the collection of testimony and the participation of witnesses is
necessary for a truth commission to serve the purpose for which it is intended. There is also
a significant information gathering and corroboration requirement, to try and record and
report with as much accuracy as possible.

15

Participating in a truth commission and

providing testimony as a witness has ramifications, depending on whether participation is
public and the identification of people believed to have been involved in the perpetration
16

of violence.

The variations of witnesses and witness testimony explored here demonstrate that
transitional justice and truth-seeking measures rely on witnesses to achieve their intended
goals. For those who have suffered and/or been witness to grave human rights violations,
providing testimony and evidence to factfinders, in trials, and in truth commissions can put
individuals and their families at risk. These risks may be psychological as the burden of
17

recounting trauma has the potential to inflict continued hardship. There are also physical
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safety and security risks. Witnesses face threats and intimidation to their own lives, and the
lives of family and friends.
Witness protection measures have taken different forms. Fear from participating as a
18

witness was a theme that reappeared throughout the operation of the ICTY and ICTR. As
such, guidelines and programs were established to protect witnesses who participate in
prosecutions. Witness protection at the ICTY includes administrative support to get to
proceedings, counselling, escorts to The Hague, and relocation programs where
necessary.

19

Protection is also attempted by holding proceedings in camera, changing

voices and hiding the identities of people testifying.

20

The ICTY and the ICTR set

important precedents in this regard. Both of these judicial tribunals demonstrated the value
of witness testimony and the pressures of witness protection and witness identification in
21

proceedings.

These deliberations have continued at the ICC, where protection for

witnesses is separated into two types: measures taken to protect witnesses where they live,
and measures taken during court proceedings to protect witness identity.

22

Investigations

also ought to be structured in a way that protects those who are willing to give evidence or
information.

23
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The same considerations are evident, though not yet entirely engrained, in
international commissions of inquiry. Bisset points to a series of international documents,
principles and guidelines which inform the structure of international commissions of
inquiry and associated witness protection mechanisms. This includes instruments such as
the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions (1991), the updated Minnesota Protocol (2016) and the Set of
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat
24

Impunity (1997, updated in 2005) which guide international commissions of inquiry. For
example, the Minnesota Protocol states: “An effective witness-protection programme is
essential for some investigations and should be in place before the investigation begins...
States should ensure that the authorities in charge of witness protection should in no way
be involved in the alleged death.”

25

There has not yet been universal application of these

26

types of guiding principles.

Choices made in the design of truth commission processes can be structured to
provide protection to witnesses. In truth commissions and other investigative commissions,
decisions made in the mandate, in terms of how testimony is collected and in the production
of the report, are implicated in the treatment and protection of witnesses.

27

South Africa

was the first truth commission to provide a formal witness protection program in its
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founding legislation.

28

Other truth commissions have made provisions for safety in the

process of data collection and dissemination that are less comprehensive. Hayner suggests
that commissions that lack formal witness protection programs can provide security to
29

people who testify by “providing strict confidentiality.” Another element that many truth
commissions include in their mandates the ability for testimony to be heard in camera or
in private. For example, the mandate for the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission outlines the protocol for the hearings as public, unless:
(a) the security of perpetrators, victims, or witnesses is threatened:
(b) it would be in the interests of justice; or
(c) there is a likelihood that harm may ensue to any person as a result of
30
proceedings being open to the public.
As with many institutional developments, particularly in states emerging from repression
and conflict, there is a difference between the design of a truth commission in its mandate
and its development in practice. Often, countries seek assistance from transitional justice
experts and others with experience with truth commissions as they proceed to establish
their own. Mandates, therefore, have a tendency to incorporate many ‘ideal type’ elements
31

that have been identified as best practice in truth commissions.

For truth commissions to encourage participation and support testimony from those
who have direct involvement with the issues under investigation (either as witnesses or
alleged perpetrators), processes and structures need to be in place to protect them from the

28
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dangers of participation. Without these structures the capacity to carry out credible
investigations is seriously challenged. Fear about participating in truth commission
processes has been identified as a harmful factor that can undermine their efforts.

32

Witnesses are targeted to prevent information from being made public. Hayner identifies
that witnesses in Uganda often returned to retract testimony, and that some witnesses in El
Salvador would only provide testimony outside of the country for fear of reprisal.

33

Witness protection measures are further dependent on the state’s ability to deliver the
34

necessary security and safety.

Institutional conditions play a role in whether witnesses

are able to participate. In order to support witness participation, the creation or
entrenchment of witness protection measures is an illustration of an entrenchment of truthseeking or an institutionalization of the truth-seeking process.

8.2
Information Gathering and Witness Protection in
South Africa
Given the reliance on witnesses and testimony, the operation of credible witness protection
is a valuable indicator for the institutionalization of conditions conducive to truth-seeking.
The South African TRC is notable in that it was the first truth commission to establish a
witness protection program. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
35

included provisions for the establishment of a “limited witness protection program.”
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However, the seeds of this inclusion are found in earlier institutional developments.
Witness protection policies developed in South Africa through incremental changes in
earlier investigative processes. The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation identified the gaps in witness protection and, based on the
characteristics discussion in Chapter 7, had a uniquely iterative capacity to adjust to fill
these gaps.
Prior to the ad hoc measures adopted out of necessity by the Goldstone Commission,
witness protection in South Africa operated at a very basic level. Newham identifies that
“until 1992, statutory provision was made for the protection of witnesses under section 185
of the Criminal Procedure Act… witnesses who were deemed by the Attorney General to
be in need of protective custody, were kept in the same conditions as prisoners awaiting
trial.”36 The National Peace Accord mentions measures for witnesses in Chapter 10, on
Special Criminal Courts, referencing the provisions made in the Criminal Law Amendment
Act of 1991.
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The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1991, still provided for the protection
38

of witnesses in protective custody.

The final report of the Goldstone Commission

captures the problems of the witness protection measures offered by the state. The report
states:
Witness protection schemes presently in operation, eg under section 185 of the
Criminal Procedure Act (No 51 of 1977), deal mainly with recalcitrant witnesses.
Without delay provision should be made for witnesses who are willing to give
evidence but are in fear of their lives; before, during and after testimony. The
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Reconciliation (October 1995).
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incarceration of such witnesses in cells or lock-ups is completely inappropriate; their
fears cause stress calling for proper counselling. Programmes need to be devised for
39
relocation after witnesses have testified, where necessary.
The subject of the Goldstone Commission investigations exacerbated the challenges of
these conditions. Given the allegations of security force involvement in the violence in
South Africa at that time, placing witnesses in this type of protection was not only
undesirable, but potentially dangerous, given high numbers of death or injury of people in
custody as discussed in Chapter 3 and 7.
The effect of minimal or questionable witness participation in such investigations is
illustrated in the Harms Commission, which the Government appointed to look into
allegations of state political murders, or hit squads, in South Africa in 1990. The limitations
of this Commission are fairly well-established: the mandate was narrow, limiting the
investigation to what had taken place within the country’s borders and there was no followthrough on state organs under investigation to produce necessary documents.

40

Assessments of the commission and its associated report point to a weak mandate and
almost satirical gathering of testimony. One media report described the situation as follows:
Some members of the [Civil Cooperation Bureau] and the police refused to testify
unless their identities were protected - and the result was that the commission was at
times turned into a comedy when some appeared in the commission room dressed in
outlandish disguises, including false wigs and moustaches. Most used code names.41
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The findings of the report were relatively underwhelming, with Justice Harms finding no
evidence of a hit squad at Vlakplaas, although the CCB “was linked to other crimes of
42

violence.” The conclusion of the report partially implicated witnesses participation in the
deficiency of evidence:
In the course of the Commission it also appeared that although allegations and
accusations are rife as to who did what and why, there is a basic lack of evidential
material that might put some flesh on the bones. In general, victims failed to furnish
43
information. Willing trustworthy witnesses did not come to the fore.
The behaviour of witnesses in this case is not particularly surprising, given the alleged state
involvement in the political murders under investigation. Indeed, the report acknowledges
the potential issues with a reliance on the police more generally for the Commission’s
44

operation.

At this time, the South African Police Service (SAPS) provided witness

protection in South Africa. The Goldstone Commission was a significant turning point for
witness protection in such investigations.

45

Through a process of gradual institutional

change within the Goldstone Commission, witness protection was incorporated into
Commission structures to strengthen violence investigation during the transition.
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8.3

Witness Protection in the Goldstone Commission

The Goldstone Commission initiated and operated its own witness protection program
46

from 1992 until the end of its operations in 1994.

The Commission’s findings relied, in

part, on witness testimony. In one of the first reports into violence, the Goldstone
Commission acknowledged, “we would like to pay tribute to the courage of the many
people who testified before us, to record that without them we could not have made any
progress at all, and to stress the importance of giving all possible protection to them and
47

their families.”

As laid out above, without witness testimony, information and

examination of instances of violence is difficult to substantiate and make public. The
second interim report, of 29 April 1992, echoes the importance of witness testimony:
The Commission has at all times been convinced, and remains so, that factual
findings cannot be made against individuals, groups or organizations on the basis of
untested evidence. For this reason, the hearings of the Commission and of
committees of the Commission have been held in public and witnesses have been
48
subjected to cross-examination by lawyers representing interested parties.
However, by the time the Commission released this second interim report, and before the
Goldstone Commission had established its witness protection program, one person slated
to provide testimony was murdered, as was a family member of another potential witness.
The second interim report states:
Then there is the issue concerning the safety of witnesses who testify before the
Commission. The murder of the leader of the “Black Cats” in Wesselton and the
apparent revenge murder of the mother of a renegade “Black Cat” witness in the same
46
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township highlight this problem. These murders took place during the course of the
investigation into the “Black Cats” and are therefore likely to severely diminish the
49
willingness of the members of the public to come forward and testify.
The nature of the investigations conducted by the Goldstone Commission and the
environment in which particularly divisive facts were being uncovered necessitated the
creation of structures to protect people testifying before the commission. More broadly, to
be seen to be working with police or investigators could also impact relationships between
community members. Those known or thought to be providing information or ‘colluding’
with the regime faced backlash and violence.

50

The volatile situation of the day

necessitated a distinction between the police, writ large, and the Commission that was
investigating instances of violence in which police were perceived to be involved. These
concerns were not unique to the Goldstone Commission. However, the Goldstone
Commission had both the statutory ability and leadership support to address these concerns,
reflecting conditions conducive to the process of conversion. In the recommendations, the
second interim report states:
The investigative functions of the Commission will continue to play an important
role in relation to the curbing of ongoing violence. In this regard, the Commission
should as soon as possible be granted adequate means and procedures for offering
51
protection to witnesses who testify before it or its committees.
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Although witness protection was not incorporated into the original mandate/legislation of
the Goldstone Commission, Chapter 6 of the National Peace Accord empowered the
Commission to “order that the relevant authority provide appropriate protection to a
52

person…if his life is endangered because of his assistance to the Commission.” This was
bolstered in 1992 with an amendment to the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation
Act, 1991. With this amendment, the Goldstone Commission used its powers to propose
adjustments to its operations, as discussed in Chapter 7, to respond to the limitations in its
ability to protect witness testimony, illustrating incremental adjustment towards stronger
information-gathering measures.
Witness protection that functioned as part of the Goldstone Commission was thus
operational within a year after the Commission began operations.

53

According to a

statement made by Judge Goldstone at the preliminary hearing into the Boipatong
Massacre, the Commission had recommended to the government that the Commission be:
empower[ed] to offer adequate witness protection to persons testifying before the
Commission. The Minister of Justice has informed the Commission that this
recommendation has been accepted and discussions are presently being conducted
by the Commission with officials of the Department of Justice with regard to
appropriate regulations. It is hoped that the regulations will be in force by 4 August
1992.54
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On 31 July 1992, the Government Gazette published an annexure to the Prevention of
Public Violence and Intimidation Act that spelled out the provisions for the protection of
55

witnesses and their families where necessary.

The provisions outlined the appointment

of a security director, and stipulated that witnesses were to be protected at locations as
determined by the security director and Chair of the commission. These regulations
included “offences and penalties” for false representations, attempts to make protected
persons known, or for contravening orders as a protected person.
The records of the opening proceedings identify that provisions had been made in
time for the Boipatong investigation:
The committee is accessible to any member of the public at any time. In addition, I
would like to make it clear that such a person may, if they have good reason to do so,
approach the committee on the basis of confidentiality and secrecy. If they require
protection because they fear reprisals or intimidation, suitable steps can be taken in
terms of powers which have recently been given to this commission, for the
protection of witnesses. In particular the commission is now enabled to arrange at no
cost to a witness, housing at a secret venue for an appropriate period after the person
has given evidence. I would appreciate if this aspect of the proceedings is brought to
56
the attention of the people of Boipatong and to the residents of KwaMadala Hostel.
The incorporation of witness protection measures into the institutional structures of the
Goldstone Commission illustrates how truth-seeking efforts were strengthened through the
operation of the Commission. Rather than relying on inadequate state-provided protection,
the Commission used its built in powers to modify the Commission in a manner conducive
to information gathering.
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Part of the challenge with witness protection and the Goldstone Commission was that
it had to rely on the existing state structures in order to be enacted. The initial reticence of
the Commission to create a witness protection program was that the police would need to
be heavily involved in the process. The discussion on investigation credibility in the
previous chapter is beneficial here. At a time when there were serious allegations of police
involvement in the perpetration of violence, police involvement was problematic. In a letter
sent to the Goldstone Commission on 5 February 1992, a non-governmental monitoring
organization, Peace Action Network, identified concerns with the Commission’s
operations as it related to investigations and witnesses, requesting “consideration be [sic]
given for their protection.” A handwritten note on the bottom of the document reads,
“10/02/92 Goldstone phoned impossible to run a witness protect[sic] programme. The
Commission wants to maintain some distance from the police, and the police are the people
57

to use in the programmes.”

However, when the need became increasingly urgent, the

Commission established certain work-around arrangements to offer protection to
witnesses. Here again the persistence, or path dependence, of the repressive institutional
framework demonstrates how problematic institutions formed the foundation of the
Goldstone Commission and against which the process of conversion is evident.
It is important to note that the Goldstone Commission’s identification of a need for
witness protection schemes was not the only influencing factor in the establishment of a
witness protection process. Newham identifies that Lawyers for Human Rights had
established an independent witness protection program that played an important role in the
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establishment of a witness protection program by the Goldstone Commission.

58

Archival

evidence points to pressure from non-governmental organizations to establish a witness
protection program. For example, the correspondence with Peace Action Network
referenced above, a non-governmental monitoring organization, suggests that the potential
for a witness protection program had been under discussion by civil society members prior
to the Goldstone Commission adopting protection measures.

59

According to reports, the Commissions’ program protected 37 witnesses and 40
60

family members.

The challenges and critiques of the witness protection program under

the Goldstone Commission largely centre on the fact that the provisions had not been
planned at the outset. Even though the witness protection has been criticized as
“reactionary,” its development within the commission of inquiry strengthened truthseeking in South Africa.

61

The Commission’s mandate incorporated other measures to protect witnesses as part
of the investigations into violence. The Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act
of 1991 stipulated that the hearings of the Commission would be held in public, except
when there was a risk to a person or their family associated with being required to provide
62

evidence to the Commission.
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The provisions in the National Peace Accord refined these
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parameters, outlining that the identity of a person providing evidence could not be
identified, the contents of documents had to be kept confidential, and that hearings could
63

be held in private when there was a threat or danger to participants.

The basis for the
64

caveat pertaining to public proceedings explicitly refers to the “safety of witnesses.”

By incorporating witness protection, as a result of both heeding the demands from
civil society and recognizing the impact that witness participation had on information
gathering, the Goldstone Commission stoked a conversation that was eventually taken up
by the TRC. The use of witnesses, and the dependence on witness protection to access
information, laid a foundation for the role of witness protection elements in the TRC. In
the final report of the Goldstone Commission, the Commission acknowledges the lingering
inadequacies of state-run witness protection for further truth-seeking. The report states:
Even if the immediate needs of the international investigation team led by the
Attorney-General of Transvaal or the proposed commission for truth and
reconciliation are not taken into account, the Commission is convinced of the dire
necessity of an adequate witness protection programme to be properly established
65
and expanded to provide for needs throughout the country.
This suggests that there was a need for witness protection measures within the informationgathering institutions that followed the Goldstone Commission, and beyond. With the
gradual changes that took place under the Goldstone Commission, the value of witness
protection operating this way helps to explain its persistence in truth-seeking in the
aftermath of the transition.
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8.4

From the Goldstone Commission to the TRC

The South African TRC was the first truth commission to incorporate witness protection
into its structures.

66

By looking further back in the institutional foundations for the truth

commission, one can trace the development of witness protection, as part of an
investigatory

commission

to

the

Goldstone

Commission.

Also

evident

are

acknowledgments by civil society organizations of the potential for institutional continuity
between the Goldstone Commission and the TRC.
As early as 1995 Gareth Newham identified that the lessons learned from the
Goldstone Commission’s work ought to inform the TRC’s implementation of witness
protection policies.67 A submission from Lawyers for Human Rights on the Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act details things that the Goldstone Commission had
learned in terms of witness protection. The document suggests that, “it has been our
experience during the Goldstone Commission that unless we were able to provide adequate
protection for witnesses, we were unable to secure their attendance at the Commission for
the purposes of procuring their testimony.”68 The Network of Independent Monitors’
submission to the Minister of Justice on the establishment of the truth commission
identifies that, “there has never been any effective witness protection programme in South
Africa and this is an area that will need to be addressed seriously by the Truth
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Commission.”69 These examples demonstrate that civil society actors raised the issue and
necessity of a witness protection program in the TRC. Further, the minutes of a technical
workshop of civil society actors that took place in 1995, identify that the witness protection
program must make clear that “witness protection” means “protective custody”.70 This is a
similar structure to that used by the Goldstone Commission, despite criticism of the
process. Although the design of the witness protection program for the truth commission
71

eventually developed into something more comprehensive,

the links to previous witness

protection schemes are evident.
Other elements of the TRC also influenced the development of witness protection
measures. The decision to widely publicize the proceedings of the TRC and to name
perpetrators in the process would, in part, have necessitated the development of processes
and structures to protect those who provided testimony. The witness protection program
72

was operational beginning May 1, 1996. According to the TRC Report, those who sought
witness protection in the beginning were victims, witnesses who were concerned about
73

safety based on details they could provide to the commission.

In October 1996, amnesty

applicants increasingly sought protection, fearing “reprisals when testifying at public
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hearings.”

The presence of protection provisions for people who testified at the

commission strengthened the truth-seeking project by enabling people to come forward
and provide evidence, and to have that evidence corroborated. 150 people used the witness
protection program offered by the TRC.

75

The South African TRC also included other elements of protection for people to
testify at the truth commission. Under certain circumstances, the Commission conducted
hearings in camera. Its founding Act provided for enhanced information-seeking potential
through Section 29:
Essentially, section 29 allowed the Commission to issue a subpoena calling on a
person to appear before it and answer questions relating to a matter under
investigation. Unless otherwise determined by the Commission, the enquiry would
take place in camera and the witness would be compelled to answer questions, even
76
though the answers might be self-incriminating.
Under Section 29, investigations and hearings could be held in private; the information and
evidence provided to these investigations and hearings would only be made public at the
77

discretion of the Commission according to the legislation.

The TRC used information

gathered in these proceedings to corroborate evidence received through other informationgathering practices conducted by the truth commission. While there is some skepticism
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about what was accomplished in these hearings,

78

the TRC Report identifies that the
79

Section 29 hearings played an important role in substantiating evidence.

The TRC also had other protection measures in place for people testifying or for those
who would be identified publicly in its proceedings. If people were going to name people
alleged to have been involved in incidents, the legislation dictated that the person
implicated had to be notified that they would be named. This included for public hearings
80

and in making findings. Though the names of people who had been granted amnesty were
to be published in the Government Gazette, the Human Rights Violations Committee had
81

to grapple perpetrators named in hearings. The recourse for accused who did not want to
be named was to apply to the courts for interdicts preventing the hearings from moving
forward.

82

Sarkin notes that the courts did require the TRC to provide adequate notice to

those who would be named, the TRC “stat[ed] that it would not necessarily disclose the
identity of witnesses that may name such perpetrators.”
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In these design decisions, the interplay between the goals of truth-seeking, and the
institutional components that facilitated truth-seeking are clearly illustrated. The Goldstone
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Commission and the South African TRC provide a valuable example of how this space for
interpretation in legislation and mandates can facilitate the truth-seeking processes with the
incremental institutional change in the Goldstone Commission enabling the development
of witness protection measures and the TRC refining it. The impact of the incremental
institutional change is evident in two ways. First, earlier investigations highlighted some
limitations of incorporating witnesses into the existing information-gathering processes.
When the leadership of the Goldstone Commission had the capabilities adjust to identified
limitations, and the resources to respond, the Commission developed modalities that were
innovative in the South African context. Second, the adoption of similar witness protection
measures at the TRC suggests a recognition of the value of the institutional conversion
toward truth-seeking and information gathering within commission structures.

Conclusion
This chapter first highlighted the importance of witnesses in transitional justice and in the
process of information gathering. Then, it demonstrated how the Goldstone Commission
responded to limitations in its operating structure, recognizing the danger for witness
participation and the limitations on information gathering during the transitional period.
Framed as a process of incremental change, the witness protection component of the
Goldstone Commission illustrates the manner in which the process of conversion better
positioned the Goldstone Commission for information gathering. In the final section, this
chapter demonstrated how the TRC was shaped and enabled by what came before it.
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Chapter 9

9

Institutional Conversion: The Question of Amnesty

The previous chapters have demonstrated that the institutionalization of truth-seeking
processes in South Africa can be explained using a path dependence framework coupled
with theories of gradual institutional change. Thus far, two examples of institutional redeployment in information-gathering institutions have been presented. Chapters 6 and 7
demonstrated that under certain conditions, the commission of inquiry, having been used
historically to reinforce the Apartheid system was transformed, illustrating a process of
‘conversion’ in institutional adjustments. Chapter 7 illustrated that the commission of
inquiry was re-deployed in a manner conducive to truth-seeking, despite the perceptions it
had developed as part of the repressive system. Chapter 8 explored one example of
institutional deployment that illustrated gradual institutional change in the commission of
inquiry, through the institution of witness protection. This chapter explores how the
institution of indemnity, and later amnesty was differently implemented and justified over
the course of the South African transition, from the initiation of negotiations, through the
constitutional negotiations, and eventually as a component of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC).
Scholars such as du Bois-Pedain and Sarkin articulate and demonstrate the
persistence of amnesty from the early negotiations to the TRC’s power to grant amnesty.

1

Sitze recognizes, for example, that initial proposals about the amnesty process were similar
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in every component to a piece of earlier indemnity legislation, the 1990 Indemnity Act,
except for one element which referenced the newly established 1993 Interim Constitution.

2

The question of amnesty within the transition was contentious until the end of the
3

negotiations. South Africa’s agreement to amnesty was included in the postamble to the
1993 Interim Constitution. The 1993 Interim Constitution included the following
provision:
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted
in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under
this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a
date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such
amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed.4
After the democratic election, the TRC was the chosen vehicle to address this clause of the
Constitution.
This chapter traces the evolution of amnesty from the indemnity process under
Apartheid, through the transitional negotiations, identifying the shift in instrumentality
from the earlier negotiations to truth-seeking in the transitional period. It raises an
important observation relating to institutional continuity and change. This chapter argues
that the development and continued relevance of amnesty in this historical period can be
explained as a product of persistence and change. We can trace a shift in amnesty’s goals
from its utility as a negotiation chip to the value placed on amnesty to access information
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Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 30-31.
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at the TRC. This account offers a different perspective in analyzing the persistence of the
institution of amnesty through the democratic election and into the TRC space, offering an
explanation for the process as an illustration of incremental institutional change.
This chapter sets the context for the amnesty discussion, first, by situating how
amnesty is theorized in truth-seeking and truth commissions. After a brief overview of
indemnity under Apartheid, the chapter traces the development of the indemnity process in
the early negotiating period, outlining elements of continuity in the decision-making and
implementing arrangements. Mahoney and Thelen outline the significance of the
coalitional dynamics, veto points or players in an environment, and the discretion in the
6

interpretation of the rules as important features of gradual institutional change. The next
three sections demonstrate how the interaction of these characteristics explains the gradual
change in the purpose and application of amnesty in the South African transition focusing
on the negotiating period, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence
and Intimidation, and the TRC. The chapter argues that amnesty-in-exchange-forinformation was not deployed with the Goldstone Commission because of the political
conditions. However, these conditions were ripe for amnesty’s conversation through the
TRC. In the final sections, the chapter explores how amnesty was employed by the TRC in

5
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light of its previous use and analyzes how these influences affected the amnesty process in
the TRC.
A note on terminology is necessary. During the South African transition period
under investigation, the terms indemnity and amnesty were sometimes used
7

interchangeably. As discussed below, prior to the amnesty arrangement at the TRC, the
Government of South Africa used indemnities to prevent charges being brought against
individuals. In the early drafts of the legislation for the TRC, Minister of Justice Dullah
Omar distinguishes between indemnity and amnesty based on whether or not an individual
8

had been tried and convicted for acts of a political objective. According to this text,
“indemnity is to be given to persons who have not yet been tried for any offence committed
with a political object. Amnesty is granted to persons who have been convicted of an
9

offense and who are serving or have served a period of imprisonment.” At the Healing of
a Nation Conference in 1994, put on by civil society organizations to discuss the potential
for a truth commission, the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, uses both terms in his
10

remarks. Earlier legislation, both under Apartheid and during the negotiations, nominally
refers to indemnity. However, with respect to information-gathering the concept of
indemnity was replaced with amnesty—in exchange for truth.

11

Parker identifies that:

no important distinction was drawn between amnesties for those convicted of
crimes and indemnities protecting violators from criminal and civil liability.
7

Sitze dedicates an entire chapter to the genealogy of these terms, see Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 2349.
8
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Indeed, the 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act uses the word
12
amnesty for both.
In the end, amnesty within the TRC included the components of indemnity. If granted
amnesty, those already serving prison sentences for crimes that fell under the TRC’s
criteria would be released and those granted amnesty would be protected from criminal or
13

civil liability for those acts.

9.1

Amnesty and Truth-Seeking

In the field of transitional justice, the viability of amnesty in processes of redress is strongly
14

debated. The debates on amnesty consider the legality of amnesties,

questions of

accountability and the prioritizing of retributive justice (and closely related arguments
15

about deterrence), and the dimensions of morality that comprise deliberations over types
16

of justice and amnesty.
17

‘settled’.

As Dugard points out, these discussions and debates are far from

Furthermore, the moral complexity at the core of the discussions is not easily
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mapped; theorizing the value of prosecution and accountability is necessarily different
18

from implementing these ideals in practice.

The issue is further complicated by ideas of

non-retributive justice. Since the South African TRC particularly, the association of truthseeking with amnesty has changed the parameters of the discussion, building on nuances
of conditionality for disclosing information, and incentivizing participation in truthseeking processes.
Leigh and Payne define amnesty as “legal measures adopted by states that have the
effect of prospectively barring criminal prosecution against certain individuals accused of
19

committing human rights violations.” An ongoing debate in the human rights community
is whether amnesties can be justified in cases of human rights abuses or whether
prosecution is always required. The entrenchment of an “accountability” norm has
channeled much of the discussion into when amnesty might be justified, if ever, and what
the limits of amnesty ought to be.

20

Pertinent to this framing is Dugard’s recognition that

amnesties should not all be treated the same.

21

Contextual differences may facilitate

prosecution, and in some cases, prosecution may not be deemed the ‘right’ path of justice
for human rights violations.
For those who contend that the impunity associated with amnesty is detrimental to
the development of human rights and democratization, amnesties are considered
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unjustifiable.

Others, however, suggest that amnesties considered and granted under

certain conditions have an instrumental role to play in addressing past human rights
violations. This may be in the very possibility of a transition itself, or, in enabling other
transitional justice mechanisms to operate.

23

Amnesty can facilitate transitions where

parties may be otherwise unwilling to negotiate.

24

A demand for amnesty or an amnesty

agreement is sometimes the contingency on which transitions or agreements are made. The
intention here is not to situate my argument along the continuum of the morality or utility
of amnesty. Rather, by presenting the broad strokes of amnesty’s role in transitional justice,
the link between amnesty and truth commissions itself can be more clearly articulated.
In the facilitator line of reasoning, amnesty can expedite the uncovering of
information. Amnesty is identified as an incentive, in this regard, for disclosing information
25

about past events.

South Africa’s conditional amnesty, that is, the granting of amnesty

only when individuals presented the complete details of crimes, influenced considerations
26

of the application of amnesty mediated by truth commissions in transitional justice.
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Amnesty agreements do not necessitate the establishment of a truth commission,
however the relationship between amnesties, truth commissions, and prosecutions is
complex. When they first emerged, new governments often established truth commissions
because prosecution was not possible. Thus, truth commissions may have been operating
27

with amnesties already in place, as was the case in Chile, for example.

In Chile, an

amnesty law passed in 1978 prevented the new regime from pursuing prosecutions for
28

human rights violations committed under the regime of Augusto Pinochet.

The amnesty

law was one of the factors that steered the new regime to adopt a truth commission in order
29

to address the human rights violations under the previous regime.

The report of one of

the truth commissions established in Chile, the Rettig Commission, recognizes that “the
worst and most systematic human rights violations perpetrated by the military government
occurred in the period covered by the amnesty.”

30

In this case, the truth commission was

not structured to grant amnesty, but had been informed by the existing amnesty
arrangement and the balance of power.
Hayner points out that the direct relationship between truth commissions and
amnesty is frequently magnified based on the notoriety of the South African case.

31

The
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South African experience has also shaped perceptions about amnesty processes in other
32

commissions, causing confusion at times. As Slye recognizes, however, the unique South
African amnesty process has “not been adopted by any other country undergoing a similar
33

transition, and it seems unlikely that it will.”

The characteristics of the South African

transition enabled the production of a transitional process that was amenable to the
negotiating parties, that could facilitate the disclosure of information, and that could
facilitate the granting of amnesty. Less attention has been paid to how the gradual changes
in the institution of amnesty explain, in part, its redeployment at the TRC. The institutional
predecessors to the TRC in South Africa shaped its institutionalization and incremental
change in important ways.

9.2

34

Indemnity/Amnesty: Apartheid and Transition

The institution of indemnity was relatively extensive for the security forces of the
Apartheid state, reflecting a pattern of path-dependence. Similar to the commission of

32
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inquiry, indemnity offered a means through which the state could enforce public order, and
contain opposition. State security forces in South Africa were afforded several protections
under law and one of these was indemnity from liability. Major pieces of legislation to
facilitate indemnity were implemented after violent events that were condemned by
international and domestic actors, like police involvement in the Sharpeville Massacre in
1960 and the police shooting of protestors during the Soweto Uprising in 1976.

35

Sitze

traces the institution of indemnity using the historical jurisprudence of the concept
suggesting that the TRC’s use of amnesty was a continuation of the practice of indemnity
that, under Apartheid, had become normalized.36
Entrenched in law were provisions that police and defence forces could not be held
liable for crimes committed in the pursuit of their duty. Bogden and Shearing characterize
this as the “right to kill within rules,” pointing to the 1977 Criminal Procedure Act 51,
which allowed shoot to kill responses to prevent suspects from getting away.37 The 1982
Internal Security Act provided “officers in the SAP of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or
above the power to order preventive detention, detention of witnesses, and for
interrogation.”38 A 1979 amendment to the Police Act provided for wider powers for the
police, in terms of search powers.39
In addition to the protection for state officers provided by the laws of policing and
enforcement, the Government of South Africa passed Indemnity Bills in 1961 and 1977 to

35
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protect members of the police, and other state officials, from being held accountable for
the police-involved shootings at Sharpeville and Soweto.40 The state justified these
indemnity provisions in terms of necessary action to maintain public order, provided
officials acted in good faith.41 Although passed in July 1961, the 1961 Indemnity Act was
given effect from March 21, 1960 (the day of the Sharpeville Massacre). The legislation
was:
To indemnify the Government, its officers and all other persons acting under its or
their authority in respect of acts, announcements, statements or information
advised, commanded, ordered, directed, done, made or published in good faith for
the prevention or suppression of internal disorder or the maintenance or restoration
of good order or public safety or essential services or the preservation of life or
property in any part of South Africa included in the Republic or the termination of
a state of emergency in certain areas included in the Republic, and to provide for
42
matters incidental thereto.
Similarly, the provisions of the Indemnity Act of 1977 covered 16 June 1976 (the day of
the start of the Soweto Uprising) onward:
To indemnify the State, members of the Executive Council of the Republic, persons
in the service of the State and persons acting under their authority in respect of acts,
announcements, statements or information advised, commanded, ordered, directed,
done, made or published in good faith for the prevention, suppression or
termination of internal disorder or the maintenance or restoration of good order or
public safety or essential services of the preservation of life or property in any part
43
of the Republic and to provide for matters connected there-with.
Both of these Acts highlight the prevention of disorder by state officials as justification for
indemnity, despite the deadly outcomes of their actions. In both Sharpeville and the Soweto
40
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violence, the police were indemnified for shooting on crowds of civilians. These actions
were justified by the state in terms of maintaining control, despite the discrepancy in threat
versus response.

44

Sitze argues that,

initially theorized under imperial conditions as a technique for the suppression of
anticolonial rebellion, indemnity functioned under apartheid as a carte blanche
endorsement for the police to wage ‘low-intensity war’ against individuals and
populations opposed to apartheid.45
Using indemnity during Apartheid achieved the Government’s ambition of public order in
the face of opposition.
Indemnity’s purpose at this time was not information gathering, nor conciliation.
The goal was to protect state agents in the pursuit of ‘order’ at all costs, as the legislation
passages above suggest. As Frankel notes in his assessment of the Wessels Commission
after the Sharpeville Massacre, there was little expectation for information. Frankel
suggests that “the police drew strength from the fact that they knew they were untouchable
in the context of the times.”46 Frankel recognizes that the prospective of amnesty in
exchange for information emerged later, with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

47

Under Apartheid, indemnity was used by the state to facilitate enforcement and
coercion without consequence; protecting the individuals that worked to maintain the
regime. In the intervening period, indemnity and amnesty were deployed for another
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purpose, facilitating progress in negotiations. Despite changes in its justification and goals,
indemnity persisted through the negotiation period and to the TRC.

9.2.1 Negotiating Political Prisoners
The second discernable goal of indemnity/amnesty in South Africa is evident in its
association with the initiation of the negotiation process. A contentious issue underscoring
the transition was the issue of political prisoners. The Apartheid regime criminalized
48

political opposition and civil protest.

Thus, people who operated in opposition to

Apartheid were criminalized for their association with these organizations, meaning many
ended up imprisoned or in exile.

49

The ANC’s position was that for negotiations to be at

least somewhat even-footed, members of political groups that were imprisoned ought to be
50

released.

The context for indemnity’s redeployment is important. Following on the pattern
of both the commission of inquiry itself and witness protection, indemnity was used
initially by the Apartheid state to maintain the status quo. But, during the opening of the
transition, it was used as a tool for change. Given the ANC’s demands to move forwards
with negotiations, the Government could not ignore the calls for prisoner release, and this
necessitated the implementation of indemnity measures. Furthermore, the negotiations
about indemnity, and later amnesty, relied on the incorporation of the ANC’s preferences,

48
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given their influence on negotiation decision-making. The implementation of
indemnity/amnesty at various stages throughout the negotiation and transition period
demonstrates sufficient ambiguity in application that helps to explain the changing
purposes of its deployment and re-deployment. This ambiguity is most prominent in the
provisions and interpretations for who met the requirements for the successive indemnity
agreements and associated legislation.
The government’s decision to lift the ban on opposition organizations in 1990
required a way to approach those imprisoned for political crimes. In his 1990 speech, de
Klerk identified that those who were imprisoned simply for being part of the organizations
51

would be “identified and released.”

While there was existing legislation that could be

used to commute sentences, it was necessary to establish a framework for people who had
52

not yet been charged with offences or who were waiting for trial proceedings. In addition,
agreements had to be forged to determine the criteria to denote crimes as political offences.
It is important to reiterate that the number of political prisoners imprisoned in South Africa
was imprecise—in part because of the government’s treatment of political offences as
criminal. People were imprisoned for a wide variety of offences “ranging from treason to
terrorism, membership of a banned organisation to murder,” complicating the release of

51
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political prisoners.

53

Given the prospects for negotiations, however, the Government’s

ability to unilaterally extend indemnities and make determinations of eligibility was
diminished.
Two agreements signed in the early 1990s were incremental steps toward the
constitutional negotiations that cemented South Africa’s transition. These were also key
points in which the indemnity and amnesty discussions are rooted. These first steps, the
Groote Schuur Minute (4 May 1990) and Pretoria Minute (6 August 1990), outlined the
process for identifying political prisoners and determining how prisoners would be
54

released. This process was legislated in the Indemnity Act, 1990.55 The deliberations and
decisions surrounding the release of political prisoners not only laid the foundation for
amnesty but discerned institutional elements for identifying and indemnifying political
prisoners.
These early agreements in the negotiating process opened the space for
amnesty/indemnity to inform the transitional conversation. As political decisions, their
composition and the means through which the agreements would be implemented, illustrate
incremental elements of change. Although the purpose of indemnity at this time was related
to accountability measures, the indemnities associated with the negotiations demonstrate
changes in the application of the institution of indemnity. Their purpose at this stage was
not about amnesty or indemnity-in-exchange-for-information. However, this stage still
illustrates gradual institutional change.
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The indemnity rules incorporated a new group of interests while maintaining the
interests of the old. As Thelen notes, institutions respond to changing societal and political
conditions, and “the political renegotiations that accompany such realignments are crucial
to understanding changes over time.”

56

This is significant because in both the Apartheid

period and in the negotiation period, indemnity was applied differently. At the height of
Apartheid, indemnity enabled the state to enforce Apartheid rules and order without fear
of repercussion. During the negotiations, its institutional application was extended to bring
the opposition forces like the ANC and the PAC into the fold. As Parker states:
the question of indemnities for those who had not been charged was bound up with
amnesties for political prisoners; both were seen less as a means of protecting agents
of the state from subsequent prosecution for human rights abuses, and rather more as
57
a necessary pre-condition for talks about talks.
The necessary extension of indemnity provisions to facilitate negotiations illustrates one
part of the process of gradual institutional change. The transitional environment, the
recognition on behalf of the state and opposition that negotiations were inevitable,
recalibrated the indemnity process to include those who had previously been excluded and
indeed victimized by indemnity provisions.
In order to extend the indemnity institution, these early negotiations and agreements
directly address a critical element of the indemnity/amnesty conversation that shaped the
58

later amnesty process: how a political crime would be defined. This is significant for two
reasons, which will be discussed in turn. First, it placed restrictions on the indemnities that
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followed, which was an adjustment to the sweeping indemnities the State provided itself
in 1961 and 1977. Second, the ‘political’ caveat on crimes provided a foundation on which
later indemnities and amnesties would be evaluated. The institution of amnesty was
reshaped by these agreements and this piece would itself become entrenched during the
1990s, later being used to determine eligibility for amnesty at the TRC and serving as an
undergirding reference for the institution of amnesty.
The negotiating parties agreed upon to determine which crimes fell under the
category of political crimes using the Norgaard principles as a framework.

59

Danish judge

Carl Norgaard established these principles during negotiations between the Government of
60

South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia. With some adjustments, these principles informed
the Indemnity Act (1990) and the Further Indemnity Act (1992) that emerged from the
negotiations, agreements, and working groups of the incremental agreements between the
Government of South Africa and the ANC in the 1990s.
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This language are also found in

the Constitution in terms of “offences associated with political objectives,”
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the TRC with respect to which types of crimes would be addressed by the amnesty
provisions.

63

The 1992 legislation, the Further Indemnity Act, strayed the furthest from the earlier
definitional arrangements. This legislation was criticized for it was perceived as a self64

amnesty for state actors and provided leeway for interpretation. Under this legislation the
President could grant indemnity for “an act with a political object,” the definition of which,
argues Parker, “covered anything that a person believed or was told was political. Whether
such a belief was reasonable was an irrelevant consideration.”

65

Savage identifies that the

Further Indemnity Act was a means to deal with the difficult cases of prisoner release with
regards to “acts with a ‘political object’ in which criminal convictions resulted. It also
allowed the government to grant indemnity in the most controversial cases.”

66

These

criticisms are underscored by the manner in which the Government passed this legislation.
When the bill did not pass in parliament, de Klerk sought approval from the President’s
67

Council, controlled by the ruling party, to pass the bill.

Implementing the arrangements once agreements had been reached brought other
challenges. This negotiation stage clearly highlights that the institution of indemnity was
focused more on securing indemnity for individuals and not on access to information for
the justifications of indemnity or amnesty. In accounts of the indemnity processes in the
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1990s, the general consensus in the literature is that the roll-out of the process was uneven
and not sufficiently transparent. Though the 1992 Further Indemnity Act raised the most
concerns, given that power rested so tightly with the President, the earlier processes were
also subject to criticisms. As Keightley identifies, much of the complexity arose from those
who remained imprisoned whose crimes were seemingly politically motivated but which
68

were also often violent.

The indemnity process for people imprisoned for contravening

Apartheid laws that stifled the opposition were less contentious, though there were still
implementation challenges.

69

The number of applications received, more than 9,000 by April 1992, caused
70

bureaucratic challenges. The volume of applications also created challenges with respect
to cases that had to be reviewed based on higher degrees of violence and could not be
addressed by blanket indemnities.

71

In March 1991, the government reported that there

were 42 “hard cases” to be assessed in this category, however, the number was higher
72

according to Lawyers for Human Rights.

The lineage and continued use of the Norgaard principles is significant, as are the
adjustments made in the indemnity-turned amnesty process. Despite challenges in their
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application, the Norgaard principles illustrate continuity in the process. The definition of
political crime was relatively consistent between the negotiations of the Pretoria Minute,
the Indemnity Act, promulgated 15 May 1990, and the government’s August 1990
73

Guidelines for Defining Political Crimes.

The Norgaard framework also influenced the TRC. The Report of the TRC identifies
that “the wording of the Act leaned very heavily on what had become known as the
‘Norgaard Principles’.”

74

This continuity demonstrates a recognition of the continued

relevance of these criteria, relying on them to guide the transitional process. Using similar
criteria throughout the negotiating process provided some mutually agreed consistency in
their application. The negotiated arrangements shifted the indemnity decisions solely from
the power of the state to reflect the demands and preferences of the former opposition
movement. This illustrates a new framing for the institution of indemnity that served the
purpose of negotiation.

9.2.2 Challenges with secrecy
The indemnity processes also proved divisive based on the secrecy that characterized the
process. The level of secrecy highlights the degree to which information gathering was not
achieved in the earlier negotiation stages of the institution’s deployment. For example,
there was agreement during negotiations that called for the establishment of a body to
advise the government on indemnity and to demonstrate objectivity for involved parties.
However, the manner in which this was actualized provided for “advisory” bodies that were

73
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“subject to high levels of secrecy.”

75

Furthermore, equal political representation on the

deciding committee was not achieved because the “three ANC nominees refused to
participate because of a ruling that deliberations had to be held in secret.”

76

The secrecy

of the operation was problematic, and was, according to Keightley:
not very successful in lending clarity to the indemnity process or in fostering the
notion of objectivity. This is not to suggest that the committees, comprising three
judges of the superior courts, were partisan to government interests. It is in particular
in relation to the proceedings of these committees, and in particular the secrecy
77
surrounding them, that criticism may be levelled.
However, media reports at the time identify that some of the judges assigned to the
committee on “hard-cases”, including judges who had enforced Apartheid laws, may have
been perceived as less credible.

78

The secrecy further exacerbated a perception that the

earlier principles agreed to in order to identify political prisoners were not necessarily
79

equally applied.

This perception arose from the indemnification of people whose crimes

did not fit the established criteria, including violence towards civilians.

80

According to

Keightley, the committee structure used to make the early decisions on who met the criteria
to receive indemnity followed the development of the indemnity process, meaning that a
81

small group of select people was responsible for decisions pertaining to indemnity.

This

was problematic because of the secret nature of the adjudication, which led some to
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question the process given what seemed to be unequal application of the criteria and the
lack of transparency in the indemnity process as a whole, given the secrecy with which the
committees operated.

82

The later iterations of the indemnity process exacerbated the problem of secrecy.
The Indemnity Amendment Act 1992 (Act no. 124) and the Further Indemnity Act 1992
(Act no. 151) were problematic given their ability to obscure information, never-mind
gathering and publicizing it. In the former, indemnity was granted under these provisions,
which also provided for the “disposal of articles seized in connection with the
investigation.”

83

The Further Indemnity Act “extended indemnity to state offenders and

provided for total secrecy regarding the actions for which individuals sought indemnity.”

84

The impact of these agreements was controversial. The Further Indemnity Act was seen as
an effort by the state to ensure security forces were protected. Parker notes that the “Further
Indemnity Act was thus widely seen as a form of self-indemnity conducted in secret.”

85

The Further Indemnity Act stipulated significant secrecy around the application and
adjudication process. This act restricted access to information, those approved for
indemnity under the Further Indemnity Act would be named, but their crimes and victims
would not be made public.

86

André du Toit also recognizes there were unintended

consequences such that mainly opposition forces sought and were granted indemnity under
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the Further Indemnity Act while few state security forces sought indemnity under the Act.

87

Making an important observation in the implementation of the Further Indemnity Act, du
Toit identifies that it “did require amnesty applicants to make personal disclosures—except
that all procedures, hearings and decisions under the Act were cloaked in official
secrecy.”

88

This illustrates that information gathering and truth-seeking were not the

priority with these indemnity processes.
Prior to the TRC, another interim Committee was established to deal with lingering
indemnity considerations.

89

To deal with these applications, before the TRC and after the

1994 democratic election, the ANC Government established a committee headed by Brian
Currin, the national director of Lawyers for Human Rights to process indemnity
90

applications that had not be dealt with prior to the election.

As McEvoy outlines, “the

committee considered 1,200 individual applicants who claimed their offenses were
91

political and recommended indemnity in 260 cases.”

This link between the

administrations, but prior to the TRC, illustrates the challenge of completing what ended
up being a continuing process.
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While the amnesty deliberations continued, and an agreement to amnesty was
included in the 1993 Interim Constitution, the framing of the provision of amnesty shifted
once again. Through the TRC, amnesty was justified as a means to uncover information
about the past regime, with a recognition that “Nuremburg-style trials” were not possible,
92

nor necessarily desirable. Although amnesty was essentially a condition for the transition,
its deployment through the TRC illustrates that it underwent a process of conversion to be
used as an information-gathering mechanism. This process is illuminated by the Goldstone
Commission’s deliberations on amnesty, prior to the TRC.

9.3
The Goldstone Commission and Information
Gathering
This section explores the roots of amnesty’s re-deployment towards information-gathering
at the TRC. A part of the justification for the conditionality of amnesty through the TRC
was the potential to use amnesty to gather information. In the intervening period, while the
negotiations were ongoing, the potential for amnesty to be used more instrumentally for
information gathering was proposed by the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of
Public Violence and Intimidation. This discussion with regards to information gathering is
important because the potential of offering something in exchange for information during
the transition played out in an important way in the period leading up to the democratic
elections and the establishment of the TRC.
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Conversations around amnesty occurred during the tenure of the Goldstone
Commission but amnesty was not formally used to gather information until the TRC. This
illustrates an interaction between three elements that inform Mahoney and Thelen’s
framework of gradual institutional change. The political context, the institution itself, and
the type of change-agent at work suggest that the possibility of deploying amnesty for a
different purpose gained potential but the environment and the institution were not
93

conducive to change. After the democratic election, the political environment and altered
composition of the power-holders offers some insight into the re-deployment of amnesty
at the TRC. However, consideration of amnesty by the Commission of Inquiry for the
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation illustrates the potential variation of
possible functions for amnesty. As this section and the next demonstrate, amnesty’s
deployment as an information-gathering measure at the TRC highlights the final shift in
the purpose of amnesty in the period under consideration.
In order to ascertain facts, in the quest for information from perpetrators and
witnesses, discussions of amnesty emerged related to the Goldstone Commission
operations.

94

The Goldstone Commission articulated the political value of granting

amnesty in investigating the allegations of violence by state apparatus. Daniel Terris
identifies that “in August 1992, Richard Goldstone took advantage of the public spotlight
to offer a bold proposal. He called for an amnesty for those who agreed to testify before
95

the Commission about matters relating to the promotion of violence.”

Analysts suggest
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that the purported purpose of amnesty in these considerations was as a means of access to
information.

96

In Graeme Simpson’s submission on the proposed legislation for

amnesty/indemnity and the TRC, he identifies that the Goldstone Commission:
stimulated debate over the merits of a general amnesty, resulting from the
Commission’s call for such an arrangement in order to better facilitate its task of
gathering information on the activities of the SADF, the SAP, and the Kwazulu
police, as well as the military wings of the ANC and the PAC. Albeit on different
grounds, the issue of indemnity or amnesty was once again linked to the concern
97
for the disclosure of information relating to (political) criminal acts.
As early as 1992, a periodical reflects that Goldstone “calls for an amnesty to enable him
to investigate fully the activities of the SADF, the SAP, the KwaZulu Police and the
military wings of the ANC and the PAC, in response to the UN recommendations on
98

violence.”

Notably, this report reads: “Judge Goldstone makes his commission available

to assist political parties in working out the details of any amnesty that would lead to full
disclosure, combat violence and start the process of reconciliation.”

99

This already hints

at the idea of amnesty for information. Mallinder suggests that “this appears to be the first
occasion where an individualised process in which amnesty was offered in exchange for
truth was suggested in South Africa, although at this moment it was suggested to deal with
ongoing violence rather than crimes of the past.”

100

However, media coverage of the Harms

96

Berat and Shain, "Retribution or Truth-Telling," 176. See also, Mallinder, "Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon
and Prosecution Guidelines in South Africa," 32.
97

Graeme Simpson, “Proposed Legislation on Amnesty/Indemnity and the establishment of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.” Submission to the Minister of Justice, Mr Dullah Omar MP, June 1994,
https://www.csvr.org.za/publications/1718-proposed-legislation-on-amnestyindemnity-and-theestablishment-of-a-truth-and-reconciliation-commission.
98

South African Conflict Monitor, August to November 1992, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University
of Natal, 5. NMAP 2015/52 , GCI file 139, Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, Johannesburg, South
Africa.
99

Ibid., 5.

100

Mallinder, "Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution Guidelines in South Africa," 32.

259

Commission also identified the inability to offer amnesty as a hindrance to witness
101

participation for fear of self-incrimination.

Undoubtedly, the credibility of the Goldstone

Commission’s operation as discussed in Chapter 7 increased the legitimacy of the
discussion with the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation.
The fourth interim report of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation, at the end of 1993, marks another turning point in the amnesty
debate. This report revealed evidence that the Commission had uncovered on a hit squad
operating in the KwaZulu Police (KZP) Force. The evidence pointed to the connection
102

between the SAP, the KZP, and the hit-squad allegations.

Under the transitional administration structures, the Transitional Executive Council
(TEC) established a Task Force to investigate the hit squad allegations. Within this task
force, a further request for an amnesty in exchange for information is identified. The
Preliminary Report of the TEC Investigation Task Group, released in December 1993,
states that a request was made to the TEC “that a provision be made for the indemnification
of witnesses or informants where the information supplied would lead to a reduction in hit
squad activities but would expose the informant to a criminal prosecution.”

103

However,

periodical reports in February 1994 illustrate that the decision had yet to be made:
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The TEC says it will consider granting indemnity to people who are prepared to give
evidence on alleged hit squads in the KwaZulu Police. The matter will be discussed
with the Goldstone Commission and the task group appointed by the TEC is
104
preparing a report on the alleged hit squads.
There was no agreement on amnesty, despite the recommendation, and having few, if any,
other means to facilitate participation by those who would have been able to advance the
105

investigations.

This is also particularly interesting, because the Interim Constitution had

been published in the Government Gazette at the end of January in 1994.

106

This suggests

that the agreement was secured and the prospects of the amnesty after the transition, while
not outlined in detail, were protected. As du Toit points out, “when the amnesty issue
resurfaced, as in Justice Goldstone’s revelation to President De Klerk of high level SA
Security Police involvement in ‘Third Force’ operations in February 1994, no reference
was made to the possible relevance of the amnesty agreement.”

107

The purpose here is not

to explain why the agreement did not emerge. Rather, the focus is on the change that the
institution of amnesty itself underwent. These considerations at the Goldstone Commission
are important in tracing the conversion within the institution. As Terris articulates, “for the
moment, then, Goldstone’s August 1992 suggestion went nowhere. Three years later,
however, amnesty would return as a major feature of South Africa’s Truth and

104

South Africa Conflict Monitor: February/March 1994, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of
Natal, 4. NMAP 2015/52, GCI, Box 36, Folder 139, 02526, Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory,
Johannesburg, South Africa.
105

“Preliminary Report of the TEC Task Group.”

106

du Toit, "A Need for ‘Truth’: Amnesty and the Origins and Consequences of the TRC Process," 415.

107

Ibid., 415.

261

Reconciliation Commission.”

108

An analysis into the political environment helps to

theoretically situate the emergence of the changing potential goals for amnesty.
The requests for amnesty/indemnity by the institutions investigating the state’s
involvement in hit squads emerged during the constitutional negotiations, after the earlier
indemnity processes had been established. The discontent with the Further Indemnity Act,
1992 and a seeming hesitancy towards further amnesties suggests that the context of the
request helps to explain the lack of institutional deployment. In particular, the deployment
of information-gathering amnesties needs to be understood in the context of contentious
negotiations and transitional administrative structures (through the Transitional Executive
Council). Although information-gathering had been a substantial justification for amnesty
in the TRC’s truth-seeking process, and despite the credibility that the Goldstone
Commission had developed, the eventual deployment of amnesty to facilitate information
gathering rested on the legitimacy of the post-transitional environment.
Whereas the Government, with the support of negotiating parties, established the
Goldstone Commission to investigate and report on the causes of violence in the hopes of
curbing it, the democratically elected government established the TRC with the goals of
promoting “national unity and reconciliation.”

109

However, it was the Goldstone

Commission’s focus on ongoing violence that is used to justify the value of the
indemnity/amnesty. As the 1993 preliminary Task Force posited:
It has become evident that persons who have been implicated in such activity are
willing to provide evidence to the Task Group and/or to the Goldstone Commission
and that such information would lead to the prosecution and exposure of persons who
co-ordinate these activities in Natal… It should be stressed that this measure, which
108
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is envisaged will be a highly selective indemnification process, would strengthen all
those mechanisms currently charged with the task of preventing violence and
110
intimidation such as the Goldstone Commission.
With this framing, the decision not to adopt these measures is important because it suggests
that the application of a contentious tool of information gathering, at a time fairly close to
the election, could not necessarily be agreed upon by the multi-party TEC. The Interim
Constitution had not yet taken effect, meaning that the Postamble in the Interim
111

Constitution that contained the amnesty provisions was not yet in force.

In this context, the potential for parties to block change can be characterized as ‘high’
112

since the TEC operated based on relative consensus.

Furthermore, as discussed further

below, amnesty has been identified as a ‘deal-breaker’ in the transitional negotiations. The
persistence of disagreement about the issue and its inclusion very late in the process
demonstrates the difficulty in reaching agreement about it. In this way, the change in
environment and institutional parameters after the transition facilitated the eventual change
in the deployment of amnesty and its associated goals. But, the Goldstone Commission
arguably also influenced another dimension of these parameters in terms of the recognition
of the potential benefit of using amnesty in this way.
The discussions by the Goldstone Commission and the reports of the Goldstone
Commission influenced the environment in another way. The information uncovered by
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the Goldstone Commission demonstrated the need for further investigation. Goldstone
writes, for example, “it is generally accepted that the revelations of the Goldstone
Commission, particularly those implicating the South African Police and the military, made
it more difficult for de Klerk to resist the ANC demand for some form of accounting.”

113

These investigations reiterated that there was information to glean from the state’s security
forces.

114

The credibility of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public

Violence and Intimidation connects here too, for impartial investigations could be used to
justify further information-gathering or truth-seeking measures.
The agreement to amnesty, established in the Interim Constitution of 1993,
necessitated some structure for its facilitation after the transition. The TRC, which had been
under discussion in civil society for several years, became that tool. During the tenure of
the Goldstone Commission, however, the political conditions were not conducive to further
institutional change as they had been after the transition. The Commission of Inquiry for
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation recognized the need and potential value
of amnesty-in-exchange-for information given the information that it uncovered. The
conditions were more conducive to change after the election with the Government of
National Unity after agreement to the amnesty clause in the Interim Constitution. The
institution of indemnity/amnesty persisted throughout the 1990s, albeit with different
goals. After the election, the conditions were favourable to change once more, and the final
outcome of the conversion process is evident.
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As du Toit reminds readers, the ANC’s position since 1992 had been that an amnesty
could not be considered except by a democratically elected government.

115

Veto points

were thus lower after the election, as transitional interests were more stable given the
entrenchment of some measure of amnesty in the Interim Constitution. The inclusion of
amnesty in the Interim Constitution meant that the deliberations about the institution
moved away from if it would be secured to considerations of how it would be enacted.
These dynamics opened the space for what Thelen calls “political renegotiations” about
116

the institution itself given the political changes.

Considering the eventual re-deployment

of amnesty through the TRC, the deliberations and investigations of the Goldstone
Commission are important precursory elements in tracing the shift in the institutions’
purpose.
It is important to consider that the relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘amnesty’ had
been ongoing during the negotiations. du Toit outlines the general trajectory of the
discussion arguing that the value of truth and information was used as a counterpoint to the
provision of general or blanket amnesties but also recognized as potentially coterminous
117

features of the transition.

He also suggests that there was a disconnect between the

ongoing public debate about truth and amnesty and the private discussions of the
constitutional negotiations.
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9.4

The Amnesty Process and the South African TRC

The inclusion of amnesty in the Interim Constitution stemmed from state-security forces’
119

threats of destabilization in light of potential prosecution.

The amnesty component of

the negotiations threatened to prevent an agreement to the Interim Constitution until the
very end; the amnesty agreement was added to the Interim Constitution as a postamble.

120

The inclusion of the amnesty clause in the interim constitution, on which the TRC mandate
based the approach to amnesty, was intended in part to “ensure that security forces would
protect the result of the first democratic election and the black majority rule government
against possible right-wing or security force attempts to overthrow it.”

121

Thus, while the

rationale for the amnesty arrangement continued the negotiated bargain, the mechanism
through which this 1993 agreement was later to be facilitated demonstrated a shift in the
justification for amnesty. Paul van Zyl characterizes the TRC as “an attempt to restore
moral equilibrium to the amnesty process.”
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Tying amnesty to questions of justice and

truth-seeking once again shifted the institution’s purpose.
The TRC became the vehicle for amnesty after the 1994 election in South Africa.
The decision to adopt a truth commission reflected the earlier negotiations.
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The

provision to grant amnesty in the mandate of the TRC is one of the unique features of the
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South African process. Particularly, the notion of a conditional amnesty, and not a blanket
amnesty, required the development of processes and protocols to facilitate applications,
124

disclosures, and decisions in order to determine who would be granted amnesty.

The

“conditionality” of the amnesty, that is the provision of amnesty when the criteria of
sufficient disclosure for crimes of a political nature was met, was a means through which
125

amnesty could be individualized.

This individualizing attempted to structure a non-

blanket approach to amnesty.
In light of the compromise on amnesty, amnesty itself is framed as a measure to
achieve the objectives of the bill establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
specifically “to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which
transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.”

126

With respect to amnesty, a specific

function of the commission was to:
facilitate and promote the granting of amnesty in respect of acts associated with
political objectives, by receiving from persons desiring to make a full disclosure of
all the relevant facts relating to such acts, applications for the granting of amnesty in
respect of such acts, and transmitting such applications to the Committee on Amnesty
127
for its decision, and by publishing decisions granting amnesty, in the Gazette;
The Amnesty committee was established to facilitate these provisions. The Amnesty
committee, one of three operational committees of the TRC, worked between 1996 and
2001.
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The Amnesty committee was initially composed of a chairperson, vice

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Six, Section 1, Chapter 5, page

83.
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 1, page 7.
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chairperson and three representative South African citizens.

129

However, two amendments

to the Act increased the number of personnel resulting, in 1997, in a 19-member committee
130

that included judges, advocates, and attorneys.

Individuals could apply for amnesty for crimes of a political nature that were
131

committed between March 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994.

The TRC required individuals to

apply for amnesty, self-initiating the testimony, rather than just receiving amnesty in
exchange for testimony.

132

Chapter 4 of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act,

“Amnesty Mechanisms and Procedures” specified the criteria for determining whether an
133

act was of a political nature.

The amnesty process required applicants to submit an

application, after which the committee would determine whether it met the basic
requirements for consideration (in accordance with the specified criteria). Applications
were separated based on the type of crimes under consideration, and applications dealing
134

with “gross violations of human rights” had to be heard in public.

The Amnesty

Committee reviewed individual applications to ensure that the criteria for amnesty were
met. 1,167 people were granted amnesty, and 145 were granted partial amnesty. In total
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7,116 amnesty applications were submitted.

Only about 2,500 of the 7,000 applications

submitted met the criteria for crimes of a political nature.

136

Significant scholarly attention has been focused on the uniqueness of a truth
commission being given the power to grant amnesty. It was the first time that this type of
137

arrangement had been formalized within a truth commission process.

Assessments and

critiques of the amnesty process in South Africa are numerous, and this type of evaluation
138

will not be reiterated here because of the thematic breadth of these inquiries.

The

purpose of the analysis here however is how amnesty itself underwent a conversion process
through its inclusion in the TRC. The change in amnesty’s purpose is evident by comparing
the earlier indemnity processes with the expectations of amnesty’s deployment at the TRC.
The discussions that preceded (and accompanied) the establishment of the TRC
legislation focused on the value of the ‘truth’ in the transitional period. This discussion ties
into amnesty’s re-framing. In his opening speech to the “Healing the Past Conference,”
Minister of Justice Dullah Omar stated that human rights violations “should be
139

investigated, recorded and made known.”
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In outlining the proposed provisions for the
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TRC, he states that “a pre-condition for indemnity or amnesty is full disclosure.”

140

The

TRC Report highlights the professed value of the exchange of truth for amnesty, suggesting
that the “individual amnesty has demonstrated its value… freedom was granted in
exchange for truth. We have, through these means, been able to uncover much of what
141

happened in the past.”

The value of amnesty in exchange for information emerged as
142

part of the justification for the amnesty inclusion in the Postamble.

The TRC Report highlights the instrumentality of amnesty in pursuit of truth. The
Report states that “the amnesty process was also key to the achievement of another
objective, namely eliciting as much truth as possible about past atrocities.”

143

The revised

justification for amnesty was complex. The narrative that emerged from the TRC’s
operation focused on the value of amnesty for information gathering purposes, although
this was a political enactment of the previous agreement in the interim constitution. The
narrative of the value of truth and information thus supplanted the context of the bargain.
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As du Toit argues the necessity of ‘truth’ in the context of the transition appeared prior to
145

the eventual establishment of the truth commission.

In 1992, for instance the ANC’s
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response to its own internal inquiry highlighted the potential value in a truth commission
that included the state.

146

That the institution of amnesty became entwined with the idea and value of truth
helps to highlight the shift in the institutional deployment of amnesty. This redeployment
illustrates the final goal that amnesty was used for in the time period under investigation in
this project. With weak veto possibilities under the Government of National Unity, and
with the amnesty secured, tying amnesty to information offered a middle path in the
aftermath of the transition. Simpson recognizes that the presence of the parties previously
in conflict within the government of national unity is important in understanding the
emergence of the TRC.

147

The Interim Constitution and the Government of National Unity

that followed were guided by continued consensus-based decision-making.

148

Furthermore, despite the recognition of the amnesty agreement, there was relative
ambiguity in the Interim Constitution about how the process would be carried out. To
revisit the language, the Postamble stipulated that Parliament would address the means
through which amnesty would be deployed: “providing for the mechanisms, criteria and
procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at
any time after the law has been passed.”149 This meant that the democratically elected
government would be responsible for determining what the process, if any, would look
like. This can be considered, as outlined by Mahoney and Thelen, “a high level of discretion
146
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in interpretation/enforcement.”

150

Conversion in the long-standing institution of amnesty

can be explained by the environment in which the truth commission was established and
the relative ambiguity in the process to facilitate and justify amnesty.

9.5

Effects on Truth-seeking at The TRC

The effect of the earlier indemnity processes and the secrecy clauses had longer term
impacts on the available information about those political crimes that had been committed
in the past. This section discusses the tensions that resulted from indemnity/amnesty’s
gradual change over time, particularly because the earlier institutional deployments were
used to prevent information and investigation. When the institution was redeployed as a
mechanism of information-gathering, the information gleaned was constrained by the
earlier institutional goals. While changes to the procedural elements of amnesty in the TRC
addressed some of the procedural shortcomings of earlier indemnity schemes, they were
not able to redress the legacy of secrecy. Access to information about the past was limited,
at least in part, by the earlier indemnity decisions and the access to information of state
records.
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This tension in procedural adjustment and the legacy of past decisions also highlights
the significant degree of transformation in the institution’s deployment. Here, components
of change are seen in the effort to transform processes from the earlier indemnity
committees and the later TRC provisions on issues of transparency, public information
about the process, and information about the associated political crimes. The committee
150
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responsible for amnesty in the TRC was more transparent in its decisions, aided by the
public nature of proceedings (except when the Committee deemed it necessary for hearings
152

to be held in private) and the necessary publication of amnesty decisions.

As the

Amnesty Committee report stipulates:
Where amnesty was granted, the Committee informed the applicant and the victim
of the decision and also, by proclamation in the Government Gazette, published the
full details of the person concerned as well as the specific act, offence or omission in
153
respect of which amnesty was granted.
Rather than the secrecy and limited details of the previous investigations, the TRC made
efforts to ensure that the public had information about the crimes for which it granted
amnesty. This is significant in light of the value placed on information in exchange for
amnesty.
One example of institutional efforts to increase information gathering was the
creation of the investigation unit, operating with the Human Rights Committee and the
Amnesty Committee. It has been characterized as a central component of the commission’s
154

work,

155

though the capacity to conduct thorough investigations has been criticized.

The

intention behind such investigations was to gather more information about particular events
under consideration by the TRC, including corroborating information in statements and
156

public hearings, and investigating details for amnesty applications.

There was, however,
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a counterpoint to the emergent information from the structure of this process. As du BoisPedain identifies, investigations were only conducted into those amnesty applications that
met the criteria upon initial review. As such, those applications for which amnesty was
denied categorically, were not used as a source to identify further information “for truth157

related purposes alone.”

However, efforts to corroborate amnesty decisions went beyond
158

the previous indemnity legislation, despite limitations in process.

The earlier process also meant engagement challenges. A significant component
that demonstrates the change between the earlier indemnity processes and the amnesty at
the TRC is the recognition that those who benefitted from the earlier indemnity provisions
had little incentive to participate in the TRC. An influential element identified by du BoisPedain and Sarkin is that earlier decisions about indemnities limited the pursuit of truth
through the conditional amnesties as envisioned by the TRC process.
Sarkin identifies that the earlier processes of indemnity altered the “amount of truth”
159

that emerged through the amnesty process.

Framing the analysis this way, Sarkin points

out that the expectation of information in exchange for truth was limited by the fact that
many people who could have contributed information to the historical record did not have
reason to participate in the amnesty process because their records (and sentences) had
already been addressed.
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du Bois-Pedain suggests, somewhat differently, that those who

had not been tried or convicted for “gross human rights violations as defined in the TRC
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Act” still ‘had to approach the Commission to receive indemnity from criminal civil
161

liability.”

Sarkin also identifies that ten people who had been granted indemnity earlier

sought amnesty through the TRC because those who had been indemnified either did not
know the parameters of the indemnity or because they sought to have the conviction for
162

which earlier indemnity had been granted expunged.

This number is significant in

relation to the total number of people who might not have applied for amnesty at the TRC
because of earlier indemnities.
The number of people who benefitted from the earlier indemnity process and early
release is difficult to identify, but a 1995 report suggests approximately 14 000 people
applied for indemnity under the 1990 and 1992 Acts, and just over 10 000 applications
163

were successful.

Sarkin contends that “the effect of indemnities on the amnesty process
164

must have been dramatic. Unfortunately, the extent of this will never be known.”

While the TRC was envisioned as a means through which information could be
gathered in exchange for amnesty, the actual reach of the process was somewhat limited,
despite adjustments in the design of the process in light of earlier experiences. The change
to the practice is evident in both the mechanics of the institution’s deployment and the
purpose. The process through which the TRC Amnesty Committee deliberated upon, and
granted amnesty, was far more transparent than the earlier indemnity processes. The reason
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for this change was the transformation of indemnity and amnesty from a state protection
mechanism, to a negotiating arrangement, and finally to an information-gathering
mechanism.
While the amnesty dimension of the TRC is often presented as one of the exceptional
features of the transition, as du Bois-Pedain and Sarkin illustrate, it also provides an
example of how earlier institutions and decisions impacted the truth-seeking and amnesty
165

processes.

Building upon this recognition, this chapter has argued that the institution of

amnesty itself underwent a process of gradual institutional change during early 1990s.
Tracing these influences provides an example of institutional conversion through the
transition. This analysis does not address the debate on the capacity or performance of the
South African TRC’s handling of amnesty. Rather, the focus is on the conversion process
within the institution of amnesty.

Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the process of conversion, as a mode of gradual institutional
change, helps to explain the persistence of the institution of amnesty and the change it
underwent in order to be used as a tool of information-gathering at the TRC. The chapter
recognized the roots of indemnity legislation in the Apartheid regime as a tool of social
order. It then traced the use of indemnities through the political negotiations to maintain
the transitional negotiations through to the TRC. Finally, the chapter argues that the goal
of amnesty changed again with respect to information gathering. As such, amnesty was
used for at least three different goals within the time period under consideration: public
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order, bargaining, and information gathering. The persistence of the institution of amnesty
through the transitional environment is explained by its gradual change. The uncertain
political environment and incorporation of different political preferences after the initiation
of the transition in 1990 created conditions through which the use of amnesty was
renegotiated and deployed.
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Chapter 10

10 Conclusion
The dissertation answers two related questions. First, what role, if any, did earlier
investigative institutions play in shaping South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC)? This dissertation argued that the TRC was influenced by the
development and operation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation. This commission of inquiry, also known as the Goldstone
Commission, transformed institutional elements of information gathering that had been
used by the repressive Apartheid regime. Second, the dissertation answered the question,
what were the Goldstone Commission’s contributing institutional developments, and how
do we characterize these contributions? I have argued that the Commission of Inquiry for
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation contributed to the institutionalization
of truth-seeking in South Africa. The operation of the Goldstone Commission illustrates
gradual institutional change in institutional modalities used for information gathering
purposes. These institutional changes help to explain the institutional foundations of the
TRC. Focusing on three institutional modalities of information gathering, I trace the role
that the Goldstone Commission played in the gradual institutional change toward stronger
truth-seeking measures.
To answer these questions. I have presented an argument in several steps. First, I
outlined the conceptual and institutional challenge of the shared institutional structure of
commissions of inquiries and truth commissions. I have pointed to the tension that when
redressing legacies of abuse and past harm, states may have to rely on institutional
structures that were used to perpetuate harm, even in times of transition. In the South
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African case, several of the institutional features of the TRC had also been used during
Apartheid to maintain the Apartheid system. I have explored this tension in relation to the
persistence of institutional frameworks including the commission of inquiry, witness
protection, and amnesty that had been used by the Apartheid system.
Second, I argue that the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation did not fall into the same pattern of earlier commissions of
inquiry that served Government interests and power relations. The founding parameters of
this institution made possible gradual changes in relatively entrenched institutional
systems. The Goldstone Commission’s establishment, during the negotiating period,
acknowledged and attempted to rectify the constraints of the previous institutions and this
had a lasting impact. I have argued that the adjustments made by the operation of the
Goldstone Commission laid a valuable foundation for the South African TRC.
Third, I have demonstrated the ways that the Goldstone Commission redressed
some of the legacies of the Apartheid investigations in a way that facilitated its own
credible investigations and also created favourable conditions to establish later truthseeking efforts in the form of the TRC. To develop this part of the argument, I analyzed
two other information-gathering institutions implicated in gradual institutional change:
witness protection and amnesty. I argued that each of these institutional modalities
underwent changes that can be explained as processes of conversion. These changes were
enabled, in part, by the Goldstone Commission’s operations. The Goldstone Commission
garnered credibility due to the consensus in its establishment and its impartial
investigations. As a result of the built-in provisions for adjustment in its founding
legislation, there was space for the Commission to respond to emergent needs.
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The Commission recognized the inadequacy of existing witness protection
measures during its operations. The development of witness protection measures within
the Goldstone Commission itself demonstrates incremental adjustment in the institution of
the commission of inquiry based on the limitations of the state-provided structure. Using
the provisions of the Goldstone Commission, the Commission incorporated witness
protection within its structures. This strengthened the information-gathering capacities.
Similar witness protection measures were later used by the TRC. Inclusion in the TRC
mandate suggests a recognition of the value of this institutional adjustment even after the
transition.
Tracing the case of amnesty, I argued that although the institution persisted in its
use during Apartheid and the negotiations, it was not used for the same purpose throughout.
I have argued that despite not being used by the Goldstone Commission,
indemnity/amnesty is still a valuable illustration of how earlier institutional features
underwent gradual change to be used for information gathering. Whereas amnesty had been
used to protect state actors under Apartheid, it transformed during the period under
consideration to a negotiating tool and then to an information-gathering mechanism.
Although amnesty underwent a significant process of conversion toward information
gathering and this was used in a novel way by the TRC, the earlier deployment of the
institution had lasting impacts on its application.
The process of conversion is evident in each of these institutional modalities. The
institutions persisted but the transitional environment provided the opportunity for changes
in their application as the transition unfolded. Significantly, undergoing a process of
incremental institutional change impacted the truth-seeking mechanisms that followed.
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This analysis points to the importance of considering institutional histories in
understanding truth commissions established in transitional periods.

10.1

Contribution

The thesis has argued that understanding the design and operation of the South African
TRC cannot be easily extricated from earlier state-led investigations. The TRC can be
better understood in light of its predecessor investigations, even if the earlier was not
intended as a precursor. Read in this vein, this thesis has argued that part of the reason the
TRC was able to be deployed as it was derived from the important work that was
undertaken by a precursor institution, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of
Public Violence and Intimidation. This thesis has offered a novel investigation of the
lineage of the TRC using historical institutionalism. When analyzed using a framework of
path dependence and theories of gradual change as has I have done in this project, it is
possible to trace how institutional modalities changed over the course of the 1990-1995
period, despite persistent institutional frameworks. The evidence presented here suggests
an important informative influence in addressing credibility challenges, modifying
institutional design limitations, and changing goals of institutional practice.
This dissertation is not arguing that ‘miniaturized’ or ‘quasi’ truth-seeking measures
necessarily have to precede transitional justice measures. Rather, its innovation is that it
argues that the experience afforded by a previous regime may warrant further attention in
the design and implementation of truth-seeking measures. The conditions alter these
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potentials. The case has been made through this dissertation that in the South African case
particularly, the governance of truth-seeking after transition and upheaval likely benefited
from the incremental adjustment of institutionalized truth-seeking that was made possible,
in part, by the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation’s mandate and emergence as a negotiated component for constitutional talks.
The conditions under which such adjustments are possible, or the particulars of the
adjustments themselves, warrant consideration in further research.
This dissertation did not argue that the implementation of the TRC depended on the
Goldstone Commission, rather it has argued that the credible operation of the Goldstone
Commission had important effects on the institutional development of the TRC. This
dissertation has interrogated how existing institutions, re-tooled, may facilitate information
gathering. In the South African case, the Goldstone Commission can be made sense of
through a framework of gradual institutional change because of the history of the
commission of inquiry in South Africa, the influence of the negotiation period on the
Commission’s design, and the operation of the Commission itself.

An important

contribution of this dissertation is the recognition that the persistence of institutional
structures plays an important role in how transitional justice institutions are implemented.
Further, the possibility that it may be these very institutions that are redeployed for truthseeking, as transitional justice measures, gives insight into what measures can be taken in
the building and design of transitional justice institutions to mitigate reversion or continuity
of the status-quo.

1
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There is significance in the recognition that truth-seeking measures may be influenced
by a process of gradual institutional change. It highlights that the existing institutional
structures are difficult to remove. The path dependent nature of certain institutional features
may both constrain and enable transitional justice. In addition, in South Africa even in
contentious and uncertain periods, there was the potential for meaningful change within
the confines of the old regime. Once this gradual change was initiated, it affected longerterm truth-seeking. This potential for change is relevant for settler-colonial societies or
other post-colonial societies that grapple with questions of justice and redress in
institutionally entrenched political systems.
This project also makes a contribution in its empirical and theoretical evaluation of the
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. This
investigative body played an important role in the transitions and negotiations and has been
under-assessed. As Fanie du Toit points out, the relative smoothness of the elections and
aftermath in the TRC has supplanted attention from developments in the peace negotiations
2

and the National Peace Accord. This Commission offers important insights into the value
of violence investigations that may not be included within the transitional justice lexicon.

10.2

Findings and the literature

The findings speak to the existing literature on truth commissions in several ways. This
project engages with the literature on the design and implementation of truth commission
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International Political Science Review 38, no. 2 (2017): 173.
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processes and attempts to discern best practice. Scholars have focused important attention
4

on the applicability of transitional justice mechanisms to local needs. It participates in the
conversation with respect to how specific institutional modalities may apply in certain
contexts and suggests that their successful inclusion may depend on how they have been
used historically. It also contributes another empirical entry point into the “evolutionary”
5

dimensions that Beattie recognizes in the development of truth commissions. Where
Beattie focuses on the development of successive iterations of the truth-seeking process
after the transition in Germany, this project suggests there is also value in exploring the
relationship between successive investigations even before transition. This research also
contributes to the conversation on the conceptualization of truth commissions. There is still
important discussion on the definition and the idea of the truth commission itself. By taking
as the outcome of interest the South African TRC and suggesting that an earlier
commission of inquiry played an important role in structuring the truth commission, this
dissertation speaks to the conceptual challenge of truth commissions and their treatment
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within and outside the field of transitional justice. This is important because, if, on the one
hand, truth commissions are treated as isolated measures of transitional justice, separate
from their institutional predecessors, there is the potential to miss the underlying
constraints associated with being a certain type of commission of inquiry. On the other
hand, without taking into account earlier investigations, other attempts at truth-seeking may
be overlooked, despite their potential value.
The early work that informs much of the field’s understanding of truth commissions
is based on institutional structures that were called commissions of inquiry; a clearer
nominal distinction emerged around the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.7 This distinction between the commission of inquiry and the truth
commission matters for how we understand each of these mechanisms. Where Stanton sees
the potential for a ‘social’ process to emerge from both of these measures, the consensus
that there is or ought to be a symbolic divergence for particular commissions to fit under
the banner of transitional justice warrants further clarification.8 Conceptually, the
dissertation’s tracing of the definitional components between the two institutions, the
commission of inquiry and the truth commission, highlights the difficulty in making clear
distinctions between the two, but such a distinction is necessary. This tension is not fully
resolved in the dissertation but the interrogation of the concepts suggests that there may be
a temporal element to the discussion; when the truth commission emerged and solidified

6

Eric Brahm, "What is a Truth Commission and Why Does it Matter?," Peace & Conflict Review 3, no. 2
(2009): 1-14; Dancy, Kim, and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, "The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission
Experimentation," 45-64; Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, 40-69.
7

Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 256-262.
8

Kim Pamela Stanton, "Truth Commissions and Public Inquiries: Addressing Historical Injustices in
Established Democracies" (Doctor of Juridical Science University of Toronto, 2010).

285

itself (or was solidified) as a symbolic project of redress, its institutional lineage became
overshadowed by the demands placed upon it. Here, the dissertation helps to articulate the
value in continuing to interrogate the lineage of state-led investigations.
Sitze’s concluding reflections that the field of transitional justice perpetuates
“necessary silence” on issues that are difficult to reconcile with the theorized values of
9

transitional justice also bear further consideration by the field. There is not space in a
project of this kind to take on this issue in its entirety. However, the continuation of the
colonial-state apparatus, or at the very least, the redeployment of similar such processes
opens up several lines of questioning, which this dissertation addresses in a small part.
The field, in its emergence, needed to specify the nature of individual transitional justice
mechanisms and theorize the justification for particular transitional justice mechanisms.

10

This research participates in the shift away from the normative implications of the field
towards the use of existing frameworks in other subfields to better understand the
mechanics of the design, implementation and operation of truth-seeking measures.
The analysis of the limitations imposed on the transition and the TRC through the
operation of earlier investigatory bodies and the potential mediating effects thereof
necessitates an acknowledgment of the continuity of institutions. In addition, delving
further into questions of lineage and design raises additional points for investigation to

9

Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 251.
10

Arthur discusses the early discussions about the value of each mechanism, see Paige Arthur, "How
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice," Human Rights
Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 321-367. Kritz outlines the specific mechanisms in Kritz, Transitional Justice:
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. See also, Hayner’s early exploration of truth
commissions, for example, Priscilla B. Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions —1974 to 1994: A
Comparative Study," Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 597-655.
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determine how the decisions made during the transitional period evolved over time. This
type of analysis is also important for the debates on how transitional justice mechanisms
map onto varied contexts. This research speaks to the idea of context specificity by
demonstrating the value of domestic gradual institutional change on the institutionalization
of practices associated with transitional justice.
Accounting for earlier investigative processes may be a way to assess how elements
like political will are demonstrated prior to the establishment of a truth commission. Efforts
to define and measure political will and transitional justice are emerging in the transitional
justice literature.

11

The research presented in this dissertation illustrates that the adoption

of an earlier investigation, furnished with a broad mandate and resources enabled an
acknowledgement of violence prior to the transition and the truth commission that
followed. Engaging with the concept of political will as it pertains to truth-seeking and
truth commissions prior to, or without, a transition, may be helpful in assessing truth
commission processes in situations where a transition has not been attempted or has not
been achieved.

12

This is particularly relevant for settler-colonial states grappling with

redress where institutional structures often remain unchanged.

13

The dissertation also makes an empirical contribution to the literature on
institutional continuity and change. The analysis offers some insight into the continuity of

11
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structures, despite, or because of, their repressive capabilities. While the continuity of the
structures of the commission of inquiry and truth commissions has been acknowledged and
investigated, the focus has tended to be on elements of continuity in these structures. Sitze,
for instance traces the persistence of both the commission of inquiry and the institution of
indemnity and highlights their continued use without sufficient change to address the needs
14

of justice.

In a similar vein, du Toit queries whether there has been sufficient change in
15

state-led investigations in South Africa because of the amnesty agreement.

However,

exploring the process as one of gradual institutional change highlights the innovations
within the institutions during the period under consideration and illuminates different
degrees of transformation.

10.3

Implications

A central implication of this work is a further caution that truth-seeking implements ought
not be transplanted from one society to the next. While the process of truth-seeking and the
use of truth commissions in particular has garnered normative favour, insufficient attention
has been paid to how the truth commission itself can be established. The bureaucratic and
institutional components that the TRC in South Africa needed in order to operate were
significant. The actual investigatory modalities that emerged were themselves influenced
by both the structures that preceded them and the operation of the Commission of Inquiry
for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. This calls into question the
centrality of the South African case as the ‘model’ on which truth commissions are based.

14
15

Sitze, The Impossible Machine.

André du Toit, "A Need for ‘Truth’: Amnesty and the Origins and Consequences of the TRC Process,"
International Journal of Public Theology 8 (2014): 393-419.
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The South African TRC may not be replicable without recognition of the institutional
developments that preceded it.
This project has identified a specific set of conditions that facilitated the credible
operation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation, which in turn had an important influence on the TRC. The adjustments that
occurred between the institutions were based on environmental features, particularly the
transition negotiation setting, and leadership. However, the governance legacies that
necessitated institutional change in information-gathering practices must be taken into
account. More broadly, the implication is that the institutional design of truth commission
processes is contending with internal and external pressures and constraints. This is not to
suggest that witness protection programmes, for example, should not be part of other truth
commissions. If witnesses cannot be protected, either by existing laws or through a formal
truth commission, critical questions ought to be raised about the viability of a truth
commission project under such conditions.
In this way, the study undertaken here demonstrates one way that context informs
transitional justice efforts. It does so through its explanatory contribution on the
institutionalization of truth-seeking practice; separating the normative value of truthseeking or restorative justice from the potential implications of the context itself on
structuring and mediating the truth-seeking process. A further implication is the
recognition that important information gathering can take place before formal transitional
justice mechanisms are implemented. This has been recognized with respect to the

289

literature on “unofficial truth projects”, but also has impacts on state-led investigations.

16

Context is important in understanding the conditions under which such informationgathering practice perpetuates the status-quo or whether and how such practices might be
valuable for later truth-seeking efforts.
In terms of truth commission evaluation, this dissertation offers a different framing
that may help to better understand factors that contribute to the strength or weakness of
17

truth commissions.

From a theoretical perspective, it suggests that institutional features

that affect how truth commissions are designed and operate may be rooted further back in
time and institutions. Although criteria for more successful truth commissions and factors
affecting legitimacy are developing in the field, these elements may also be implicated by
18

previous experience with similar institutions.

From an evaluation standpoint, this

necessitates an assessment of limitations in the design and operation of truth commissions
to explain success or failure.

19

From a practical perspective, if more attention is given to

the possibility that factors that affect truth-seeking processes are rooted in past institutions

16
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and experiences, then there is an increased prospect for making necessary adjustments to
truth commissions based on these experiences. In practice, the operation of earlier
investigations themselves may provide insight into how truth-seeking processes may be
carried out, enabling those responsible for implementation to adjust elements like design
or timing.

10.4

Future research

There are a number of elements that would benefit from further research as a result of this
dissertation. The institutional focus on the Goldstone Commission in this project narrowed
the scope. Expanding assessments of the Goldstone Commission and the democratic
transition from other theoretical perspectives will further understandings of both this
specific commission of inquiry and the patterns of establishing commissions of inquiry
during contentious periods.
One important next step is to evaluate how this process of institutionalization plays
out in other cases and different conditions. This includes other countries engaged in
transitional truth-seeking processes but also other mechanics of institutionalization, such
as the influence of external actors. The process of institutionalization discussed in this
dissertation is domestic. It also occurred prior to the entrenchment of the transnational
network of transitional justice scholars and practitioners.

20

How the institutionalization of

truth-seeking is affected by efforts facilitated or accompanied by international pressures is
an important line of inquiry. It is important because of the adoption of parallel transitional

20
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justice mechanisms, and the influence of the advocacy for transitional justice efforts in
states with varied levels of institutional capacity.
A related line of reasoning that warrants further consideration is how truth-seeking
is institutionalized over longer periods of time and the impact of transitional justice
mechanisms on this institutionalization. Access to information is a rather understudied
element or potential output of truth-seeking processes. Whether and how freedom of
information or access to information laws and implementation are impacted by truth
commission processes may be a useful indicator that can be used to evaluate the longerterm institutionalization of truth-seeking measures.
Finally, a dimension that has not been covered in the dissertation is an exploration
of how earlier truth-seeking measures influence the adoption of future transitional justice
mechanisms. This line of research would be particularly insightful to mitigate ‘all or
nothing’ responses to transitional justice implementation. With critiques leveled at ever
broadening mandates, understanding how transitional justice mechanisms may evolve to
include overlooked dimensions in earlier processes, or emergent shortcomings, may be
21

illustrative.

For example, further understanding of the conditions under which narrow

iterations of truth-seeking may be implemented successively may reduce pressures placed
on truth commissions to meet all truth-seeking needs at one time. Such analyses of
22

successive Chilean mechanisms of transitional justice are emerging.

This line of

21
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interrogation is valuable based on the theorized value of truth and assessing the best vehicle
to access information about human rights violations.
***
The Goldstone Commission played a significant role investigating violence during South
Africa’s transition from Apartheid to democracy. Its investigations and reports offered an
impartial assessment of the causes of violence at a time when violence was rampant. On
certain issues, it was the first time information and evidence was made public by an official
source. Its credibility was a testament to its leadership and the environment through which
it navigated its operation. The symbolism and reach of the TRC captured worldwide
attention. The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and
Intimidation has remained somewhat modest. Its operation and contributions to
transformation in South Africa ought not be overlooked because it operated prior to the
democratic elections. Indeed, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public
Violence and Intimidation played an important role in South Africa’s democratic renewal.
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